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Abstract 
 
Research into the impact of government ownership on the financial performance 
and earnings-management of listed companies typically makes the assumption 
that the government is a monolithic entity and fails to consider that government 
ownership rights are usually administered by different types of government 
organisations. This thesis comprises two empirical studies to investigate whether 
the existence of different government investment organizations in Malaysia 
(called government-linked investment companies or GLICs,) which have 
differing objectives and control structures, also have different results in terms of 
performance and earnings-management.  The portfolio companies that GLICs 
manage are known as government-linked companies (GLCs). 
 
The first empirical project explores the impact of GLC ownership structure 
(relating to the different group of GLCs, GLICs ownership concentration in 
GLCs, the existence of golden-share provisions and the presence of senior civil 
servants and of politicians on the boards of directors of GLCs) in terms of 
corporate performance as measured by accounting and market data. Using panel 
data of GLCs listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia between 2004 and 
2008, we provide evidence that in Malaysia the impact of government ownership 
on the financial performance of government-controlled listed companies varies 
depending on the type of organization managing the government’s ownership 
stakes.  
 
In the second empirical project, we investigate the impact of ownership structure 
(ownership types, blockholders and managerial ownership) on earnings-
management practices of listed companies on the Main Board of Bursa 
Malaysia.  This involved 2696 firm-year observations between 2004 and 2008. 
We provide evidence that firms in our sample indeed managed their reported 
earnings upward; firms controlled by private blockholders engage in earnings-
management practices at a higher magnitude than GLCs controlled by 
government blockholders. Between the GLCs, we found no evidence of the 
impact of different GLICs had on GLCs earnings-management practices.   
 
This research is of interest to policy makers such as government, GLICs or 
regulators. In addition, the findings from both empirical projects are of potential 
interest to portfolio investment companies and minority or foreign investors who 
might either benefit from the presence of blockholders or might be exploited by 
their power to pursue self-interested objectives rather than shareholders’ value.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
In emerging economies, government block ownership in listed companies is much 
more prevalent than in developed economies, particularly Anglo-Saxon countries 
(Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000). Emerging economies tend to be characterized 
by a high degree of imperfection in capital, labour and goods markets (Zattoni, 
Pedersen and Kumar, 2009) and a lack of large and sophisticated private institutional 
investors (Ameer, 2010). Malaysia as an emerging economy is no exception in this 
matter; it is a big challenge to compete with other countries in the region to attract 
foreign funds into Malaysian equity markets. Inflow of foreign funds into Malaysian 
equity markets is important for business investment as limited access to external 
funds is frequently identified as one of the keys problems which hamper the 
economic development of emerging economies both at national and firm level 
(Hearn, Piesse and Strange, 2010; Tsoukas, 2011; Fan, Wei and Xu, 2011).  
 
Governments often invest in private companies to provide access to additional funds, 
to further the development of strategic firms and industries, and to promote corporate 
governance by improving the supervision and control of their portfolio companies 
(Wade, 2004; Lau and Tong, 2008; Malaysia Ministry of Finance, 2010). Moreover, 
governments tend to maintain ownership rights in privatized firms which operate in 
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monopoly markets as a means to promote fair trading practices in the absence of 
effective regulators, which protect market participants against abuses of market 
power (Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami, 2009). 
 
The Malaysian Government made strategic investments through organisations called 
government-linked investment companies (GLICs), especially in key industries such 
as banking and financial services, electricity, telecommunications, airlines and other 
infrastructure projects.  Companies in which the government-backed GLICs own a 
majority stake are in turn called government-linked companies (GLCs). Although the 
GLCs collectively account for 10 per cent of Malaysia’s economic output, employ 
more than 300,000 people and have a market capitalisation of £47.1 billion or 49 
percent of total market capitalisation (Malaysia Ministry of Finance, 2010: 100), past 
research pertaining to the impact of the government ownership on the listed 
companies’ performance and earnings-management is rather limited. 
 
Our research has been inspired by the observation that research into the impact of 
government ownership on the financial performance and earnings-management of 
listed companies typically assumes the government to be a monolithic entity. In the 
past, enquiries into the impact of government ownership on performance (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994; Boyocko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996; Sun, Tong, and Tong, 2002; 
Tam and Tan, 2007; Azmi, 2008; Shen and Lin, 2009; Mohd Ghazali, 2010; Ab 
Razak, Ahmad, and Joher, 2011; Le and Buck, 2011; Najid and Rahman, 2011; 
Wang and Yung, 2011) and earnings-management (Yen, Chun, Abidin and Noordin, 
2007; Ding, Zhang and Zhang, 2007; Wang and Yung, 2011; Mohamad, Rashid and 
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Shawtari, 2012) of listed companies largely treated government investment as 
homogeneous.  
 
In reality, government ownership, particularly in emerging economies, is often 
managed by a range of government organisations. We argue that different types of 
government investment organisations in Malaysia have different objectives and 
control structures; these differences matter when measuring impact of government 
ownership on listed companies’ performance and earnings-management activities.  
 
We also motivated by the fact that, as blockholders in listed firms, GLICs can 
potentially mitigate the lack of minority shareholder protection rights by improving 
the supervision and control of their portfolio firms (Wade, 2004; Lau and Tong, 
2008). In Malaysia, for instance, federal GLICs are explicitly charged with 
improving the corporate governance of their portfolio companies (Malaysia Ministry 
of Finance, 2010)
1
. This is expected not only to improve the financial performance of 
the individual firms but also to encourage the mobilisation of private domestic 
savings as well as foreign direct and portfolio investment to improve domestic firms’ 
access to outside capital (Malaysia Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance, 
2006a; 2006b; Malaysia Ministry of Finance, 2010). 
 
Therefore, the main objective of this study is to investigate the impact of different 
groups of GLICs on corporate performance and earnings-management activities of 
their portfolio companies by taking into consideration the existence of different types 
of GLICs and different influences that may affect how they exercise their control 
                                                          
1
 Corporate Governance Survey Report (2008) conducted by Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 
and Nottingham University Business School involving all listed companies in Bursa Malaysia 
Securities revealed that, GLCs were the leaders in terms of implementing recommended corporate 
governance best practices as suggest in Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2001.      
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rights.  By focusing on this issue, this study will provide a unique contribution to our 
knowledge. By looking not just at blockholders or government blockholders as a 
whole, but rather at different types of government blockholders, this study closes 
gaps in the literature; indeed, this is a novel approach to a study concerning the 
effects of government ownership on financial performance and earnings-
management practices of listed companies, in the context of an emerging market. 
This in turn may contribute to deeper knowledge related to ownership by the 
government, and thus open up a new dimension of how researchers should deal with 
this issue in future. 
 
To achieve the objective mentioned above, this thesis is comprised of two main 
projects. The first empirical project explores whether controlling block ownership 
by the three main types of government investment organisations indicated above, 
their ownership concentration, the existence of golden share provisions, and the 
participation of politicians and senior civil servants in the boards of directors impact 
the performance of government controlled listed companies in Malaysia.  
 
In relation to this matter, we argued that GLCs owned by Federal Government 
Sponsored Pension and Investment Funds (PIF GLIC) have clear objective to 
maximise depositors’ and unit holders’ wealth as compared to Federal Government 
GLIC (FGLICs) that highly influenced by Government to pursue social and 
development objectives. Therefore, we hypothesized that financial performance of 
GLCs controlled by PIF GLIC is better than financial performance of GLCs 
controlled by FGLICs. In addition, as laws and regulations are more difficult to 
enforce the further entities are away from the centre of power (Chen et al., 2009), we 
therefore expect the financial performance of GLCs controlled by FGLICs is better 
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than the financial performance of GLCs at the state level that controlled by State 
Economic Development Corporations (SEDC).  As PIF GLIC is also GLIC at federal 
level, we also hypothesized that the financial performance of GLCs controlled by PIF 
GLIC is better than the financial performance of GLCs controlled by SEDCs. With 
regards of GLICs shareholdings in GLCs, we argued that the higher the degree of 
share ownership by a blockholder, the greater the incentive and ability for them to 
participate in the supervision and control of the firm’s management. We therefore 
expect that a significant relationship between the proportion of GLIC ownership and 
GLCs’ financial performance.  
 
We also investigate the impact of golden shares on GLCs’ performance. We argued 
that, as the government perceives GLCs with golden shares to be of strategic 
importance to the economic and social development of Malaysia, they might benefit 
from government protectionist measures that may positively impact on their financial 
performance. We therefore hypothesised a positive significant relationship between 
GLC performance and the existence of golden share provisions. Finally, as 
politicians and senior civil servants might be less capable of controlling managers or 
giving advice on strategic decisions due to their often limited business expertise 
(Chen at al, 2009), we therefore hypothesized that the proportion of senior civil 
servants and politicians on the board of GLCs are negatively related to financial 
performance of GLCs.    
 
In this study, we only interested in the degree to which different government 
investors with different objectives, motivations and control structures affect financial 
performance of their portfolio companies (GLCs). Therefore, we only considered all 
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listed GLCs and excluded the non-GLCs.  Our focused on GLCs also to consider 
whether different government investment organizations differ with regard to among 
other on their protection of minority shareholder interests, the study that never be 
conducted in Malaysia, by far. This is of interest both to the government, which 
expects GLICs to further corporate governance and corporate financial performance 
of GLCs, and for portfolio investors, who in an environment with poor enforcement 
of minority shareholder rights might be attracted to partly government owned 
companies 
 
In this study, we were not interested to compare performance of GLCs and non-
GLCs as this type of research has been conducted regularly both in developed and in 
an emerging markets including Malaysia. The findings normally showed that the 
performance of state owned enterprises (SOEs) lagged behind private firms 
(Boardman and Vining, 1989; Wei and Varela, 2003; Shen and Lin, 2009). Survey 
by Shirley and Walsh (2000) was interesting to be quoted here. They survey previous 
studies that related to performance differences between SOEs and private companies. 
They found that among 52 studies in the survey, majority of the studies (32 studies) 
suggest that private companies performed better than SOEs. Study by Villalonga 
(2000) also revealed a same conclusion. 
 
In Malaysia, there is also the case where GLCs performance were lagged behind 
private firms as found in various studies such as by  Tam and Tam (2007); Najid and 
Rahman (2011); Ab. Razak et al. (2011). As such, we expect our research is going to 
have similar results. But, by taking into consideration of the impact of different 
government investment institution and corporate performance of their portfolio 
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companies, we open a new paradigm and perspective on how we should deal with 
government ownership in the future by taking care of different government 
investment institution with different objectives, motivations and control structures. 
 
In addition, as argued by Demsetz and Lehn (1985: 1176) that “corporate ownership 
varies systematically in ways that are consistent with value maximisation,” we also 
investigated issues of endogeneity and reverse causality in the relationship between 
ownership and performance.  
 
The second empirical project is motivated by the findings in the first empirical 
project. In the first empirical project, some results regarding dependent performance 
variables using accounting data and using market data are inconsistent; in accounting 
data one sees a more pronounced positive effect, particularly the impact of ownership 
concentration by controlling government investors and golden shares on GLCs’ 
accounting performance. This suggests that market participants might discount the 
accounting information of companies with certain government-related corporate 
governance features, perhaps due to concerns about exploitation but also accounting 
manipulation.   
 
This raised the question whether GLCs with different types of controlling GLIC 
owners (government blockholders) engage in different levels of earnings-
management and more generally whether GLCs engage in different levels of 
earnings-management compared to firms not controlled by government investors. 
This question motivated us to investigate the issue of earnings management practices 
among portfolio companies controlled by GLICs in depth as the issue particularly 
important particularly to the minority (foreign) investors, who might either benefit 
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from the presence of government blockholders or might be exploited by their power 
to steer the company in accordance with their own interests.   
 
Therefore, in the second empirical project, we further extend our research by also 
including firms without government controlled blockholders, in order to measure 
reporting quality relying on competitor benchmarks and to get a wider idea about 
corporate reporting quality in Malaysian listed companies. In this project, we argued 
that PIF GLICs might have an incentive to deter earnings management in their 
portfolio companies as their investment is long-term investment which aims to 
provide continuing benefits to their depositors or unit holders. On the flip side, 
FGLICs’ influence on their portfolio companies is likely to be politically motivated 
rather than commercially motivated. Therefore, we expect the magnitude of 
earnings-management of GLCs controlled by PIF GLICs is lower than the magnitude 
of earnings-management of GLCs controlled by FGLIC. However, as GLCs 
controlled by SEDCs in under less scrutiny as laws and regulations are more difficult 
to enforce the further entities are away from the centre of power (Chen et al, 2009), 
we expect the magnitude of earnings-management of GLCs controlled by FGLIC is 
lower than the magnitude of earnings-management of GLCs controlled by SEDC.  
As PIF GLIC is also GLIC at federal level, we hypothesized that the magnitude of 
earnings-management of GLCs controlled by PIF GLIC is lower than the magnitude 
of earnings-management of GLCs controlled by SEDC.      
 
In addition to government blockholders, we also examine earnings-management 
activities in the listed firms controlled by private blockholders. As the main objective 
of private blockholders are more inclined to maximizing profits by for example; 
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influencing shares prices through reporting favourable income, we expect the 
magnitude of earnings-management of listed firms controlled by private blockholders 
is higher than the magnitude of earnings-management of GLCs controlled by various 
GLICs.  
 
Finally, in this second empirical project, we also investigate the impact of 
blockholder ownership concentration and managerial ownership on earnings-
management. By taking into account the weak degree of investor protection as well 
as poor corporate governance structure in Malaysia that might lead to high 
information asymmetry in firms, we expect a significant positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and earnings-management. However, as the impact of 
blockholders ownership concentration on earnings-management can be discussed in 
both positive and negative associations, we therefore predict a significant 
relationship between blockholders ownership concentration and earnings- 
management without specifying the direction of the relationship.    
 
In this project, we also examine the potential complementary and substitutive 
relationship of boards of directors and audit committee characteristics in mitigating 
earnings-management. Finally, we also take into account the potential for a bi-
directional relationship between ownership structure and earnings-management by 
using a simultaneous system of equations. This is particularly important as past 
studies largely ignored the potential for simultaneity bias between both variables 
(e.g. Ding et al. 2007; Mohd Ali, Mohd Salleh and Hassan, 2008; Yang, Lai and Tan, 
2008; Al-Fayoumi, Abuzayed and Alexander, 2010; Mohamad et al., 2012).  
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1.2 General contributions 
 
This study contributes to knowledge and research about corporate governance by 
providing new insight and understanding on the role of government in an emerging 
market. In general, this study may be beneficial to market participants in particular: 
 
 
1.2.1 The Malaysian government 
 
This research recommends that governments which want to use GLICs to promote 
corporate governance and performance in listed companies, and to attract domestic 
and foreign investors, should consider carefully how objectives and organisational 
characteristics of different GLICs are likely to impact on the performance and 
earnings-management of their portfolio companies in this respect. However, as our 
study is only about corporate governance protecting minority shareholders’ interests 
in relation to financial performance and earnings-management practices, the 
government cannot use our findings to find out about how effective GLCs support its 
policies relating to, for example, employment and social objectives.       
 
 
1.2.2 Government investment organisations and Putrajaya Committee on 
GLC High Performance  
 
Perhaps the main benefit of this study is for government investment organizations; 
they will be able to understand their role to play more clearly in terms of ensuring the 
excellence and efficiency of companies under their control. In the meantime, the 
Malaysian government established the Putrajaya Committee on GLC High 
Performance (PCG) in 2005. Its principal mandate is to design and implement 
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comprehensive national policies and guidelines to transform GLCs into high-
performing entities and establish the institutional framework to manage and 
subsequently to oversee the execution of these policies and guidelines. This study 
helps PCG in determining the best corporate governance mechanisms for GLCs in 
order to achieve the objective of transforming GLCs into high-performing entities. 
 
1.2.3 Portfolio and minority investors 
 
As government investment organisations tend to dominate the capital markets of 
emerging economies, it is of interest, in particular to portfolio investors, to explore 
whether the impact on corporate governance, performance and earnings-management 
of different types of GLICs varies systematically. Findings from this study will help 
investors in their decision-making processes. Moreover, by also taking into account 
earnings-management activities by firms which are not controlled by government 
investors, this study contributes to knowledge about the advantages and 
disadvantages of investing in firms controlled by blockholders from the perspective 
of an emerging market. This issue is important particularly to the minority (foreign) 
investors, who might either benefit from the presence of blockholders (government 
or private) or be exploited by their power to manipulate earnings to pursue self-
interested objectives rather than shareholder’s value. 
 
1.2.4 Market regulators and lenders 
 
This study may also in benefit to other stakeholders such as regulators and lenders. 
The results from this study will help regulators (e.g. Malaysia Securities Commission 
and Bursa Malaysia Securities) in policy formulation and enforcement of rules (e.g. 
12 |  P a g e
 
Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement) where they will be able to strengthen existing 
regulations or introduce new policies minimizing the earnings-management activities 
in listed firms. Moreover, in terms of enforcement of the rules, they can use findings 
from this study to focus on firms that are included in the group with higher levels of 
earnings-management activities.  
 
For lenders, the results of this study can help them become more cautious in lending 
decisions by also take into account the earnings-management activities by listed 
firms that conducted for the purpose among others, to get a loan from them. 
 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis consists of five chapters.   
Chapter two discusses government ownership and control in Malaysia. It provides 
an explanation of the GLICs concept and how the government controls GLICs as 
well as their portfolio companies. 
Chapter three discusses on research methodology related to various research 
pradigms, the used of quantitative and qualitative research method and also the 
adaptations of suitable research method in Malaysian environment.   
Chapter four focuses on the first project that examines the impact of GLICs in 
Malaysia on corporate performance of their portfolio companies. Based on their 
investment objectives and their control structure, the study seperated GLICs into 
three main groups, namely (i) federal government sponsored pension and investment 
funds; (ii) federal government owned GLICs charged with promoting the federal 
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government’s economic and social policies; and (iii) State Economic Development 
Corporations charged with promoting state governments’ economic and social 
policies. The issues of endogeneity and reverse causality of variables understudies 
are also addressed in this chapter. 
Chapter five focuses on the second project that examines the impact of GLICs on 
earnings-management activities of their portfolio companies. Similar to first project, 
we seperate GLICs into three types as mentioned above. In addition, we also 
included listed companies owned by private blockholders as part of our study.           
Finally, chapter six summarizes the findings of the two projects above and provides 
a thesis contributions, limitations as well as the thesis overall conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN MALAYSIA 
 
 
2.1 Background of Government ownership in GLICs 
The first GLIC in Malaysia was founded in 1959. The original purpose of the 
Ministry of Finance Incorporated (MOF Inc) was to supervise companies once 
owned by the British Colonial Government prior to 1957
2
. However, from 1971 
onwards, the role of MOF Inc was extended to acquire further assets to support the 
Malaysian Government’s New Economy Policy introduced in 1970 (Gomez and 
Jomo, 1999). The policy is aims to facilitate the direct and indirect participation of 
indigenous population or Bumiputera
3
 in the country’s economic development 
(Gomez and Jomo, 1999). In particular, the policy was designed to restructure the 
multiethnic but economically-divided Malaysian society by increasing native 
Bumiputera corporate equity ownership to 30 percent by the year 1990 (Khan and 
Jomo, 2000; Fisk and Osman-Rani, 1982). 
 
This policy, designed to improve the Bumiputeras’ economic position was deemed 
vital for the social stability of Malaysia following the May 1969 post-election race 
riots, which was prompted by racial sentiment and dissatisfaction of inequality in 
                                                          
2
 Malaysia gained independence from Britain on August 31, 1957. 
3
 Bumiputera is the Malay language terms for the “sons of the soil” (Torii, 1997). 
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economic and wealth distribution between the majority Malay population
4
 – who 
were largely poor and lived in suburban areas – and the minority Chinese 
population
5
 – who were generally wealthy and lived in urban areas. Though assertive 
in nature, the policy requires that the expansion of Bumiputera’s economic share be 
achieved by expanding the Malaysian economy, rather than by the nationalisation or 
seizing of non-Bumiputera-owned businesses. Therefore, ideally, both the 
Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera population will benefit from government policy 
hence achieving an economically balanced and socially harmonious society 
(Malaysia, 1971).  
 
To support the New Economy Policy, further GLICs were established at federal 
levels
6
 such as the Urban Development Authority (UDA) in 1971 and National 
Equity Corporation (Permodalan Nasional Berhad) in 1974. These organizations 
were established predominantly to help the Bumiputera population invest their 
savings in private companies and thereby participate in the economic growth of the 
country (Jomo, 1991; Prasad, Vozikis and Ariff, 2006). Meanwhile, at a regional 
level, State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs) were established to 
safeguard the interests of Bumiputera in their own state, such as the Selangor SEDC 
in 1964 and Kedah SEDC in 1965 (Gomez and Jomo,1999). These GLICs are 
expected to invest in equity on behalf of the Bumiputera as a beneficial owner, and 
hence, control and influence the directions of the GLCs.      
 
                                                          
4
 Malays ethnicity is part of Bumiputera group. 
5
 Chinese ethnicity is part of non-Bumiputera group 
6
 Malaysia is a federated constitutional monarchy that practices parliamentary democracy and has a three-tier 
government structure: federal, state and local government (Oxford Business Group, 2007: 239)  
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The New Economy Policy greatly influenced how business activities carried out in 
Malaysia, causing excessive political interference in business and uneven access to 
opportunities (Gomez and Jomo, 1997). According to Tam and Tan (2007: 220) as a 
consequence of the policy, “firm performance in Malaysia is often seen to be a 
function of the identity of the owner, its ties to powerful political agents and the 
resulting access to business opportunities and finance.” 
 
 
 
2.2 Government control over GLICs and GLCs 
 
While privatization policy of the 1980s saw many of MOF Inc owned assets 
transferred to the private sector, GLICs continue to hold ownership and control rights 
in many privatised companies, particularly in strategic industries. Among the 
objectives of GLICs today are to make their investment on behalf of federal and state 
governments and exert their influence over their portfolio companies (GLCs) to 
achieve key government policies. This is particularly with regard to the development 
of new and strategic industries that deemed crucial to Malaysian economic growth, 
creating employment opportunities, economic and social development plan and 
providing basic infrastructure needs. Since the benefit to the society is expected to be 
derived not simply from the cash flow rights in the GLCs, but the ability of GLICs to 
influence the management of the companies, GLICs need to own a sufficient 
proportion of the outstanding share capital. This is because acquiring a substantial 
stake of the companies’ equity allows GLICs to gain a significant influence over the 
listed companies’ affairs. 
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In turn, GLCs are defined as business entities in which the governments, through 
their GLICs, have a controlling stake (Malaysia, Ministry of Finance, 2010, p.100). 
Controlling stake in this context refers to the government's ability to appoint 
members to the board of directors or senior management, and/or to make major 
decisions for the GLCs such as the award of business contracts, corporate strategy, 
restructuring and financing, as well as acquisition and divestment exercises either 
directly or through GLICs (Lau and Tong, 2008).  
 
GLCs evolved in different ways. Some originated as a government-link entities or 
departments before they were being incorporated and eventually privatized as public 
listed companies during the Malaysian Privatization Policy initiative in 1980s. Others 
were the result of investment by GLICs in existing private businesses or formed by 
GLICs as part of their business expansion activity. Based on their investment 
objectives and control structures and in line with Wicaksono (2009), GLCs in 
Malaysia can be classified into three major categories of ownership: 
i. GLCs owned by federal government sponsored pension and investment funds 
(PIF GLICs), such as the National Equity Corporation (Permodalan Nasional 
Berhad), the Armed Forces Fund Board (Lembaga Tabung Angkatan 
Tentera), the Employees Provident Fund and the Pilgrimage Fund Board. The 
objective of these organisations is to provide pension benefits or to maximise 
the long-term savings returns of their mainly Bumiputera depositors and unit 
holders. Because of the strategic importance of the funds not only for 
economic enfranchisement of the indigenous population but also for 
Malaysia’s pension system – in particular for private sector employees – and 
long-term economic development (Asher, 1998), PIF GLICs are under 
18 |  P a g e
 
ministerial oversight. Their boards consist of representatives of the depositors 
or the employers and employees who contribute to the funds, as well as 
government representatives, usually in the form of senior civil servants, rather 
than politicians.  
ii. GLCs owned by federal government owned GLICs (FGLICs), such as 
Khazanah Nasional Berhad and MOF Inc that are charged with promoting the 
government’s economic and social policies. While the federal government 
benefits from dividend payments by FGLICs’ portfolio companies, the main 
objective of the investment is to maintain government control of strategic 
assets and of industries which are deemed crucial to Malaysia’s economic 
growth and social development. Officially, minority shareholders in GLCs 
controlled by FGLICs are expected to be protected – not exploited – by the 
government blockholder (OECD, 2010). The boards of federal government 
owned investment organisations tend to be dominated by government 
representatives and led by senior federal politicians, such as the prime 
minister and the minister of finance.  
iii. State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs) were established under 
state legislation from the mid-sixties onwards. SEDCs aim to promote 
regional economic and social development programmes (Fisk and Osman-
Rani, 1982; Jomo and Tan, 2005) and generate dividend income for their state 
governments. The boards of SEDCs tend to be chaired by the Chief Minister 
(equivalent to Prime Minister at federal government) of the particular state, 
and the boards tend to be composed mainly of senior civil servants or political 
representatives from the relevant state. 
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See Table 2-1 for descriptions of the major characteristics of each group of GLICs in 
Malaysia. 
 
In addition to investment by GLICs, the Malaysian government is able to influence 
some GLCs in strategic industries via a special rights redeemable preference share, 
commonly known as “golden share” (Gomez and Jomo, 1999; Woon, 1989). They 
are administered by the MOF Inc on behalf of the Malaysian government.  The 
golden share does not give any rights to the government to take part in any capital or 
profits of the GLCs, or a right to vote in the annual general meetings (AGM) or 
extraordinary general meetings (EGM) of the GLCs, but it does confer special rights 
to the government which will enable the government, through MOF Inc, “to ensure 
that certain major decisions affecting the operations of the Company are consistent 
with the Government’s policies.”7 The special rights carried by the golden share 
include the right to attend and speak in the AGM or EGM of the GLCs, the right to 
appoint not more than three persons at any time as directors of the company,
8
 and 
provide the government with legal rights or veto powers to overrule any resolution 
proposed by the board of directors or the shareholders of the company which is 
deemed inconsistent with government policies (Sun and Tong, 2002).  
 
Golden shares are used not only to support the government’s economic and social 
policies, but also as a means of monopoly regulation as GLCs with golden shares 
tend to benefit not only from economies of scales but some of them also have 
                                                          
7
 See Tenaga Nasional Berhad Annual Report 2010:331 
  
8
 See Malaysian Airline System Berhad Annual Report 2009:206. The number of members of the 
BOD that can be appointed by Government in the GLCs with the golden share varies. 
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monopoly powers which are remnants from the time at which they were operated 
directly by Government departments before privatization (Woon, 1989). 
 
Apart from influencing GLCs through GLICs’ controlling stake and golden shares, 
GLICs are themselves supervised by federal and state parliamentary Public Accounts 
Committees. In addition, with regards to GLICs scrutiny of and influence on GLCs’ 
corporate governance, all GLICs can draw on expert advice by the Putrajaya 
Committee on GLC High Performance as well as the Auditor General. However, 
supervision tends to be tighter for federal GLICs, in particular FGLICs, than SEDCs. 
The reason for this is probably FGLICs’ higher public visibility and closer proximity 
to the centre of power (Chen et al. 2009).  
 
Moreover, besides the indirect control politicians and government officials can exert 
over GLCs via their influence over GLICs, senior civil servants and politicians often 
serve directly on the boards of directors of listed companies, including GLCs (Azmi, 
2008). This practice is perhaps the most visible evidence of the close relationship 
between business and politics in Malaysia (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). 
 
In conclusion, although the initial objective of the establishment of GLICs focused 
on the social purposes which are to support the government’s policies, today GLICs 
and their portfolio companies have become important participants in the economic 
development of Malaysia and the backbone of the country’s capital market 
development. As mentioned in the previous chapter, GLCs collectively account for 
10 per cent of Malaysia’s economic output with market capitalisation of £47.1 billion 
or 49 percent of total market capitalisation (Malaysia, 2010, p.100). As such the 
study on the impact of GLICs on financial performance and earnings management of 
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GLCs will not only benefit Malaysian Government in general and GLICs in 
particular but also help investors make the best decision on their investments as well 
to encourage foreign investment inflows into Malaysian capital market. 
 
 
2.3 Corporate governance in Malaysia 
 
2.3.1 Corporate governance development  
 
Poor corporate governance is often implicated as an important contributor to the 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997/98 (e.g. Asian Development Bank, 2000; Abdul 
Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006).  Malaysia was among the countries that was 
badly hit by the crisis. According to Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006), the 
crisis in Malaysia exposed serious weaknesses in corporate governance practices in 
the country; namely, weak financial structure, over-leveraging by companies and 
lack of transparency, disclosure and accountability. Following the crisis, the 
Malaysian government embarked on numerous corporate governance reforms 
intended at improving corporate governance practices in the corporate sector and to 
restore the confidence of foreign investors on Malaysian capital market which was 
severely affected during the crisis
9
 (Liew, 2007). The following is a short list of 
activities and organizations set up to improve corporate governance in Malaysia 
during and after the Asian Financial Crisis: 
 
                                                          
9
 In the first six month of AFC, Malaysian Ringgit (the Malaysian currency) plunged from a value of 
2.52 vs the US dollar to 4.5 Malaysian Ringgit and the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index fell 75% from 
its pre-crisis level (Asian Development Bank, 2000). Foreign direct investment also shrank from 
RM14.5 billion to RM8.5 billion due to the negative impact of the crisis on corporate profits, retained 
earnings and investor confidence (Ping and Yean, 2007). 
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i. 1998 – the establishment of High Level Finance Committee on Corporate 
Governance to propose recommendations on the establishment of corporate 
governance framework in Malaysia (Ow-Yong and Guan, 2000) and the 
establishment of Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance to raise the 
awareness and promote high standards of corporate governance towards 
coping with the rapid changing capital market environment; 
 
ii. August 1999 – enhancing disclosure quality. In an effort to enhance the 
quality of disclosure, Bursa Malaysia Securities adopted quarterly reporting 
where all listed companies have to disclose their financial information 
(reports on income statements, balance sheets and cash flow statements) to 
the public with effect from August 1999; 
 
iii. March 2000 – the Malaysian Securities Commission endorsed and published 
the first Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG), largely derived 
from the recommendations of the Cadbury Report (1992) and Hampel Report 
(1998) in the United Kingdom and covered matters related to fair treatment of 
all shareholders, protection of shareholder rights, transparency through the 
timely disclosure etc.; 
 
iv. 2001 – the new Bursa Malaysia Revamped Listing Requirement to promote 
better corporate governance by, among others, imposing a mandatory 
disclosure of complying with MCCG and requiring the audit committee to 
have at least one member from the finance or accounting background. It also 
required all listed companies to prepare their audited consolidated accounts in 
accordance with the standards by Malaysian Accounting Standard Board;  
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v. 2001 – The establishment of Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group 
(MSWG) to provide an official platform for minority shareholders activism to 
protect their interests; 
 
vi. 2007 – The introduction of MCCG 2007 (revised version of MCCG 2000) to 
improve the quality of the board of public listed companies by putting in 
place the criteria for the qualification of directors and strengthening the audit 
committee, as well as the internal audit function of the listed companies. In 
this year also, a major change occurred on Malaysian financial reporting 
standards where the standards were revised to be virtually identical with 
IFRS; and     
 
v. 2012 – The introduction of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012 
(MCCG 2012). This new code which superseded the MCCG 2007 and 
became effective on 31 December 2012 requires listed companies to report on 
their compliance with the principles and recommendations of the MCCG 
2012 in their annual reports. It focuses on clarifying the role of board in 
providing leadership, enhancing board effectiveness through strengthening its 
composition and reinforcing its independence. It also encourages companies 
to put in place corporate disclosure policies.  
 
The ongoing efforts towards establishing the framework of corporate governance as 
discussed above indicates the government’s seriousness in ensuring a conducive 
business environment in Malaysia, which can also directly or indirectly impact the 
quality of financial reporting. 
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2.3.2 Financial reporting standards  
 
La Porta et al. (1998) suggests that accounting standards in Malaysia before the 
Asian Financial Crisis were relatively good with the score of 76 from maximum of 
90 points. However, they also found that enforcement and actual practice is weak. To 
address the issue of inconsistency among listed firms on the use of financial 
reporting standards, the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB) was 
established under the Financial Reporting Act 1997 as an independent authority to 
develop and issue accounting and financial reporting standards in Malaysia which 
carry the force of law. The principles of the accounting standards developed by the 
MASB, called the Malaysian Accounting Standards, are consistent with International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) issued by the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC) in the 1980s (Liew, 2007) with additional guidance tailored to 
deal with specific issues that are not dealt with in IAS and comply with local laws 
and regulations (Morris, Pham and Gray, 2011).  
 
Following the introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to 
replace the IAS in 2001 by International Accounting Standards Board (IASB – 
formerly known as IASC), beginning in 2004 the MASB initiated a broad strategic 
direction to gradually align its accounting standards with IFRS. Its main objective 
was to improve financial reporting in Malaysia. As a first step, the Malaysian 
Accounting Standards were renamed as FRS (Financial Reporting Standards) and 
renumbered to be in line with standards issued by IASB to make it easier for 
investors, preparers and auditors to see the relationship between the two. In 2007, the 
standards were revised to be virtually identical with IASB standards and finally in 
the 1
st
 January 2012, a new IFRS-compliant framework called Malaysian Financial 
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Reporting Standards (MFRS Framework) was taken into effect as part of the full 
convergence of accounting standards in Malaysia with IFRS and applicable to all 
entities in Malaysian (mandatory adoption) other than private entities and 2012 will 
be the first year financial reporting in Malaysia prepare under full IFRS regime. 
Recently, The World Bank (2012) indicates a high level of compliance with 
FRS/MFRS in financial reporting prepared by public firms in Malaysia. 
 
Even though compliance with new accounting standards is not an assurance that 
financial reports are free from earnings-management activities, studies on the 
relationship between accounting accruals and subsequent stock return following the 
accounting regulation change show encouraging findings. For example, Chan, Lee 
and Lin (2009) examined the relationship between accounting accruals and 
subsequent stock return following the accounting regulation change in the UK with 
regards to the introduction of Financial Reporting Standards No.3: Reporting 
Financial Performance (FRS3).  Based on 3,462 firm-years of observations during 
1986-1992 (pre-FRS3 period) and during 1995-2002 (post-FRS3 period), they find a 
significant reduction in accrual anomalies in the UK from the pre-to post-FRS3 
periods.  
 
In the meantime, some studies focus on the effect of IFRS on earnings-management. 
Zeghal, Chtourou and Sellami (2011) investigate whether adoption of IFRS by 
French companies is associated with lower earnings-management activities. Based 
on a sample of 353 French listed companies in the period of 2003 to 2006, their 
results show that mandatory adoption of IFRS is associated with a reduction in the 
earnings-management level. In Malaysia, Wan Ismail, van Zijl and Dunstan (2010) 
investigated the differences in earnings quality of Malaysian companies before and 
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after the adoption of FRS. Based on sample of 2663 firm-years observations of 
Malaysian listed companies in the period between 2002 and 2009, they found that 
earnings quality is higher after the adoption of FRS, where the abnormal accruals 
rate is significantly lower and reported earnings by public firms in Malaysia are more 
value-relevant.   
 
As such, the introduction of IFRS in Malaysia may be seen as an advantage to the 
country due to high quality and high credibility of the standards. According to Ball 
(2006), IFRS promises more accurate, comprehensive and timely financial reporting 
relative to national accounting standards replaced by it. This should leads to more-
informed valuation in the equity market, and hence lower risk to investors.  
 
 
 
2.4  Literature review: government ownership and corporate 
performance 
2.4.1 Theoretical background: ownership structure, government ownership 
and corporate performance 
Issues related to the relationship between ownership structure and corporate 
performance has been discussed since Berle and Means (1932). In their book 
"Modern Corporation and Private Property," they argued that the main feature of the 
modern enterprise is a separation between ownership and control that can trigger 
conflict between the two parties, as in practice agents do not always pursue the 
principal’s interest, particularly the wealth maximization objective.  Agents may 
instead pursue their own interests. 
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Principal-agent theory suggests that the ownership structure of a company has 
implications both for the incentive alignment between managers and directors and for 
the supervision and control incentives of investors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). In this context, it is not only the 
size and distribution of ownership stakes, but also the identity of the blockholders 
(La Porta, Lopes-De-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999).  
 
 
Property rights theory suggests that, given the mismatch between costs and benefits 
from their participation in the internal corporate governance of their portfolio 
companies, investors who only own a small proportion of shares in any one company 
are likely to suffer from control apathy (Rock, 1991). In particular, in economies 
with inefficient capital, goods and labour markets, low ownership concentration in 
firms may lead to a control vacuum, which allows senior executives to exploit firms 
and their shareholders for their own private benefit (Himmelberg, Hubbard, and 
Palia, 1999; Holderness, 2003). 
 
This explains the prevalence of blockholders in emerging economies (Al Farooque, 
2010). Since private investors who control large stakes in individual companies are 
likely to face a much more positive cost-benefit relationship from their supervision 
and control efforts, their presence is expected to improve the control of firms’ 
management and, therefore, reduce agency costs (Rock, 1991; Holderness, 2003). If 
blockholders are mainly interested in long-term returns of the firms they invest in, 
the positive impact of their control efforts on the firms’ cash flow and subsequently 
their share prices and dividend payments will also benefit minority shareholders who 
only hold a few shares (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Holderness, 2003). 
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However, on the flip side, blockholders might use their control power to encourage 
firms’ management to pursue policies that promote their interests at the expense of 
other, less powerful, investors (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 
2000; Laeven and Levine, 2008). As controlling blockholders do not suffer 
proportionally from negative financial effects they inflict on the firm, this problem 
tends to be exacerbated if there is a disparity between cash flow rights and control 
rights of blockholders due to pyramidal ownership structures or multiple class shares 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010).  
 
This suggests that, in addition to the size of the ownership stake, the control 
incentives of blockholders are of crucial importance to the impact of block 
ownership on corporate performance.  
 
With regards to the control incentives of government investment organisations, Le 
and Buck (2011: 231) argue, “if the state is concerned with extracting tax revenues, 
based on a proportion of profit, or maximising the value of its stake for subsequent 
asset sales, it may press managers, just like a private blockholder, to make efficient 
decisions that raise firm value.” The same should apply if their objective is to 
improve corporate governance of their portfolio companies in order to make the firm 
and the overall capital market more efficient and attractive for investment by 
domestic and foreign portfolio investors and to reduce domestic firms’ cost of 
capital. Consequently, from the perspective of resource dependency theory, 
government block ownership is expected to be particularly beneficial to firm 
performance and minority shareholder protection in environments with limited 
29 |  P a g e
 
competition on goods, managerial labour and capital markets and weak law 
enforcement regimes (Sun et al., 2002; Defond and Hung, 2004). 
 
However, investment objectives of government investment organisations often also 
include the promotion of social targets, of economic development at national or 
industry rather than firm level, or of political support (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; 
Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996; Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000; Shen and Lin, 
2009). If company resources are employed to facilitate those objectives, the influence 
of government investment organisations on their portfolio companies might lead to 
the exploitation of private minority shareholders. As previously discussed, this 
problem is expected to be exacerbated when there is a disparity between the cash 
flow and control rights of government investors, such when government 
organisations hold preference shares with multiple voting rights or golden shares. 
This suggests that the objectives of government investments organisations are likely 
to influence how government ownership affects firm performance. 
 
From a property rights perspective, government representatives who control 
ownership stakes on behalf of the government tend not to benefit personally from 
any cash flow gains generated by their control efforts. Consequently, their economic 
control incentives are lower than those of the representatives of other blockholders, 
such as families or institutional investors, who either own the shares personally, or 
whose income is tied to the performance of the companies they supervise. This raises 
the prospect that government representatives might suffer from control apathy or that 
they might collude with managers or other investors to exploit the firm (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994; Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000; Le and Buck, 2011). 
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Nevertheless, Chen et al. (2009) emphasized that some government representatives 
benefit indirectly from the performance of the GLCs they supervise. They argue, for 
instance, that while government representatives who monitor SEDCs’ investments in 
China cannot expect to be promoted depending on the firms’ performance, the career 
prospects of government representatives who supervise FGLICs’ investments are 
closely linked to the performance of their portfolio firms. Chen et al. (2009) also note 
that GLICs which offer government representatives better career prospects are able 
to hire candidates that are more qualified. This suggests that the incentives of 
government representatives are likely to influence how government ownership 
affects firm performance. 
 
Our discussions so far assume the existence of one-way relationship between 
ownership and performance. However, there are researchers who argue that the 
ownership-performance relationship could be on the opposite direction where firm 
performance that actually determined firm’s ownership structure and not vice versa. 
(Demstez, 1983; Demstez and Villalonga, 2001; Al Farooque et al., 2007). Demstez 
(1983) for example argues that ownership structure is an endogenous outcome of 
shareholders decisions which motivated and influence by profit-maximizing. These 
issues will be addressed in our study. 
 
2.4.2 Empirical evidence on the relationship between government ownership 
and corporate performance 
The majority of empirical research so far suggests that government ownership tends 
to negatively impact financial performance of listed companies (see e.g. Boardman 
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and Vining, 1989; Megginson and Netter, 2001; Wei and Varela, 2003; Goldeng, 
Grunfeld and Benito, 2008; Shen and Lin, 2009). Shirley and Walsh (2000) survey 
previous studies that related to performance differences between state-owned 
enterprises and private enterprises. They found that, among 52 studies in the survey, 
majority of the study (a total of 32) suggest that private enterprises performed better 
than state owned enterprises
10
. A similar picture can be seen from the study by 
Villalonga (2000). 
 
Boardman and Vining (1989) compared the performance of state-owned enterprises, 
mixed enterprises and private corporations among the 500 largest non-U.S. industrial 
firms as compiled by Fortune magazine in 1983. They employ four profitability 
measured which are return on equity, return on assets, return on sales, and net 
income. Based on ordinary least squares regression of 57 state-owned enterprises, 23 
mixed enterprises and 409 private corporations, they find that on average, large 
industrial mixed enterprises and state-owned enterprises are less efficient and less 
profitable than private corporations. Perhaps non-economic goals in addition to profit 
maximization be one of the factors of the lower performance of SOEs as highlighted 
in many studies on government ownership-performance (see for example Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994; Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000; Le and Buck, 2011, Wang and Yun, 
2011).       
 
Goldeng, Grunfeld and Benito (2008) examine the differences in performance 
between private companies and state owned enterprises in one of the Scandinavian 
economies, Norway. They measure performance using return on assets and 
                                                          
10
 The term ‘state owned enterprises’ has a similar meaning to the term ‘government-linked 
companies’ used in this study.  
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operational costs. Similar to other studies mentioned above, they find that the 
performance of state-owned enterprises is indeed inferior to that of private 
enterprises. 
     
Tian and Estrin (2008) investigate the relationship between government ownership 
and corporate value of Chinese public listed companies in two stock exchanges, 
Shanghai Securities Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Based on a large data 
set between 1994 and 2004 (9594 firm-year observations), they find that the overall 
impact of government shareholding on corporate value in China (measure by return 
on assets and quasi Tobin’s Q) is negative.      
 
In developing countries other than the Asian region, Zeitun (2009) investigates the 
impact of ownership structure on company’s performance using 167 Jordanian listed 
companies over the period 1989-2006. Measures of performance using accounting 
(return on assets and return on equity) and market performance (quasi Tobin’s Q and 
market to book value ratio), Zeitun (2009) reports a significant negative relationship 
between government ownership and firm’ accounting performance. On the other 
hand, Zeitun (2009) also find that government ownership decrease the likelihood of 
default.    
 
 
The results are by no means consistent, even for individual countries (see e.g. Sun et 
al., 2002; Wei and Varela, 2003; Tian and Estrin, 2008; Shen and Lin, 2009 and Le 
and Buck, 2011 on the relationship between government ownership and corporate 
performance in China). 
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However, contradicting many past studies in China, Chen et al. (2009) show that the 
performance of private controlled listed firms not superior to SOE controlled 
companies and they are only marginally better than SOEs controlled by state asset 
management bureaus. In detail, they investigated the relations between types of large 
shareholders, ownership structure and firm performance of listed firms. However, in 
contrast to past studies that largely treated government investment as homogeneous 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Boyocko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996; Sun et al., 2002; 
Ang and Ding, 2006; Tam and Tan, 2007; Azmi, 2008; Shen and Lin, 2009; Mohd 
Ghazali, 2010; Ab Razak et al., 2011; Le and Buck, 2011; Najid and Rahman, 2011; 
Wang and Yung, 2011), they group China’s state owned enterprises (SOEs) into 
three categories of ownership, namely: SOEs controlled by state asset management 
bureaus, SOEs affiliated with the central government, and SOEs affiliated with local 
government.  
 
 
Chen et al. (2009) argue that distinct types of owners have different objectives and 
motivations and this will affect how they exercise their control rights over their 
portfolio companies. For example, in terms of monitoring activities, SOEs affiliated 
to the central government are subject to stricter supervision and monitoring from 
various departments under the central government compared to SOEs affiliated to 
local government, which are subject to weaker supervision and management as laws 
and regulations are more difficult to enforce the further away the organizations are 
from the centre of power.            
 
Findings from Chen at al.’s (2009) research indicate that the performance of Chinese 
listed firms varies across the type of controlling government shareholders. In regards 
to government investment organizations, SOEs affiliated with the central government 
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perform the best, SOEs controlled by state asset management bureaus perform worst 
and SOEs affiliated to the local government are in the middle. These findings are 
appealing because they show the importance of taking into account the identity of 
government investment organization as their influence over the investee company 
may impact on the financial performance of the company. Lumping of all types of 
government ownership into one group as in prior studies indeed obscures the real 
impact of the government as shareholder.  
 
 
Other than Chen et al. (2009), there are other studies suggest SOEs performed better 
than private companies. For example, Ang and Ding (2006) investigate the 
governance structure of GLCs in Singapore under the control of Temasek Holdings, 
the government investment holdings entity
11
. They compare the financial and market 
performance of all GLCs and non-GLCs listed on the main board of the Singapore 
Exchange over an 11-year-period from 1990 to 2000. They identified GLCs as listed 
firms where Temasek Holdings is a single largest shareholder and must hold an 
effective ownership interest of around 20% or more. Findings from their research 
show that GLCs on average exhibit higher valuations than those of the non-GLCs in 
many performance measures. Variable of interest, the degree of government 
shareholding in GLCs through Temasek Holdings is positively and significantly 
related to firm value (measure by quasi Tobin’s Q) and in term of firm profitability 
(measure by ROA and ROE), GLCs outperform non-GLCs.      
 
Regarding the impact of government ownership on firm performance in Malaysia, 
the Malaysian government suggests that block ownership by GLICs serves to 
                                                          
11
 Malaysia and Singapore used term GLCs rather than SOEs. Temasek Holdings is equivalent to 
Khazanah Nasional Berhad in the context of Malaysia.   
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promote economic growth, social integration and the improvement of corporate 
governance and performance (Malaysia Ministry of Finance, 2010; Malaysia 
Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance, 2006a; 2006b). Previous research 
on the impact of government ownership and control rights on the financial 
performance of listed companies in Malaysia is limited to considering the question 
whether listed companies controlled by GLIC block holdings out or underperform 
other firms.  
 
In this context, research by Tam and Tan (2007) based on data from 150 publicly 
listed firms suggests that GLCs tend to underperform firms controlled by family or 
foreign investors. However, their study is not comprehensive enough to draw 
conclusions on the effects of government ownership on firm performance as they 
employed limited sample of GLCs (10 GLCs) and focused on only one particular 
year (year 2000).  
 
Later Lau and Tong (2008) investigated the impact of government ownership on firm 
value (proxy by quasi Tobin’s Q). 15 GLCs controlled by Khazanah Nasional Berhad 
that listed on the main board of the Bursa Malaysia Securities from the year 2000 to 
2005 (90 firm-year observations) were included into the sample. Similar to Ang and 
Ding (2006), they used a threshold of 20% of government effective ownership 
through Khazanah Holdings Berhad to identify GLCs. Findings of their study 
suggests that government ownership positively and significantly related to Tobin’s 
Q. However, similar to Tam and Tan (2008), this study does not provide sufficient 
evidence for a conclusion on the impact of government ownership on the 
performance of listed companies in Malaysia as the study only focuses on one group 
of GLCs that owned by Khazanah Holdings Berhad. As discussed in the previous 
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chapter, there are two more main GLICs in Malaysia, which are the PIF GLIC and 
SEDCs.  These have their own GLCs that should be part of the sample size. 
 
Recently, Najid and Rahman (2011) investigated the governance structure of GLCs 
in Malaysia owned by Khazanah Nasional Berhad and its relationship to the GLCs 
performance. The main measures of performance are return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE) for accounting performance and Tobin’s Q for market 
performance. They used a matched sample of 47 GLCs and non-GLCs over a 6 year 
period from 2001 to 2006. Findings from the study suggest lower firm performance 
among the GLCs in all performance measures relative to non-GLCs. However, in the 
pool regression
12
 they find firm value proxy by Tobin’s Q is positively and 
significantly related to government ownership even though the magnitude of the 
relationship is very small (coefficient 0.00826 at p<0.05). We noted that the obvious 
weakness in their study is the used of financial companies as part of their sample 
selection. Most studies on the ownership structure or corporate governance and 
performance usually drop financial companies, mainly because of their incomparable 
financial data (Sun et al., 2002). In the Malaysian business environment, financial 
companies are also subject to different regulations
13
 than firms in others industries 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ab Razak et al., 2011). As such, including financial 
companies in the sample can produce bias and inaccurate results. Moreover, similar 
to Lau and Tong (2008), their study is not comprehensive as the sample was limited 
to only GLCs owned by Khazanah Nasional Berhad.  
 
                                                          
12
 In the pool regression only GLCs is part of the regression model as Najid and Rahman (2011) 
employed dummy code for GLCs and non-GLCs. Hence, the non-GLCs form the control sample for 
comparative purposes.  
13
 Banking and financial institutions are subject to special regulations under Banking and Financial 
Institutions Act 1989 while others companies subject to Companies Act 1965 (revised 2006). 
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One more important study that also investigates whether GLCs perform better than 
non-GLCs is by Ab Razak et al. (2011). In detail, they examine governance 
mechanism and firm performance of Malaysian GLCs and non-GLCs over an 11-
year period from 1995-2005 listed on the main board of Bursa Malaysia Securities. 
Tobin’s Q and ROA are employed to measure market and accounting performance 
respectively. Their main findings suggest that GLCs exhibit lower valuations than 
non-GLCs in both performance measures.   
 
In recent years in Malaysia, there has been renewed interest by researchers to explore 
the influence of government ownership of the company's performance. However, as 
highlighted earlier, there has not yet been any research into whether different types 
of GLICs affect GLCs differently or whether the disparity between cash flow and 
control rights due to golden shares impacts on GLCs’ performance as investigated in 
this study.  
 
2.5 Hypotheses development 
 
2.5.1 Types of GLICs and GLC performance 
 
As previously discussed, GLICs in Malaysia can be categorised into (i) federal 
government sponsored pension and investment funds (PIF GLICs); (ii) federal 
government owned GLICs (FGLICs) charged with promoting the federal 
government’s economic and social policies; and (iii) State Economic Development 
Corporations (SEDCs) charged with promoting state governments’ economic and 
social policies.  
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The primary objective of PIF GLICs is to provide pension benefits or maximise 
savings returns for their depositors or unit holders. While they are under the purview 
of the sponsoring government ministries, who have the ability to appoint 
representatives to their boards of directors, the majority of board members are 
representatives of depositors or unit holders or independent directors or specialist 
advisors. Moreover, the government’s representatives on the boards tend to be senior 
civil servants rather than politicians, who might try to use their influence to pursue 
personal political interests.  
 
The clear objective to maximise depositors’ and unit holders’ wealth as well as the 
influence of their representatives is expected to incentivise PIF GLICs to use their 
influence over their portfolio companies to improve their corporate governance and 
to maximise shareholder wealth.  
 
By contrast, the boards of directors of FGLICs, such as the Khazanah Nasional 
Berhad and the MOF Inc., are appointed by the government and dominated by senior 
politicians, in particular the prime minister and senior ministers, as well as senior 
civil servants. The fact that government representatives have various other demands 
on their time and that they tend to have little experience in business or finance is 
likely to limit their ability to contribute effectively to the supervision and control of 
FGLICs or their portfolio companies. Moreover, as their remuneration is not directly 
tied to the performance of the FGLICs or their portfolio companies, their economic 
incentive to engage in or to control are limited. 
 
The performance of FGLICs is monitored by the Auditor General and the federal 
parliamentary Public Accounts Committee. Moreover, the Putrajaya Committee on 
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GLC High Performance routinely assesses the performance and corporate 
governance of key GLCs in the FGLICs’ portfolio. Because of this additional 
scrutiny, government representatives might have a personal incentive in the positive 
development of the corporate governance and performance of the FGLICs portfolio 
companies in order to avoid public embarrassment and therefore damage to their 
career and election prospects. 
 
Nonetheless, while FGLICs are charged with improving the corporate governance of 
their portfolio companies and the federal government benefits from GLCs’ dividend 
payments, FGLICs are also expected to serve the country’s national interests. While 
good corporate governance and the mobilisation of both domestic and foreign 
investment are part of the government’s economic and social development plan, so is 
the promotion of strategic assets and industries deemed crucial to Malaysia’s 
economic growth and the support of the economic development of the indigenous 
population (Malaysia Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance, 2005; 2006a; 
2006b). This suggests that government representatives might use their influence in 
FGLICs to exert pressure on GLCs to use company resources to support the 
government’s policies rather than improve their long-term profitability (Gomez and 
Jomo, 1999; Najid and Rahman, 2011). 
This consideration suggests: 
Hypothesis 1: The financial performance of GLCs controlled by PIF GLICs is better 
than the financial performance of GLCs controlled by FGLICs.  
 
Although there are similarities between SEDCs and FGLICs with regards to the 
organisations’ objectives and the composition and control incentives of their board 
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members, the performance of SEDCs and their portfolio companies is under less 
scrutiny as laws and regulations are more difficult to enforce the further entities are 
away from the centre of power (Chen et al., 2009). Moreover, the Putrajaya 
Committee on GLC High Performance rarely scrutinises the performance of SEDCs’ 
portfolio companies, although SEDCs themselves fall under the scrutiny of the 
relevant state’s parliamentary Public Accounts Committee and the Auditor General. 
We therefore expect that: 
Hypothesis 2: The financial performance of GLCs controlled by FGLICs is better 
than the financial performance of GLCs controlled by SEDCs.  
 
Given our earlier discussion regarding the objectives and corporate governance of 
PIF GLICs, we also hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 3: The financial performance of GLCs controlled by PIF GLICs is better 
than the financial performance of GLCs controlled by SEDCs.  
 
 
2.5.2 GLIC ownership concentration and GLC performance 
Property rights and agency theory suggest that, the higher the degree of share 
ownership by a blockholder, the greater the incentive and ability to participate in the 
supervision and control of the firm’s management (Rock, 1991; Holderness, 2003; 
La Porta et al., 1999). Tighter monitoring is expected to reduce agency costs and, 
therefore, lead to improved financial performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). This 
suggests a positive relationship between GLIC ownership and GLC performance.  
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Moreover, as blockholders’ cash flow rights increase, their incentives to exploit 
minority shareholders falls, as they carry a higher proportion of the costs of any 
misuse of company funds (La Porta et al., 1999; Holderness, 2003).  
 
In line with these considerations, empirical research by Ang and Ding (2006) on the 
influence of the degree of state ownership on corporate performance of GLCs in 
Singapore suggests a positive significant relationship between firm value and 
government ownership. Similarly, in the context of Malaysia, Lau and Tong’s (2008) 
and Mohd Ghazali’s (2010) research on the impact of GLIC ownership on GLC 
performance also found a significant positive relationship between the degree of the 
government ownership and firm value. We therefore expect that: 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive significant relationship between the proportion of 
GLIC ownership and GLCs’ financial performance.  
 
2.5.3 The impact of golden shares on GLCs’ performance 
As previously discussed, the Malaysian government is able to influence some GLCs 
in strategic industries via a special rights redeemable preference share, commonly 
known as “golden share” (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). Irrespective of any government 
investment, golden shares allow the Ministry of Finance’s GLIC (MOF Inc.) to speak 
at shareholders’ general meetings, to appoint up to three members14 to the board of 
directors, and to overrule resolutions proposed by the board of directors or the 
shareholders of a company (Sun and Tong, 2002).  
 
                                                          
14
 As discussed in Chapter 2, the number of members that can be appointed to the board of directors 
varies according to Memorandum and Articles of each companies  
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Research into the effect of disparities between cash flow and control rights of private 
investors (e.g. see Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010) suggests that excess control rights 
increase the incentives of blockholders to engage in minority shareholder 
exploitation. This suggests that GLCs with golden shares are likely to be particularly 
vulnerable to pressure to use resources to promote government policies, even if this 
is to the detriment of their long-term profitability. Indeed, empirical research on 
golden share type regulations in China (Sun et al., 2002), Egypt (Omran, 2009) and 
Europe (Boardman and Laurin, 2000) indicates a negative relationship with corporate 
performance.  
 
However, as the government perceives GLCs with golden shares to be of strategic 
importance to the economic and social development of Malaysia, they might benefit 
from government protectionist measures. Related to this, golden shares are used not 
only to support the government’s economic and social policies, but also as a means 
of monopoly regulation, as some of the GLCs with golden shares tend to benefit not 
only from economies of scale but also monopoly power.  This monopoly power 
remains from the time when they were operated directly by Government departments 
before privatization as well as financial support (Woon, 1989). For example, in 2008, 
Telekom Malaysia Berhad, a GLC with golden shares was awarded USD3.3 billion 
government contract to develop Malaysia’s nationwide high-speed broadband 
network project without going through an open tender (The Star, September 17, 
2008). These sorts of protectionist measures are expected to contribute positively on 
the financial performance of GLCs with golden shares. 
We therefore hypothesise that: 
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Hypothesis 5:  There is a positive significant relationship between GLC performance 
and the existence of golden share provisions.  
 
2.5.4 The impact of the presence of senior civil servants and politicians in 
GLCs’ boards on GLCs’ performance 
 
In Malaysia, business and politics are comparatively closely related (Gomez and 
Jomo, 1999). Therefore, senior civil servants and politicians are often appointed to 
the boards of directors of GLCs (Azmi, 2008).  
 
 
From a perspective of resource dependency theory, senior civil servants and, 
particularly, politicians might act as boundary spanners for companies and provide 
them with preferential access to government contracts and subsidies, or support their 
lobbying of market regulators (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Cannella, 2008). 
They might also help reduce firm’s uncertainty about political developments by 
providing expert insights into relevant decision processes (Hillman, 2005). This is 
likely to be particularly beneficial to firms that operate in resource-constrained 
environments, such as emerging economies. Previous research (Johnson and Mitton, 
2003; Mitchell and Joseph, 2010) on listed companies in Malaysia suggests that 
political connections may be beneficial, particularly in times of adverse economic 
circumstances, as politicians can use their influence to facilitate preferential 
treatment regarding financial support or protectionist measures.  
 
 
However, from a theoretical perspective, politicians and civil servants might be less 
capable of controlling managers or giving advice on strategic decisions due to their 
often limited business expertise (Chen et al., 2009). As such, their appointment to 
GLC boards might affect financial performance negatively. In addition to lack of 
44 |  P a g e
 
expertise, theoretical considerations suggest that as politicians and government 
officials do not benefit personally from increased profitability of the firms, they 
might suffer from control apathy (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000). Chen et al. (2009) 
suggest that if politicians and senior civil servants are able to derive career benefits 
from being linked to the supervision and control of successful GLCs, they might be 
incentivised to contribute positively to firms’ corporate governance; this only applies 
in a very limited fashion in Malaysia. 
 
Politicians are therefore likely to have stronger control incentives than civil servants, 
but politicians, who are subject to elections, might be tempted to use their influence 
over GLCs to pursue business policies beneficial to key interest and voter groups 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000). This may adversely affect 
the company’s financial results.  
 
We therefore expected a negative association between senior civil servants and 
politicians on GLC performance. This leads us to hypothesize:    
 
Hypothesis 6: The proportion of senior civil servants on the board of GLCs is 
negatively related to financial performance.  
Hypothesis 7: The proportion of politicians on the board of GLCs is negatively 
related to financial performance.  
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2.6  Literature review: ownership structure and earnings management 
 
2.6.1 Theoretical background: ownership structure and earnings-management  
 
Issues related to earnings-management practices are important subjects of debate in 
corporate finance literature, especially after a series of accounting scandals involving 
the earnings restatement and financial statement fraud by corporate management as 
exampled by Enron and Worldcom (Elias, 2004; Razaee, 2005). However, the 
dominant paradigm in academic literature is that most public companies are widely 
held or diffused and earnings-management views, as agency problems arise from the 
misalignment of interest between owners and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Davidson III, Jiraporn, Kim and Nemec, 2004). Many discussions on the earnings-
management are associated with this conflict (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010) and 
earnings-management is generally driven by a desire to influence the share price to 
benefit the managers themselves, as market performance usually associated with the 
various incentives provided to them (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
 
Various studies on the ownership structure, for example, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes 
and Shleifer (1999) and Classens et al.(2000), indicate that in many markets, 
especially in emerging economies, most listed companies do not have a widely 
dispersed ownership structure. They have one or more blockholders who may be 
categorized as government or private blockholders. In firms controlled by private 
blockholders, the top management of these companies is comprised of the 
blockholders themselves or represents their interests (Ding et al., 2007; Tam and 
Tan, 2007). Thus in such markets the issue of earnings-management in listed firms is 
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geared more to the conflict of interest between blockholders and minority 
shareholders (Ding et al., 2007). 
 
 
From the agency theory viewpoint, the ownership structure of a firm is expected to 
have noticeable implications both for the incentive alignment between 
managers/insiders and directors and the supervision and control incentives of 
investor (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999). However, in circumstances where 
there is an information asymmetry gap between information held by 
manager/insiders and what is known by outside (minority) shareholders, 
managers/insiders might take advantage to promote their own benefits at the costs of 
outside (minority) shareholders.   
 
To overcome the problems caused by information asymmetry as discussed above, 
and particularly to constrain earnings-management activities in firms, corporate 
governance frameworks are established as a mechanism to monitor and control the 
managers and compel them to act in an efficient, trustworthy, accountable and 
transparent way through quality financial reporting. Quality financial reporting is 
expected to overcome the problem of inequality of information between outside 
shareholders and management, which in turn can reduce earnings-management 
activities within the firm. 
 
Past studies by Klein (2002), Park and Shin (2004), Xie, Davidson and Dadalt (2003) 
and Peasnell et al., (2005) highlight some key corporate governance variables that 
are expected to play an important role in minimizing the earnings-management 
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activities in firms. These include board of director characteristics, board 
independence, audit committee characteristics, knowledge of financial accounting 
and audit committees as well as a separation of powers between the Chairman and 
the company's CEO. These corporate governance mechanisms are expected to reduce 
earnings-management and increase the accountability of the company.  
 
For example, the presence of an independent non-executive director might help 
improve a firm’s financial information disclosure through more transparent and 
informative financial reporting. This is because they are expected to carry out a 
monitoring role more objectively and in the best interests of shareholders and not to 
be influenced by the management. Therefore, the greater the percentage of 
independent directors, the more effective are efforts to control and limit earnings-
management.  
 
In addition, appointment of a well-qualified external audit firm providing quality 
services may enhance confidence and trust of shareholders in the financial statements 
prepared by the manager of the company. This is for the reason that the  financial 
statement users believed the external auditor's responsibility is not only to provide 
assurance to them regarding the truth and fairness of the information presented in the 
audit client's financial statements, but also responsible for detecting and preventing 
fraud in firms including the earnings management activities. 
 
However, from the perspective of external auditors, the responsibility to detect and 
preventing fraud is not their main attention as the responsibility of fraud detection 
lies upon management (board of directors and CEO) and not external auditors 
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(Kassem and Higson, 2012) . In actual fact, the main duties of external auditors are 
to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the 
financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or 
fraud.  Thus, auditors are not directly responsible for detecting every fraud in an 
organization including earnings management, but only the material misstatements 
arising from them  
 
Another important step to minimize agency problems related to earnings-
management, which are closely related to the ownership structure of firms, is the use 
of managerial ownership and blockholders’ ownership concentration strategy. 
 
Managerial ownership. The traditional agency theory argues that managerial 
ownership helps to align managers’ interest with shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). This incentive alignment effect is expected to have more impact as managerial 
ownership increases, suggesting that increasing ownership by management will be 
followed by an increase in corporate performance and opportunistic managerial 
behaviour decrease monotonically (Teshima and Shuto, 2008). This is because 
managers are expected to have incentives to work hard to increase firm value as they 
are also firm shareholders. In addition, they might also try to convince shareholders 
about their ability in order to continue to lead the company. 
 
Blockholders’ Ownership concentration. Property rights and agency theory suggest 
that, the higher the degree of share ownership by a blockholder, the greater the 
incentive and ability to participate in the supervision and control of the firm’s 
management (Rock, 1991; Holderness, 2003). This leads to more effective 
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monitoring activities by blockholders which could mitigate agency problems in firms 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Moreover, according to 
Gomes (2000) and Kao, Wu and Yang (2009), highly concentrated ownership may 
also serve as a signal for reputation-building by blockholders because they know 
expropriation will not only cause minority shareholders to discount share prices that 
reduce their wealth but may also negatively affect their image. Thus ownership 
concentration creates alignment effects which are expected to encourage 
blockholders to minimize earnings-management in the firms they invest in.   
 
2.6.2 The importance of corporate reporting in firm performance 
 
Francis, Schipper and Vincent (2003) found that reported earnings numbers are more 
closely associated with shares prices than cash flows, sales and other financial 
statement data. In other words, earnings figures are important as they affect share 
prices. In the same vein, Ronen and Yaari (2008) stressed that earnings are the 
ultimate object of managing the accounting numbers and valuable in making 
decisions that require estimating future earnings and assessing risk.   
 
Against this background, preparers and users of corporate reporting have different 
perspectives on the importance of corporate reporting on firm performance. From the 
perspective of managers, financial reporting is important to the company as it 
contributes to attracting investment in the company and provides funds for 
investment activities. In addition, earnings figures in financial reporting help a 
company secure loans from financial institutions or refinancing for capital 
expenditure. It also give a positive image to the managers that run the company and 
provide them with financial incentives such as performance bonuses, increments and 
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allowances as well as the opportunity to own shares of the company through 
management incentives schemes, as proposed in the agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
 
Meanwhile, for the majority investors or blockholders, corporate reporting is 
essential to the performance of the company as it may propel share price; as the 
largest shareholders, they will see the greatest profit. Moreover, accounting 
performance, particularly earnings reported in corporate reporting, are commonly 
used in determining dividends and other payouts for shareholders. In this case they 
are the most profitable.  
 
 
For minority investors such as equity investors that do not have private access to 
corporate information and rely heavily on public information (Burgstahler, Hail and 
Leuz, 2006), corporate reporting is a very crucial element in their investment 
decisions. As discussed above, accounting performance reported in corporate 
reporting influence firm’s share prices and as minority investors, they can make 
immediate profits by selling the shares owned by them.  
 
 
Finally, as managing earnings in corporate reporting for the purpose of minimizing 
taxes reduces government revenue, the government also has an interest in ensuring 
high quality corporate reporting, as it is not only provides lasting benefits to firms in 
terms of accounting profitability, but also in ensuring consistent revenue to 
government in term of taxes. Due to this, tax authorities need financial statements in 
corporate reporting to ascertain the appropriateness and accuracy of taxes and other 
duties declared and paid by the company. Other than that, profitable companies 
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provide employment opportunities and contribute to economic development which is 
the main focus of responsible government.  
 
2.6.3 Incentive to manipulate or improve corporate reporting 
In spite of the above discussion on the importance of corporate reporting to firm 
performance, different actors (insiders; either managers or blockholders) might also 
have an incentive to manipulate the corporate reporting or to improve the validity of 
the reports.  
 
Managers. For managers, corporate reporting is an important way for them to 
communicate their private information to report earnings that more accurately reflect 
firm performance and give more informative to outside parties (Burgstahler et al., 
2006). Corporate reporting also offers the opportunity for them to provide a view 
“through the eyes of insiders” regarding the firm’s overall financial position and 
prospects that investors highly value. This explained the incentive or motivations for 
managers to improve the validity of corporate reporting.  
 
 
However, opportunistic managers may take advantage of the information asymmetry 
gap to manipulate reported earnings in corporate reporting. Given that financial 
reports provide value-relevant information, particularly to external users, the reliance 
on accounting figures presented in the reports leads to a strong incentives for 
managers to manipulate the figures through earnings-management to the advantages 
of themselves at the detriment of shareholders in the long-run (Ronen and Yaari, 
2008). 
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In particular, managers might have incentives to manipulate earnings as their tenure, 
promotions and compensation are tied to firm accounting performance (Ronen and 
Yaari, 2008) or if their additional financial incentives (performance bonuses, 
manager’s share options, annual increment etc.) are tied to the share prices. In other 
words, the better the firm’s accounting performance the higher the post of manager 
will be and the better financial compensation provided by the company to them. In 
addition, the shareholders are also likely to continue their contract. Similarly, the 
higher the share price, the higher the financial benefits derived by the manager such 
as performance bonus, annual salary increases, additional allocations of shares and so 
on. 
 
Moreover, in today’s market environment, efficient market hypothesis suggest that, 
share prices react rapidly to information when information becomes available. 
Favourable reactions are evidenced by increases in share prices and vice versa. In 
this situation, managers might have incentive to manipulate corporate reporting 
especially if they are also shareholders of the firms as they can benefit personally 
from an increase in share prices. Gao and Shrieves (2002) find that the sizes of stock 
options and bonuses are positively related to the intensity of earnings-management, 
measured by absolute value of discretionary accruals. Similar results were reported 
by Cohen, Dey and Lys (2005). 
 
 
Some researchers argue that while managerial ownership helps to align interest of 
managers and shareholders, too high managerial ownership can also adversely affect 
the company. Morck et al. (1988) argue that greater managerial ownership would 
provide managers with deeper entrenchment and therefore, greater scope of 
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opportunistic behaviour. At high levels of managerial ownership, the entrenchment 
effect will take place where at this point managerial ownership becomes ineffective 
in aligning managers to take value-maximizing decisions and in the context of 
earnings-management they are more likely to manipulate earnings (Yeo, Tan, Ho and 
Chen, 2002) and may choose accounting options that reflect personal motives rather 
than the firm’s economic interests (Sanchez-Ballesta and Garsa-Meca, 2007). This is 
partly because, with a high ownership stake, managers become too powerful and 
cannot be dismissed by other shareholders, as their voting power guarantees future 
employment.  
 
 
In relation to this, managers might have incentives to engage in three types of 
earnings-management. First, managers might have an interest in income-increasing 
earnings-management in order to for example raise share prices where they, as part 
of firm’s shareholders, will benefit not only from higher share prices but also from 
financial incentives provided by board of directors as discussed above. Other than 
that, they may also have incentive to increase reported earnings to enhance the share 
performance to avoid hostile takeover target (Easterwood, 1998).  
 
 
Second, managers may have incentives to engage in income-decreasing earnings-
management where they act to report lower earnings in financial reports, if they have 
a personal interest to reduce the company's share prices so that they can control the 
company through management buyouts at a lower cost (DeAngelo, 1986). In 
addition, managers may also have incentives to decrease earnings because of tax 
avoidance motivations. For example, firms can trade off tax savings and meet their 
earnings target for financial reporting purposes by delaying discretionary 
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expenditures or they can reduce taxes by accelerating discretionary expenditures 
(Lee and Swenson, 2011). Similar approaches can be done with regard to the timing 
of revenue recognition to avoid higher tax.  
 
Third, by means of smoothing earnings, they may have incentive to use accounting 
techniques to hide the true company performance in the period in order to level out 
net income fluctuations from one period to the next. According to Grant, Markarian 
and Parbonetti (2007), managers used this approach to reduce risk that related to 
their compensation plan such as the incentives for executive stock option. 
Additionally, by deferring income through the use of the accrual method when the 
target earnings for the bonus plan cannot be reached or when the bonus has reached 
the maximum level, managers can maximize their long-term bonus income (Cornett, 
McNutt and Tehranian, 2009) 
 
Government blockholders. As previously discussed, when GLICs become 
controlling shareholders in listed firms, they might have incentives to curtail 
earnings-management activities in those firms, particularly because of their long-
term of investment objectives. Moreover, this is in-line with government objective to 
improve corporate governance in GLICs portfolio companies to ensure the 
continuing confidence of foreign investors in Malaysian capital market. This is 
particularly important as domestic sources of outside finance are limited, as in 
Malaysia and other emerging economies face the problem of mobilizing internal 
saving to provide capital for investment by companies.  Access to savings from 
spreading middle classes is also limited. To reduce domestic credit constraints, there 
is a need to raise funds from foreign investors as they can play an important role in 
funding corporations (Shimomoto, 2002; Leuz et al., 2008). Therefore, to increase 
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the confidence of foreign investors and attract investment towards Malaysian capital 
market, there is a need to implement good corporate governance in firms as firms 
with problematic governance structures, particularly those with high level of insider 
control receive less foreign investment (Leuz et al., 2008).  
 
 
However, in the context of government blockholders in Malaysia that are dominated 
by senior politicians and senior civil servants on the board of some GLICs, namely 
FGLIC and SEDCs, they may also have political incentives to influence reported 
earnings of the portfolio companies to pursue business policies beneficial to key 
stakeholders and voter groups. There is a possibility that GLCs owned by FGLIC and 
SEDCs engage more in earnings-management activities than federal government 
sponsored pension and investment funds who has less influence by politicians and 
senior civil servants. By being able to differentiate between different types of GLICs, 
this study provides evidence, from a principal-agent perspective, determining if 
different organizations’ objectives and control structures of GLICs might have 
different impact on earnings-management activities of their portfolio companies. 
 
Private blockholders. Other than government block ownership, private block 
ownership in listed firms in Malaysia is dominated by family-controlled firms 
(Claessens et al., 2000). Two opposing arguments exist as to the effect of their 
control (through share ownership or the appointment of family members to corporate 
board) on the earnings-management activities in firms.  
 
 
On one hand, family-controlled firms will limit the ability of managers to manipulate 
earnings as they have a better knowledge of their business activities which enable 
them to detect manipulation of accounting numbers (Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 
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2003). In addition, there will be less pressure on managers to engage in earnings-
management solely to show good performance in the short term while the controlling 
families will have a long-term interest in the firm (Jiraporn and DaDalt, 2009). 
Additionally, they should protect their investment interests because compared to 
small shareholders that can sell their shares quickly if they detect account 
misstatement in reported earnings, blockholders selling a block of shares often 
trigger share price to plunge; that will be detrimental to the value of their investment. 
 
On the other hand, blockholders who own a large portion of company shares and 
require a higher return from their investment will also benefit from favourable 
reported earnings such as the increases in shares prices. As such they might put 
pressure on managers to conduct income-increasing earnings-management (Zhong, 
Gribbin and Zheng, 2007; Alzoubi and Selamat, 2012; Halioui and Jerbi, 2012). In 
addition, Ding et al. (2007) suggested that in situations where expropriation of 
blockholders would result in lower actual earnings (such as losses due to related 
party transactions), they will exercise pressure on managers to manage earnings 
upward, to avoid any leakage of information (hiding exploitation) on their 
misbehaviour. Reducing the tax burden is another reason why blockholders might 
have an interest in encouraging earnings-management in the companies controlled by 
them (Ronen and Yaari, 2008).   
 
The incentive of blockholders to manipulate earnings is partly due to the 
entrenchment effect, particularly in countries in which the ownership concentration is 
higher and there is weak investor protection (Leuz. et al., 2003). In this case, the 
greater control that blockholders have by virtue of their equity ownership, may lead 
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them to enjoy private benefits that are not enjoyed by other shareholders, especially 
minority shareholders (Denis and McConnell, 2003). As the results, private benefits 
enjoyed by blockholders have the potential to increase the earnings-management 
activities in firms thus reduce the value of the firms in the long-term. This argument 
is in line with firms that operate in the institutional environment in which the Type II 
agency problem (the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders) are more common.  
 
Discussion in this section focuses on the theoretical underpinnings underlying this 
study. It also touches on the relationship between ownership structure and earnings-
management and the used of corporate governance mechanisms to minimize 
earnings-management in company. It also discusses the importance of corporate 
reporting to firm performance from the perspective of the parties who have an 
interest as well as their incentive especially the insiders to manipulate or improve 
corporate reporting. The next section presents previous empirical studies in 
connection with the relationship between ownership structure and earnings-
management. 
 
2.6.4 Empirical evidence on the relationship between ownership structure and 
earnings-management 
 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between ownership structure and earnings-
management provides inconclusive results. Studies on the impact of blockholders on 
earnings-management activities, such as those by Yeo et al., (2002); De Bos and 
Donker (2004) suggest that blockholders can effectively control the process of 
preparing financial statements and improve its credibility by exercising meticulous 
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control of earnings-management practice which reduces the tendency to manipulate 
the results by managers. Related to this, research using both country-level and cross-
country analysis has shown that ownership structures can have a positive impact on 
the quality of financial reporting due to insider influence (e.g. Fan and Wong, 2002; 
Haw, Hu, Hwang and Wu, 2004; Burgstahler et al., 2006). 
 
However, Leuz et al., (2003) in their research on the differences in the level of 
earnings-management across 31 countries based on financial accounting data from 
1990 to 1999 for over 8,000 listed firms, found that countries with relatively 
concentrated ownership, weak investor protection and less developed stock markets 
exhibit high levels of earnings-management. This explained different level of 
minority investor protection and ownership level matter in the study on earnings-
management activities. In addition, findings from their study are also consistent with 
their argument that managers and controlling owners have incentives to manage 
reported earnings in order to mask true firm performance and limit information 
disclosure for the benefit of controlling parties. 
 
Studies on the relationship between ownership and earnings-management in 
emerging markets mostly support the findings in Leuz et al. (2003). For example, Al-
Fayoumi et al., (2010) examined the relationship between earnings-management and 
ownership structure for a sample of Jordanian industrial listed firms during the 
period 2001-2005. Based on the final sample of 195 firm-year observations, they 
found that insider ownership
15
 (managerial ownership) significantly and positively 
affects earnings-management; this is consistent with the entrenchment effect as 
                                                          
15
 Al-Fayoumi et al., (2010) defined insider ownership as the percentage of shares held by officers or 
directors within the firm and their families. 
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previously discussed in this study. They also find insignificant role for institutions 
and blockholders in monitoring earnings-management behaviour in firms. 
 
Halioui and Jerbi (2012) also suggested similar results. They studied the impact of 
blockholders on earnings-management in 31 Tunisian listed firms during the period 
from 1998 to 2009 or 257 firm-year observations. They find that firm controlled by 
blockholders manage their earnings more than firm not controlled by them where in 
the context of Tunisia, blockholders are not effective in monitoring earnings-
management activities in the firms they invest in.  
 
Recently, a more comprehensive study was performed by Gopalan and Jayaraman 
(2012). They examined earnings-management practices of insider-controlled firms 
across 22 countries that involved 48,410 firm-year observations for the period from 
1992 to 2006.  Similar to Luez et al., (2003), they found that insider-controlled firms 
are associated with more earnings-management than non-insider controlled firms in 
weak investor protection countries.  
 
With regards to the research on the relationship between government ownership and 
earnings-management in emerging markets, much of the empirical literature is in the 
context of China. For example, Ding et al. (2007) investigated the impact of both 
ownership concentration and different ownership types, specifically the difference 
between government blockholder and private blockholders in Chinese market. They 
employed a total of 273 matched samples comprising portfolio companies owned by 
government blockholder and privately-owned listed companies (government-owned 
versus privately-owned). Findings from their study show that the higher the degree of 
60 |  P a g e
 
ownership concentration the lower earnings-management activities in their portfolio 
companies and suggest that “when the ownership concentration reaches a high level, 
large shareholders become the true owners of the firm, and are thus more likely to 
seek to preserve its future growth potential by minimising accounting earnings”. 
With regards of the ownership types, their analysis shows that privately-owned listed 
firms involved in income-increasing earnings-management more than their 
government-owned counterparts.   
 
Later Wang and Yung (2011) examined the impact of government ownership on 
earnings-management in Chinese market with a bigger sample size. They constructed 
a balanced panel data of listed firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange over a nine-year period from 1998 to 2006 that involved 2,833 firm-
year observations of government-owned listed firms and 2,239 firm-year 
observations of privately-owned listed firms. Consistently with Ding et al., (2007), 
they found that lower level of earnings-management among government-owned 
firms than privately-owned firms. They suggested that the protection of government-
owned firms by the government might have played important role in mitigating the 
pressure on managers to manipulate firm-specific information.  
 
In the Malaysian context, literature published on the relationship between ownership 
structure and earnings-management is scarce particularly on government ownership. 
Yen et al. (2007) examine the association between block ownership by GLCs and 
Chinese family-linked companies. Based on 25 matched samples of listed companies 
of each group of blockholders
16
 for the years from 2004 to 2005, they found that 
                                                          
16
Yen et al., (2007) select their sample of GLCs and Chinese family-linked companies from the 100 
indexed companies of composite index in Bursa Malaysia 
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earnings-management activities are lower in the firms owned by Chinese family 
linked companies as compare to their GLCs counterpart. However, they found a 
negative relationship between GLIC ownership concentration and earnings-
management, suggesting that government blockholders are effective in mitigating 
earnings-management activities in their portfolio companies.  
 
We noticed that while their study is not comprehensive, as only 25 listed federal 
GLCs were involved (listed GLCs owned by SEDCs excluded from sample as they 
not part of 100 indexed companies of composite index in Bursa Malaysia), the main 
concern is the use of finance-related companies as part of the sample, even though 
Yen et al. (2007) mentioned that these firms have unique characteristics and different 
compliance and regulatory requirements. This raises questions about the validity of 
the results obtained since the majority of previous studies on earnings-management 
exclude finance-related companies from sample as they are subject to different 
compliance and regulations (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ab Razak et al., 2011) and 
more importantly their behaviour of accruals differs from other industries (Klein, 
2002; Park and Shin, 2004; Mohd Ali et al., 2008). To our knowledge, this is the 
only published study that focuses on the issue of earnings-management in the context 
of GLCs in Malaysia. 
 
Johari, Mohd Saleh, Jaffar and Hassan (2008) examined the role of independent 
boards, CEO duality, board competency and managerial ownership on earnings-
management practices of Malaysian listed companies. Based on 598 firm-year 
observation of listed firms for the financial year ended in 2002 and 2003, they 
suggested that high ownership by managers (more than 25% shareholdings) may 
induce managers to manage earnings. However, corporate governance variables such 
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as CEO duality, independent board and board competency as well as interaction 
between the variables do not influence the practices of earnings-management in 
firms. 
 
 
Meanwhile, Mohd Ali et al., (2008) examined the association between the levels of 
ownership by different shareholders and earnings-management activities in 
Malaysian listed companies by taking into account the effect of firm size. They 
divided ownership into three types; namely, managerial ownership, block ownership 
and foreign ownership
17
. The sample is based on secondary data obtained from 
annual reports of firms listed on Bursa Malaysia for the years ending 2002 and 2003 
that involved final sample of 1,001 firm-year observations. The results show a low 
magnitude of association between ownership variables and earnings-management 
where managerial ownership can be an effective monitoring mechanism on earnings-
management activities in small firms. Their results also indicate that ownership by 
holding companies helps in reducing earnings-management in large or small firm’s 
sizes.    
 
Generally, previous empirical studies produced mixed results regarding the 
association between ownership structures and earnings-management. In Malaysia, 
while literature published on this issue is lacking, particularly on the association 
between government ownership and earnings-management, existing studies are also 
not comprehensive and thus are unable to help determine how serious earnings-
management practice among the different types of ownership of listed firms.  
 
                                                          
17
In this paper, Mohd Ali et al., (2008) sub-divided managerial ownership into shareholdings held by 
executive and non-executive. For block ownership they sub-divided into shareholdings by individual, 
institutional and holding companies.  
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2.7 Hypotheses development 
 
The following hypotheses are designed to test the impact of ownership structures on 
the magnitude of earnings-management of listed companies in Malaysia. 
 
 
2.7.1 Types of GLICs and GLC earnings-management 
As previously discussed, GLICs in Malaysia can be categorized into (i) federal 
government sponsored pension and investment funds (PIF GLIC); (ii) federal 
government owned GLICs (FGLIC) charged with promoting the federal 
government’s economic and social policies; and (iii) State Economic Development 
Corporations (SEDC) charged with promoting state governments’ economic and 
social policies.  
 
The primary objective of the PIF GLIC is to provide pension benefits or maximize 
savings returns for their depositors or unit holders. In terms of control structures, the 
majority of board members in PIF GLIC are representatives of depositors or unit 
holders as well as independent directors or specialist advisors.  
 
Research on the impact of institutional investors
18
 on earnings-management activities 
of their portfolio companies generally supports the role of institutional investors in 
preventing earnings-management (Ronen and Yaari, 2008; Cheng and Reitenga, 
2009). A study by Park and Shin (2004) in Canada listed firms shows that large 
public pension funds have a greater influence on the reduction of the earnings-
                                                          
18
Pension and investment funds included in the category of institutional investors (Zouari and Rebaï, 
2009) 
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management by playing an active role in deterring earnings-management activities 
due to the earnings-management behaviour that can negatively affect their long-term 
investment performance. They also found that the representatives from large public 
pension funds on the board further reduce earnings-management.  
 
Similar results are suggested by Zouari and Rebaï (2009) in the US market where the 
involvement of pension funds in firms capitals limits managers’ earnings-
management behaviours due to the fact that they are better informed than individual 
investors due to their informational advantages. Burns, Kedia, and Lipson (2010) 
also reported that monitoring by institutional investors in the US reduces earnings-
management.  
 
In addition, institutional investors might also have an incentive to deter earnings-
management as their investment is long-term investment which aims to provide 
continuing benefits to their depositors or unit holders. According to Chung, Firth and 
Kim (2005), institutional investors want managers to focus on firm long-term 
profitability rather than being pre-occupied with managing earnings on a year-by-
year basis. This for the reason that among other issues, while small investors can sell 
their shares quickly, for example if they expect a financial scandal due to earnings-
management practices, the situation is not the same for institutional investors that 
normally hold shares in large amounts. Selling shares on a large scale would further 
decrease the share prices thus producing a loss on their investment.  
 
In Malaysia, Abdul Jalil and Abdul Rahman (2010) examined the impact of 
institutional shareholdings on earnings-management activities of their portfolio firms 
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using sample of listed firms between 2002 until 2007. They suggest that institutional 
investors in Malaysia are effective in mitigating self-serving earnings-management 
behaviour in their portfolio firms and one of the government-owned institutional 
investors, namely Permodalan Nasional Berhad, is the most effective institutional 
shareholder in mitigating opportunistic earnings-management behaviour.  
 
 
By contrast, the boards of directors of FGLIC, such as the Khazanah Nasional 
Berhad, are appointed by the government and dominated by senior politicians, in 
particular the prime minister and senior ministers, as well as senior civil servants. 
The fact that government representatives have various other demands on their time 
and tend to have little experience in business or finance is likely to limit their ability 
to contribute effectively to the supervision and control of FGLIC or their portfolio 
companies thus might open space for managers to engage in earnings-management 
practices. Moreover, there is also the possibility for politicians on the board of 
FGLIC to use their portfolio companies for political purposes such as to boost share 
prices, particularly during an election year. In relation to this, empirical study by 
Piotroski, Wong and Zhang (2008) on the impact that political forces have on the 
financial reporting practices in China find that the government-controlled listed firms 
are significantly less likely to experience negative share price crashes around the 
years of the National Congress, in advance of political promotion decisions and 
during the course of corruption investigations relative to non-event year. Despite the 
political system in China and Malaysia is different, it is probable that the same issues 
occur in Malaysia cannot be ignored as FGLICs' influence on their portfolio 
companies is likely to be politically motivated rather than commercially motivated 
(Najid and Abdul Rahman, 2011). Finally, we argue that in the context of emerging 
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economies like Malaysia, the presence of senior politicians on the board of FGLIC 
may also create extra pressure on managers in GLCs to engage in income-increasing 
earnings-management. 
 
This consideration suggests: 
Hypothesis 1: The magnitude of earnings-management of GLCs controlled by PIF 
GLIC is lower than the magnitude of earnings-management of GLCs 
controlled by FGLIC. 
 
Although there are similarities between FGLIC and SEDC with regards to the 
organizations’ objectives and the composition of their board members, the 
performance of SEDC and their portfolio companies is under less scrutiny as laws 
and regulations are more difficult to enforce the further entities are away from the 
centre of power (Chen et al., 2009). Moreover, the Putrajaya Committee on GLC 
High Performance rarely scrutinises the performance of SEDCs’ portfolio 
companies, although SEDCs themselves fall under the scrutiny of the relevant state’s 
parliamentary Public Accounts Committee and the Auditor General. In these 
circumstances, there is a potential for SEDC to take into account the political 
considerations to influence the companies under their control to report higher 
earnings and this put pressure on managers of their portfolio companies to engage in 
earnings-management practices. Research by Chen, Lee and Li (2008) on earnings-
management activities of local government-owned firms in China (equivalent to 
GLCs owned by SEDCs in Malaysian context) found that earnings-management 
exists mainly in listed firms controlled by local governments than those controlled by 
federal government. 
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Our next line of argument is that FGLIC may also be concerned more about lack of 
transparency and volatility of the share returns resulting from earnings-management 
in their portfolio companies (Yang, Chi and Young, 2011) that may hinder foreign 
investment to Malaysian capital market. This is because, for many foreign investors, 
quality of financial reporting and stability of the financial markets are the main 
considerations in determining investment decisions (see OECD White Paper, 2003; 
Kothari, 2001; Leuz et al., 2008). Thus, the desire to help in implementing federal 
government policy in attracting foreign investment has the potential to be the main 
incentive for FGLIC in deterring earnings-management activities in their portfolio 
companies.  
 
We therefore expect that: 
Hypothesis 2: The magnitude of earnings-management of GLCs controlled by 
FGLIC is lower than the magnitude of earnings-management of GLCs 
controlled by SEDC. 
 
 
Given our earlier discussion regarding the objectives and corporate governance of 
PIF GLIC, we also hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The magnitude of earnings-management of GLCs controlled by PIF 
GLIC is lower than the magnitude of earnings-management of GLCs 
controlled by SEDC. 
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2.7.2 Private blockholders and earnings-management (PRIVATE) 
 
 
Following Ding et al., (2007) and Wang and Yung (2011), we consider blockholders 
other than government blockholders as private blockholders. Majority of previous 
empirical studies particularly in Chinese markets that compare earnings-management 
between government and private blockholders suggest that listed firms controlled by 
private blockholders involved in earnings-management more than their government-
owned counterparts (Ding et al., 2007; Wang and Yung; 2011).  
 
 
In Malaysia, Yen et al. (2007) found that earnings-management activities are lower 
in the firms owned by Chinese family-linked companies as compare to their GLCs 
counterpart. However, since we doubt the validity of their results as previously 
discussed, further evidence is needed. In the meantime, while listed firms controlled 
by private blockholders have to compete to keep growing, some GLCs, particularly 
those in strategic industries, might benefit from protectionist measures and financial 
support (Tan, 2007). Related to this, Wang and Yung, (2011) suggested that the 
protection of government-owned firms by the government might have played 
important role in mitigating the pressure on managers to manipulate firm-specific 
information.  
 
GLCs, particularly those owned by federal GLICs, are monitored by various 
government institutions such as Auditor General, the federal parliamentary Public 
Accounts Committee and the Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance that 
routinely assesses the performance and corporate governance of key GLCs. These 
monitoring activities might help in minimizing earnings-management practices in 
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GLCs. Moreover, GLICs in fact are explicitly charged with improving the corporate 
governance in their portfolio companies (Malaysia Ministry of Finance, 2010) that is 
in line with government policy to attract foreign investment. Therefore, to implement 
the mandate and to support government policy on foreign investment, GLICs might 
have incentive to mitigate earnings-management practices in their portfolio 
companies. All these considerations unfortunately are not part of the objectives of 
private blockholders that are more inclined to maximizing profits.  
 
This consideration suggests: 
Hypothesis 4: The magnitude of earnings-management of listed firms controlled by 
private blockholders is higher than the magnitude of earnings-
management of GLCs controlled by PIF GLIC, FGLIC and SEDC. 
 
2.7.3 Managerial ownership and earnings-management (MANSHARE) 
 
One of the ways suggested by agency theory to solve the agency problem between 
owners and managers is through share ownership by managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In this way, the manager will be part of the company’s ownership 
(managerial blockholders) and in practice should act in conformity with the interests 
of other shareholders in order to protect their long-term investment objectives in 
firms. This will reduce the agency cost in organization and from an earnings-
management viewpoint this incentive alignment effect will minimize manager 
incentive to manipulate accounting figures in financial reporting for their personal 
interests.  
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Empirical studies show mixed results on the relationship between managerial 
ownership and earnings-management practices. Research in developed stock markets 
mostly suggest effects that are consistent with contention in agency theory that 
managerial ownership helps in reducing earnings-management activities in firms 
{see for example, Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith, 1982 (US markets); Warfield, Wild 
and Wild, 1995 (US markets); Teshima and Shuto, 2008 (Japan markets); Yang, Lai 
and Tan, 2008 (Taiwan markets); Alves, 2012 (Portugal markets)}.   
 
However, in emerging markets with high ownership concentration along with 
comparatively weak degree of investor protection as well as a less developed stock 
market (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens and Fan, 2002; Leuz et al., 2003; Haniffa 
and Hudaib, 2006; Rachagan and Satkunasingam, 2009), the effect of managerial 
ownership on earnings-management may give opposite results.  
 
 
Related to this, Limpaphayom and Manmettakul (2004) examined the relationship 
between managerial ownership and earnings-management proxied by discretionary 
accruals of listed firms in Thailand for the period from 1998 to 2000 that involved 
207 firm-year observations. They found that managerial ownership is positively 
related to the use of discretionary accruals in financial reporting. They argued that 
unique institutional settings such as high ownership concentration and poor corporate 
governance structure in Thailand is leading to relatively high agency conflicts and 
information asymmetry contributes to these findings.   
 
Al-Fayoumi et al., (2010) investigated the relationship between earnings-
management and ownership structure for a sample of Jordanian industrial listed firms 
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involving 195 firm-year observations during the period 2001-2005.  Their results 
showed that managerial ownership is significant and positively affect earnings-
management.  
 
Meanwhile, in Malaysia, Johari et al., (2008) examined the role of corporate 
governance variables and managerial ownership on earnings-management practices 
of Malaysian listed companies. Based on 598 firm-year observation of listed firms 
for the financial year ended in 2002 and 2003, they suggested that managerial 
ownership is associated positively with earnings-management practices.  
 
Although our hypothesis competes with the agency theory, it takes into account the 
ownership structure and market discipline that differs between developed markets 
and emerging markets. This hypothesis is worth to be proposed. 
 
We therefore expect that: 
Hypothesis 5: There is a significant positive relationship between managerial 
  ownership and earnings-management 
 
 
2.7.4 Blockholders ownership concentration and earnings-management  
 
Property rights and agency theory suggest that, the higher the degree of share 
ownership by a blockholder, the greater the incentive and ability to participate in the 
supervision and control of the firm’s management (Rock, 1991; Holderness, 2003). 
Like in many other East Asian countries, Malaysian companies generally have a high 
level of ownership concentration and dominant insider investors (La Porta et al., 
1999; Liew, 2007). Given the comparatively weak degree of minority shareholder 
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protection in the country (Claessens and Fan, 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; 
Rachagan and Satkunasingam, 2009), ownership concentration by blockholders 
might lead to tighter supervision and control of managers and, therefore might reduce 
the risk of accounting manipulations by opportunistic managers. This is for the 
reason that the higher interest of blockholders in firms, the greater their incentives to 
monitor management (Ramsey and Blair, 1993). This is practical particularly when 
the costs associated with monitoring management are less than the expected benefits 
to their large equity holdings in the firm.  
 
Gomes (2000) suggested that high concentrated ownership by blockholders is a 
signal to the blockholders commitment to develop a reputation for not expropriating 
minority shareholders. Moreover, blockholders’ large stakes may give them greater 
access to information: given their voting power, management is more willing to meet 
with them (Edmans and Manso, 2011).  
 
Empirical research by Ding et al. (2007) in Chinese market on the relationship 
between earnings-management measures and ownership concentration found that the 
higher the degree of ownership concentration the lower the level of abnormal 
accruals in their portfolio companies. They suggested that “when the ownership 
concentration reaches a high level, large shareholders become the true owners of the 
firm, and are thus more likely to seek to preserve its future growth potential by 
minimising accounting earnings.” Similar findings were suggested by Wang and 
Yung (2011). In other markets, Abdoli (2011) reported a significant and negative 
association between blockholders’ ownership concentration and earnings-
management in the Tehran Stock Exchange and recently Alves (2012) found that 
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discretionary accrual as a proxy of earnings-management is negatively related to 
ownership concentration by the largest shareholders in Portuguese listed firms.  
 
However, while a higher degree of ownership by blockholders might benefit 
minority shareholders by undertaking the monitoring role of management, and has 
potential to alleviate the governance problem, there is a possibility that they could 
actually do more harm than good when they become entrenched; they might 
expropriate the wealth of minority investors (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Ding et al., (2007) argued 
that, in situations where expropriation of blockholders would result in lower actual 
earnings, they may exercise pressure on managers to manage earnings upward, to 
avoid any leakage of information on their misbehaviour. Similar arguments are found 
in Ely and Song (2000) and Leuz et al., (2003) where blockholders, in order to hide 
firm’s real economic situation, may increase manager incentive to conduct income-
increasing earnings-management as they might put more pressure on managers to 
report favourable accounting performance. This discussion suggests that when 
blockholders become entrenched, mainly caused by too high ownership 
concentration, this may result in higher earnings-management activities.  
 
As the impact of blockholders ownership concentration on earnings-management can 
be discussed in both positive and negative associations, we therefore predict a 
significant relationship between the variables without specifying the direction of the 
relationship. Therefore, the proposed hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 6: There is a significant relationship between ownership concentration  
  by blockholders and earnings-management 
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TABLE 2-1: Major Characteristics of GLICs in Malaysia   
No. Criteria Federal Government Sponsored Pension and 
Investment Funds 
 
Federal Government Owned GLICs  State Economic Development 
Corporations  
 
1. 
 
GLICs name The Employee Provident Fund,  the National 
Equity Corporation (Permodalan Nasional 
Berhad), the Armed Forces Fund Board 
(Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera) and  the 
Pilgrimage Fund Board 
 
Khazanah Nasional Berhad, Ministry of Finance 
(Incorporated) etc. 
State Economic Development Corporation 
of Johor, Perak, Kedah, Pahang and 
Selangor etc. 
2. Statute/Act Established under the Parliament Act  
 
Established under the Malaysian Companies 
Act 1965 as a company limited by shares 
 
Established under the State Legislation  
3. 
 
 
Shareholders and 
ownership 
Technically owned by depositors or unit holders 
as the ultimate beneficiaries. However, since 
these GLICs had been established under the 
Parliament Act and the Malaysian government 
also provides funding and capital guarantees, 
they are under the purview of specific 
government ministries.  
 
Malaysia Ministry of Finance: 100% 
 
 
 
State-owned statutory body   
 
 
 
4. Primary Objective To provide pension benefits or maximize 
savings returns for their depositors or unit 
holders  
(e.g. Khazanah Nasional Berhad) 
Investment holding arm of the Government of 
Malaysia and is empowered as the 
Government's strategic investor in new 
industries and markets as well as to serve the 
country’s national interests, particularly with 
regards to the control of strategic assets and 
industries deemed crucial to Malaysia’s 
economic growth and its social development 
plan. 
 
 
 
 
Promoting the state government’s 
economic and social development policies 
particularly in exploiting their own natural 
resources and supporting new industries as 
well as to ensure Bumiputera’s 
participation in the ownership and control 
of the corporate wealth of the state.  
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5. 
 
Board Composition 
 
 
 
(e.g. Employee Provident Fund) 
 
i. A Chairman; 
 
ii. 5 government representatives;
 19
 
 
iii. 3 employers’ representatives; 
 
iv. 3 employees’ representatives; 
 
v. 3 professional representatives; and 
 
vi. 1 ex-officio (CEO) 
 
(e.g. Khazanah Nasional Berhad) 
 
i. A chairman;  
(Malaysia’s Prime Minister and Minister of 
Finance) 
 
ii. Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department; 
 
iii. Second Finance Minister; 
 
iv. 5 professional representatives; 
 
v. 1 ex-officio (CEO) 
 
 
All SEDCs have a similar board 
composition where the Chief Minister of 
the particular state is the Chairman of the 
board and other members are mostly senior 
civil servants or political representatives 
from the relevant state. For example below 
is board composition of Kedah SEDC:  
i. Chairman: Kedah Chief Minister 
 
ii. 3 officials of the Kedah Civil Service; 
 The State Secretary 
 The State Legal Adviser 
 The State Financial Officer 
 
iii. 3 officials of the Federal Government; 
 Representative from the Ministry 
of Finance; 
 Representative from the Prime 
Minister’s Department; 
 Representative from the Ministry 
of International Trade & Industry 
 
iv. 5 other members; 
 Three politicians from Kedah 
 One ex-senior civil servant 
 One representative from Kedah 
SEDC 
 
v. 1 ex-officio (CEO) 
 
 
Source: Memorandum & Article of Association of SEDCs, Khazanah Nasional Berhad and various of GLICs under the Federal Government Sponsored Pension and 
Investment Funds group 
                                                          
19
 All government representatives are senior civil servants 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
All research is based on some underlying philosophical assumptions about what 
constitutes valid research and which research method is suitable for the development 
of knowledge in the study performed. This chapter outlines the research 
methodology employed in this research project and discusses various research 
paradigms and possible approaches to our study. In addition, this chapter also 
discusses the two main research methods which are quantitative research methods 
and qualitative research methods as well as their adaptations for the Malaysian 
context. 
 
3.2 Research Paradigm 
There are various paradigms in research but the two primary research paradigms are:  
 
3.2.1 Positivism – this paradigm associated with quantitative research. It involves 
hypothesis testing to obtain “objective” truth and also used to predict what 
may happen at a future date. Critical realism is a sub-type of positivism that 
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incorporates some value assumptions on the part of the researcher. It involves 
looking at power in society. In this paradigm, researchers primarily rely on 
quantitative data; and  
 
3.2.2  Interpretivism – this paradigm associated with qualitative research. It used 
to obtain an understanding of the world from an individual perspective and 
critical humanism is a sub-type of the interpretive paradigm. The critical 
humanism approach is one in which the researcher involves people studied in 
the research process. 
 
TerreBlance and Durrheim (1999) stated that the research process has three main 
dimensions, namely ontology, epistemology and methodology. According to them, a 
research paradigm is an all-encompassing system of interconnected practice and 
thinking that define the nature of enquiry along these three dimensions of research 
process.  
 
Kuhn (1962) defines a paradigm as “an integrated cluster of substantive concepts, 
variables and problems attached with corresponding methodological approaches and 
tools…..”. He refers paradigm as a research culture with a set of beliefs, values and 
assumptions that a research community has in common regarding the nature and 
conduct of research (Kuhn, 1977).  
  
Ontological and epistemological aspects concern what is commonly referred to as a 
person's world view. Ontology consists of two syllables, ie. ontos and logos. Ontos 
mean something tangible and logos meaning knowledge. So the principal area of 
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philosophy ontology is questioning the fact of the existence of things that are 
according to the systematic relations order based on law of causality. Ontology can 
be also interpreted as knowledge or theory about the existence of any fact. Thus, the 
object of knowledge is experience that can be seen. In other words, ontology is the 
study of things that exist in reality based on logic alone. 
 
Meanwhile, epistemology is the part of philosophy that deals with the occurrence of 
knowledge, sources of knowledge, origin of knowledge, the limits, the nature, 
method, and the authenticity of knowledge. So the material object from epistemology 
is knowledge and its formal object is the fact of the knowledge. 
 
Lastly, methodology refers to the most appropriate method to conduct research and 
determine an effective procedure for answering the research problem. In order to 
effectively implement a research, the methodology must involves the formation of 
hypotheses formulated, the selection of the study design, data collection methods, the 
determination of the population and selection sample, test pilot if necessary and data 
analysis methods. 
 
 
3.3 Quantitative and qualitative research method 
 
Many debates discuss the use of both of these methods in research. If researchers are 
too obsessed and realistic with numerical analysis, they assume that the quantitative 
method is the best. However, some are not satisfied with the quantitative study. They 
felt that not all things mechanical in nature. They agree with the view that the 
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qualitative research is the better way to understand the social world phenomenon and 
human interaction. 
 
Quantitative studies hold the perspective of positivism and post-positivism. 
Positivism pioneered by Aristotle, Francis Bacon, August Comte and Kant Immauel. 
After World War two, the flow of post-positivism began to grow to replace the 
notion of positivism.  
 
Through post-positivism paradigm, the researchers tried to carry out research to test 
theories and hypotheses of the study and measurement of research conducted more 
on objectives measurement that can be seen.  
 
In the meantime, researchers in qualitative research sticking with constructivism that 
understands the reality of human experience based on their own life. Measurement is 
more subjective in qualitative study. This means that researchers are able to interpret 
the meaning of diversity depending on each individual differently. 
 
 
3.3.1 Qualitative research 
 
Qualitative research more focused to observe the phenomenon from different 
perspectives, and the construction of meaning is from the perspective of the subject. 
Thus, qualitative researchers are more accepting interpretivism perspective that 
growing when there are some group of researcher who are not satisfied with the post-
positivist perspective view.  
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They argued that post-positivism was too mechanical in nature, especially in 
explaining human interaction. They argue that people should have a better 
understanding of the world to provide more open space for interaction between 
human beings and also emphasizes how people should behave in a social world 
(Miller, 2005). The fact is, there are some research question that are cannot be easily 
answered through quantitative research but requires qualitative explanation in 
interpreting human phenomena.  
 
Qualitative research also not focused on large data collection. However, the focus is 
on the acquisition of quality information even with a small sample selection. As 
such, the advantages of qualitative research selection as a very effective method in 
discussing factors that are not backed by numerical. 
 
In this type of research, the researcher is the main instrument, particularly in the data 
collection process. This contrasts with the quantitative study which many researchers 
rely on questionnaires as used in the survey design. This also means that the 
researcher's role in qualitative research is more important and sometimes risky. This 
is because as the main instrument, the main challenge faced by researchers is to 
refrain from making an unbiased assessment particularly when interpreting the data 
such as the results from statistics analysis. 
 
Qualitative data collection is also quite risky if researchers are not careful because 
even a small mistake is certainly caused the data invalid. Thus, qualitative 
researchers need to master the skills of data collection along with strategies to 
maximize data collection means. Phenomenology, ethnography, grounded theory and 
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case studies are among the design in qualitative study that often carried out by 
researchers.  
 
In the meantime, the data collection methods that are commonly used include 
observation methods (participant observation), in-depth interviews, focus groups and 
document analysis 
 
3.3.2 Quantitative research 
 
In the meantime, quantitative research is research that required numerical data and 
involve statistical analysis to understand and explain the phenomenon being studied. 
Through this method, researchers should collect data formally and systematically.  
 
For example, if researchers use questionnaires as research tools, they must ensure 
that each survey conducted to meet the objectives and research questions and has a 
validity of measuring instruments and have practical reliability. Through quantitative 
research, the problem is stated in the form of hypotheses. 
 
Quantitative research is divided into two types: the intervention study and non-
intervention study. For the intervention study, the appropriate study design is 
experimental studies, while for non-interventional study the appropriate study 
designs are correlation study and survey. Experimental studies describing whether 
intervention influence the outcome of one group compared with the other groups, 
while the correlation study is to predict the relationship or relationships between 
variables. Finally the survey study describes trends for a population.  
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3.3.3 The main differences between quantitative and qualitative study  
To see the difference between these two methods of study, we can learn from some 
of their research aspects as follows:  
 
i) Paradigm research Used 
In qualitative research, the paradigm used is sourced from a natural paradigm 
phenomenological view and unlike quantitative research, this paradigm derived from 
positivism views. Among the assumptions of qualitative method are research 
question is socially developed, prioritize areas of research, involve complex variables 
that related to one another and are difficult to measure.  
 
It also uses a hypothesis-based approach that based on grounded theory that appear 
and can be described. Research used as the main instrument for finding patterns, 
pluralism, complexity and little use of numerical indicators. Reporting was 
descriptively and most important role is personal involvement by the researcher to 
create the empathic understanding of the problem being studied. 
 
Contrast to this, quantitative research paradigms have assumed that social facts have 
objective reality. It prioritize those variables that can be identified and based on a 
view from outside that have general meaning, can be expected as well as have a 
causal explanation. Quantitative research used hypotheses and theoretical, 
manipulation and control, experimentation, deductive, analytical components, 
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finding consensus and summarized data by using numerical methods in its research 
methodology. 
 
Here, the role of the researcher is not bound where they do not have to identify 
themselves. Quantitative study also provides an objectives view of a question that 
going to be studied. 
 
ii) Research purposes 
 
 
Quantitative methods are able to create an objective description on the limited 
phenomenon and determine whether the phenomenon can be controlled through 
multiple interventions. On the flip side, qualitative methods means to develop an 
understanding on individuals and events by taking into account the relevant context. 
 
iii) Problem Identification 
 
 
Quantitative methods describe the problem in the form of relationship between 
variables, cause-effect relationships, comparative relationships or associative 
relationship
20
. Meanwhile, the problem identification in qualitative methods is 
usually formulated in general and broad, but at the time of data collection, the 
problem will be detailed out. 
 
                                                          
20
 Associative relationship is a relationship that positive in nature that can strengthen or reinforce links 
or solidarity between social groups 
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Table 3.1 shows the summary of differences between quantitative and qualitative 
study 
 
3.4 Validity and reliability in research 
 
Validity and reliability are very important instrument to defend the accuracy of the 
instrument from exposed to defects. The higher the value of the validity and 
reliability instrument, the more accurate the data will be obtained for produce good-
quality studies. A researcher must concern with the validity and reliability of the 
instrument and research data as it will determine the validity and reliability of the 
results. 
 
3.4.1 Validity of research 
 
Validity is defined as the appropriateness, truthfulness, meaningfulness and 
usefulness for instruments that enable data to be inference. Validity also means the 
agreement between two attempts to measure the same trait in maximum with 
different method (Fraenkel and Wallen (1996). According to them, there are three 
techniques in determining the validity of the instrument. 
 
i. Content-related evidence of validity 
 
The technique refers to the accuracy of the content and format of the instrument, the 
comprehensive nature of instruments and usability variables. The accuracy and 
adequacy of the contents of the items and its consistency are important to be 
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measured and evaluated by the sample. This technique uses expert judgment to prove 
the accuracy of the content item when evaluating the instrument. 
 
ii. Criterion-related evidence of validity 
 
This technique refers to the relationship between the scores or results obtained from 
an instrument with a score or results derived from one or more other instruments to 
see how the relationship of these instruments. This way requires researchers to 
compare the predictions with the results of the initial analysis to final analysis. 
 
It also requires researchers to do concurrent validity which means that the same two 
tests, administered to two different samples in the same time period yielded two 
scores equal or nearly equal. This method requires reading index correlation 
coefficient (r), which shows the degree of relationship between the scores obtained in 
the two instruments. 
 
iii. Construct-related evidence of validity 
 
This technique refers to the degree of proof consistently derived from variety of 
different evidence. There are three steps to finding Construct-Related Evidence; (a) 
variables to be measured must be clearly defined; (b) hypothesis built should be 
based on the underlying theory to variables; and (c) hipotesis was logically and 
empirically tested. 
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3.4.2 Reliability of research  
 
Reliability of the instrument is a measure to determine the consistency of the scores 
or results of each item. Consistency means that when the same items tested several 
times on the same subject at different time intervals but still give a decision or 
answer equal or nearly equal. According to Campbell and Fiske (1959), reliability 
defined as agreement between two efforts to measure the same trait in maximum by 
using the same method. 
 
The concept of reliability of measurement in quantitative methods, especially the use 
of questionnaires designed to test batches of questionnaires through the means test 
pilot which is one small-scale testing. The pilot study represents a preliminary trial 
before the items of the actual test applied to real samples.  
 
The purpose of the pilot study made is to get the transparency of data from the trial 
by a small group of individuals. Another purpose is to assess the reliability, objective 
and usability of the item itself. In general there are three ways to test the degree of 
reliability of items understudy:  
 
i. Test-retest reliability 
 
This test describes the degree of score that should be always consistent every time 
when it is tested. The same instrument repeatedly tested to the same sample group 
but at different times. Two sets of data obtained will be analyzed through correlation 
analysis to see strength of the relationship. If the correlation coefficient reliability 
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near to the value of one, then the two sets of data have a strong relationship or 
connection or the instrument has high value of reliability. 
 
 
ii. Equivalent-from reliability 
 
In this test, two different tests sets but have the same content (variables), the same 
number of items, the same structure, the same level of difficulty and the same 
direction. The two instruments will be given to the same group of sample at the same 
time. Two sets of data collected will be analyzed to get the reliability coefficients.  
 
The scores from the two samples must be correlated each other. Average scores 
obtained from both test is an indication of the degree of reliability. It is also referred 
to as alternate-form reliability scores that show diversity from one form to another 
form. Test-retest and Equivalent-form reliability test can be combined to assess the 
stability of scores obtained at each time and administered to a small number of 
samples. This technique is very good because the items can be generalized in a set of 
items. 
 
iii. Internal consistency 
 
Internal consistencey method is used to assess the internal consistency of the 
instrument. Only one item is set to be tested to a small number of samples. There are 
three procedures in this method: 
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a) Split-half procedure 
For a long and difficult to run instruments, it requires division into two categories 
according to the odd and even number of items that administered at two different 
times with two test forms in a group samples. Correction Spearman-Brown formula 
is used in this procedure.  
 
b) Rationale equivalent reliability  
This technique is to determine how all of the items in a test related to each other 
items including the relationship between the sub items and the total items. 
 
c) Cronbach’s alpha procedure 
It is commonly-used for evaluate the correlation coefficient based on the average 
correlation of items in a test where each item is assume to be in a standard form. If 
the items are not standardized, then average covariance then be used in the analysis.  
 
3.5 The adaptations of quantitative analysis in this study 
This study investigates the impact of government ownership on corporate 
performance and earnings management activities of their portfolio companies. In 
detail, this examined the impact of different GLICs on financial performance of 
GLCs and whether different GLICs have different impact on earnings management 
practices of GLCs controlled by them.  
 
To measure financial performance among GLCs and earnings management practices 
among GLCs and non-GLCs, we need to employ data from reliable sources to ensure 
the validity and reliability of our research as previously discussed. Therefore, we 
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decided to employ published data from annual reports of all firms in our sample. The 
published data in annual reports are considered from reliability source as the data has 
been verified and audited by external auditors. Moreover, various internal 
mechanisms such as board of directors, audit committee as well as internal auditor 
has been carefully review the data before it can be released to public.  
 
Therefore, the data collected from published reports as we employed in this study 
can be considered as data from a reliable source and has high degree of data 
reliability and validity. Moreover, as nature of this study is on corporate performance 
and earnings management, we cannot use other sources of data such as interview or 
questionnaires as those approaches might lead to bias results because of unreliability 
source of data. This is for the reason that, if we used for example questionnaires as a 
tool of data collection, we might risk of data been manipulated by managers as they 
usually try to show good firm’s financial performance and at the same time try to 
hide all information on earnings management practices.        
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Table 3.1: Summary of differences between quantitative and qualitative study 
Research features Quantitative study Qualitative study 
Data form The numerical Data that can 
be measured. 
Data in the form of words or 
sentences collected through 
interviews or recorded in the 
form of pictures or videos. 
Research 
instrument 
Researchers using 
instruments such as 
questionnaires and 
achievement tests to collect 
data. The instrument 
functions as a measuring tool 
and a tool intermediary 
between researchers and 
study participants. 
 
 
Researcher is the main 
instrument for data collection. 
Researchers need to be in the 
situation under study, listen 
and observe the phenomenon 
to be studied directly. 
Research design Research design set before 
data collection. 
 
 
Research designs are flexible, 
can be adjusted according to 
the conditions and 
requirements of the situation 
Study participant Researchers are not 
participants in the study. 
Study participants were 
selected sample using 
specific sampling techniques 
 
Research is part of the research 
participants. Information is 
obtained directly from study 
participants 
Research 
methodology 
Researchers study population 
or a representative sample of 
the population. Large sample 
size and selected based on 
probability. 
 
 
 
Small sample size and selected 
based on the intended and not 
probabilities. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT-LINKED INVESTMENT 
COMPANIES IN MALAYSIA ON THE PERFORMANCE OF 
THEIR PORTFOLIO COMPANIES 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD, 2010: 5) “the scale and scope of state-owned enterprises in many Asian 
economies calls for specific attention to be given to their corporate governance.” In 
Malaysia, Government-linked Companies (GLCs), i.e. listed firms in which 
government linked investment companies (GLICs) hold a controlling stake (Malaysia 
Ministry of Finance, 2010:100), produce 10 per cent of the country’s economic 
output, employ more than 300,000 people and account for 49 per cent of the total 
stock market capitalisation of the Bursa Malaysia (Malaysia Ministry of Finance, 
2010).  
 
The OECD (2010: 5-6) states that such state-owned enterprises “often suffer both 
from passive ownership by the state and, at the same time, from undue political 
interference.” This can lead to poorer corporate governance and performance. 
However, improvements in the corporate governance of these companies are 
expected to facilitate not only economic efficiency gains for individual firms but also 
to help attract foreign investors and domestic depositors to domestic capital markets. 
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While many emerging economies have introduced reforms aimed at increasing 
minority shareholder protection and increasing the transparency and efficiency of 
their capital markets, the ability to enforce minority shareholder protection rights 
often remains rather limited (Claessens and Fan, 2002; Rachagan and 
Satkunasingam, 2009). As blockholders in listed firms, GLICs can potentially 
mitigate this problem by improving the supervision and control of their portfolio 
firms (Wade, 2004; Lau and Tong, 2008). In Malaysia, for instance, federal GLICs 
are explicitly charged with improving the corporate governance of their portfolio 
companies (Malaysia Ministry of Finance, 2010)
21
. This is expected not only to 
improve the financial performance of the individual firms but also to encourage the 
mobilisation of private domestic savings as well as foreign direct and portfolio 
investment to improve domestic firms’ access to outside capital (Malaysia Putrajaya 
Committee on GLC High Performance, 2006a; 2006b; Malaysia Ministry of Finance, 
2010). 
 
This is of particular importance as limited access to external funds is frequently 
identified as one of the key problems which hampers the economic development of 
emerging economies both at national and at an individual business level (Hearn, 
Piesse, and Strange, 2010; Tsoukas, 2011; Fan, Wei, and Xu, 2011). Portfolio 
investors tend to avoid companies and countries with weak investor protection laws 
and weak enforcement regimes (La Porta, Lopes-De-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1997; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gibson, 2003; Fan et al., 2011).  
                                                          
21
 Corporate Governance Survey Report (2008) conducted by Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 
and Nottingham University Business School involving all listed companies in Bursa Malaysia 
Securities revealed that, GLCs were the leaders in terms of implementing recommended corporate 
governance best practices as suggest in Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2001.      
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In the past, enquiries into the impact of government ownership on the performance of 
listed companies largely treated government investment as homogeneous (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994; Boyocko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996; Sun, Tong, and Tong, 2002; 
Tam and Tan, 2007; Azmi, 2008; Shen and Lin, 2009; Mohd Ghazali, 2010; Ab 
Razak, Ahmad, and Joher, 2011; Le and Buck, 2011; Najid and Rahman, 2011; 
Wang and Yung, 2011).  
 
However, research by Chen, Firth, and Xu (2009) into the impact of government 
ownership on listed firms in China first examined whether differences in objectives 
and motivations of the government investment organisations have an impact on 
government ownership in listed companies’ performance. In relation to this, what 
distinguishes our study from the study by Chen et al. (2008) is mainly that we focus 
on Malaysia.  Malaysia’s political and economic systems differ from China. These 
differences certainly affect how the respective governments influence the affairs of 
their government investment organisations as well as the portfolio companies owned 
by them. For example, while all government investment organisations in China (at 
central or local government level) must comply with the regulations and directives 
from the same government (one-party systems), GLICs in Malaysia are subject to 
policies of the ruling political party.  
 
Previously, researchers often suggested that government block ownership has a 
negative influence on firm performance due to politicians’ incentives to use their 
influence over firms to pursue political, social or economic objectives to the 
detriment of other shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Cuervo and Villalonga, 
2000; Sun et al., 2002; Le and Buck, 2011; Wang and Yun, 2011). However, there 
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has been little consideration of how politicians’ direct or indirect role in the corporate 
governance of portfolio companies affects the firms’ performance. 
 
By taking into account different types of government investment companies, their 
ownership concentration, the existence of golden share provisions and the 
participation of politicians and senior civil servants in the boards of directors of 
GLCs in Malaysia, this project aims to contribute to a more detailed understanding of 
the impact of government ownership and political representation in boards on the 
performance of listed GLCs. This topic is of particular importance for emerging and 
developing economies, which aim to develop their stock markets by mobilising 
domestic savings and attracting foreign investors to facilitate firms’ access to 
external funds (Tsoukas, 2011).  
 
Malaysia is an interesting case in this context, as the government explicitly expects 
its federal GLICs to facilitate good corporate governance and minority shareholder 
protection in their portfolio companies (Malaysia Ministry of Finance, 2010; 
Malaysia Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance, 2006a; 2006b). 
Moreover, in Malaysia, GLICs can be differentiated into three distinct types, with 
different objectives and control structures.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 explains the data and 
the research approach employed. Section 4.3 discusses the empirical results and 
finally section 4.4 concludes the chapter. 
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4.2 Research Approach 
 
4.2.1 Sample Selection  
 
Our initial sample consisted of all GLCs listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia 
between 2004 and 2008 in which a single GLIC held at least 20 percent of the 
outstanding share capital and is the largest investor, in line with Ang and Ding 
(2006), Lau and Tong (2008), Ab Razak et al., (2011). This takes account of the 
Malaysian government’s own definition of GLCs as “companies that have a primary 
commercial objective and in which the Malaysian Government has a direct 
controlling stake” (Malaysia Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance, 
2006c: A1-1). While not specifying a certain percentage of ownership, the 
government suggests that its control rights should be sufficient to appoint board 
members and influence major decisions in relation to such matters as the awarding of 
contracts, strategy development, restructuring and financing, acquisitions and 
divestments. 
 
Research investigating the impact of block ownership on corporate performance 
tends to use a variety of thresholds, generally ranging from 3 per cent to 20 per cent 
(Gadhoum, Lang, and Young, 2005; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). Given our research 
objective, we opted for a 20 per cent threshold, in line with previous research by La 
Porta et al. (1999), Ang and Ding (2006) and Setia-Atmaja (2009). At this level of 
ownership, we expected that individual GLICs have sufficient voting rights to 
control the GLCs’ management if they choose to engage in the supervision and 
control of their portfolio companies. According to Holderness (2003) in his survey of 
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blockholders and corporate control, 20 percent is the best available estimate of the 
current level of block ownership of public corporations. 
 
As they are subject to different regulatory requirements, firms in the financial 
industry (such as the banking sector, insurance, securities and unit trust) were 
subsequently excluded (Ab Razak et al., 2011; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ibrahim 
and Samad, 2011). In addition, following Ibrahim and Samad (2011), we excluded 
companies which fail to comply with obligations under Practice Note 17
22
 and also 
firms with incomplete data. This leaves 224 firm-year observations for the sample 
period. Table 4-1 presents the sample selection process. 
 
TABLE 4-1: The sample selection process 
 
Descriptions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
 
Total GLCs listed on the Main 
Board of Bursa Malaysia Securities 
 
 
58 
 
59 
 
60 
 
57 
 
52 
 
Companies that are classified by 
Bursa Malaysia Securities in the 
financial industry 
 
 
(12) 
 
(12) 
 
(12) 
 
(10) 
 
(10) 
 
Companies in PN17 status 
 
(0) 
 
(0) 
 
(0) 
 
(1) 
 
(1) 
 
 
Incomplete data set* 
 
(0) 
 
(0) 
 
(0) 
 
(2) 
 
(2) 
 
 
Total firms (Pool=224) 
 
46 
 
47 
 
48 
 
44 
 
39 
 
 
* Companies information is not available either due to annual reports are not available because of 
merger and acquisitions, delisting, PN17 status or no data available on Datastream, Thomson One 
Banker or FAME.  
                                                          
22  PN17 stands for Practice Note 17/2005 and is issued by Bursa Malaysia Securities; relating to companies that 
are in financial distress. Companies that fall within the definition of PN17 will need to submit their proposal to 
the Approving Authority to restructure and revive the company in order to maintain the listing status. 
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All non-financial data were collected from the companies’ audited annual reports and 
all financial data were collected from DataStream. The number of GLCs varied over 
the period of 2004 until 2008 mainly due to mergers and acquisitions particularly in 
2006/07, such as by Kumpulan UEM Berhad and Kumpulan Sime Darby Berhad.  
 
This final sample of 224 firm-year observations represents 78.32 percent of the 
whole population of GLCs is comparable to those used in previous studies in 
Malaysia. For example, Lau and Tong (2008) used data from 15 GLCs under 
Khazanah Nasional Berhad from 2000 until 2005 (90 firm-year observations total) in 
their research on GLCs ownership concentration and performance. Meanwhile, Tam 
and Tan (2007) employed 150 listed firms in the year of 2000/2001 in their research 
on the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. In similar 
research, Chu and Cheah (2006) were satisfied with 147 listed firms on the Main 
Board of Bursa Malaysia Securities.  
 
Previous studies in other developing countries also employed sample sizes that were 
almost similar with this research. For example, Jackling and Johl (2009) utilized 180 
firm-year observations in their research on the issue of board structure and firm  
performance in India and Zeitun (2009) employed 167 Jordanian listed companies in 
their study on the issues of ownership structure, corporate performance and failure in 
Jordan market. 
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4.2.2 Year of observations  
 
The observation period of 2004 until 2008 was chosen to reflect a phase of relative 
economic stability in Malaysia, because the period is after the Asian financial crisis 
and before the global financial crisis, which started in the second half of 2008 (IMF, 
2008; Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2010). 
 
Table 4-2 reports the distribution of samples by industry, where 45 percent of firms 
in the sample belong to trading/services industry, followed by the properties and 
plantations industries.  
 
TABLE 4-2: The sample distribution according to industry classification   
 
No. Industry Group Number of firms  
(N=224) 
 
Percentage 
(%) 
1. Trading/Services  101 45.1% 
2. Consumer products 20 8.9% 
3. Infrastructure project company 3 1.3% 
4. Plantations 26 11.6% 
5. Industrial Products 19 8.5% 
6. Properties 48 21.4% 
7. Technology 3 1.3% 
8. Construction 4 1.8% 
  Total 224 firms 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 99 | P a g e  
 
4.2.3 Control variables 
 
In line with previous research (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 
2001; Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Anderson and Hamadi, 2007; Chen et al., 2009), 
we control for a range of variables which are expected to impact corporate 
performance. 
 
(i) Firm size (Size) 
 
Firm size is measured as logarithm of total assets. In general, larger firms are 
expected to be more profitable due their access to new technology, greater economies 
of scale, and diversification (Leng, 2004). However, the ultimate goals of owners and 
managers differ; managers tend to maximise personal income and owners tend to 
maximise profits and in large firms it is impractical for the owner to exercise control 
over managers for strategic and operational activities (Himmelberg, Hubbard and 
Palia, 1999; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000). This situation allows for greater managerial 
discretion, thus increasing agency cost in organizations that impact the firm’s long-
term performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
 
In Malaysia, study by Lau and Tong (2008) on GLC’s performance finds 
insignificant association between firm size and performance. Recently, Mohd 
Ghazali (2010) in his research on the ownership structure of 87 non-financial listed 
companies in Malaysia also found no relationship between firm size and 
performance. Therefore, based on the above discussion and consistent with most of 
the empirical results, we expect a significant association between firm size and 
corporate performance without specifying direction of the relationship.  The natural 
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log of total assets is used as a proxy for firm size that controls for differences in firm 
size This usage is consistent with a long line of previous research (e.g. Ang and 
Ding, 2006; Maury, 2006; Al-Farooque et al., 2007; Karaca and Eksi, 2012). 
 
(ii) Monopoly / market power (Monopoly)  
For GLCs involved in strategic industries and need time to develop the ability to 
compete, the government provides them with exclusive monopoly licences which 
afford them market dominance.  These monopolies are often remnants from the time 
before privatisation (Woon, 1989). We control for the existence of such licenses as 
for their probable impact on corporate performance. 
 
(iii) Liquidity (Liquidity)  
Liquidity is measured as a ratio of current assets to current liabilities. To meet a short 
term obligations such as paying short-terms debt and creditors, as well as reserve for 
emergencies, the firm needs cash. A higher liquidity ratio shows that a firm has 
resources to meet short-term obligations (Williamson, 1988). Liquidity also measures 
the availability of firms to convert assets into cash for investment; the more liquid 
the assets, the more potential for company to earn higher income from investment 
and therefore contribute to better firm performance. 
 
Empirical studies have found inconclusive results about the impact of liquidity on 
corporate performance. For example, Dionne and Garand (2003) found a negative 
relationship between the liquidity ratio and performance. However, a study by Cho 
(1998) of Fortune 500 manufacturing firms on the issue of managerial ownership and 
performance finds a positive association between the variables. Recently, An and 
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Naughton (2009), in their study of the impact of family ownership on performance of 
Korean listed firms from 2000 to 2005, found significant positive relationship 
between liquidity and firm performance.  Liquidity that measures as a ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities is predicted to impact significantly on corporate 
performance. 
 
(iv) Financial leverage (Leverage)  
Leverage is measured as proportion of debts to shareholder’s equity. It might 
influence corporate performance into two ways. On one hand, high leverage may be 
a sign of resource constraints in a firm.  Firms with high leverage may be at risk of 
bankruptcy if they are unable to make payments on their external debt financing.  
 
On the other hand, higher leverage can also be used to control opportunistic 
managers through additional monitoring activities by lenders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Banks, for example, can provide an effective monitoring function to control 
manager’s opportunistic behaviour such as earnings-management activities. Ismail 
and Weetman (2008) found a highly significant negative relationship (at a 1% level) 
between leverage and earnings-management and suggest that highly geared firms in 
Malaysia manage earnings less than lower geared firms due to close scrutiny by the 
banks, who are acting both as creditors and advisers. Results of empirical studies on 
the relationship between leverage and corporate performance are mixed. For 
example, a study by Hu and Izumida (2008) on the relationship between ownership 
concentration and corporate performance using Japanese panel data found a negative 
relationship between leverage and performance measures. Similar results were 
suggested by Jackling and Johl (2009) in their study in Indian market.    
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However, in the context of Malaysian listed firms, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) in 
their research on the relationship between corporate governance structure and 
performance of Malaysian listed companies from 1996 to 2000 find a significant 
positive relationship between leverage and performance. The use of leverage as one 
of the control variables is consistent with a long line of previous research (see 
Davies, Hillier and McColgan, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Hu and Izumida, 
2008; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Setia-Atmaja, 2009). Hence, we expect a significant 
relationship between leverage and performance.  
 
(v) Corporate governance variables  
Effective corporate governance systems are expected to reduce agency problems and 
thereby improve economic efficiency. Rhoades et. al (2000) suggested that the 
selection of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms inside an organization 
helps align the interest of shareholders and managers. As contended in agency 
theory, the board of directors, as the highest-level of control mechanism in the 
organization, plays an important role in aligning and controlling managers’ activities.  
This is because the board has power to compensate for managers’ decision making 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Zahra and Pearce (1989) suggested that agency theory is 
the most comprehensive explanation of board monitoring function. Related to this, 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that a functioning board of directors is one of the 
major devices that limits agency costs and is the most important internal control 
monitoring mechanisms in firms that ratify the decisions initiated by management.  
This effectively creates a separation between “decision management” and “decision 
control.”    
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Evidence from previous literature suggests several characteristics of boards such as 
board size, board meeting frequency and the presence of independent directors may 
influence the effectiveness of boards in their monitoring role
23
. Therefore, consistent 
with previous studies in this area (e.g. Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998; 
Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; O’Connell and Cramer, 2010), 
we control for other standard corporate governance variables related to board of 
directors such as board size (BODSIZE), the number of board of directors meetings 
per year (BODMEET) and the percentage of independent non-executive directors on 
the board of directors (BODINED) as their probable effects on GLCs’ corporate 
performance.  
 
Board size. Generally, each firm will have its own individually appropriate board 
size if labour, goods and capital markets are sufficiently efficient, as size of the board 
will depend on the firm’s characteristics (such as size, complexity and risk of 
business) and the characteristics of its business environment (such as multinational 
vs. national, industry risks, etc.). If markets are not efficient, as in most emerging 
economies (Zattoni et al., 2000), the firm’s board size might not be appropriate. 
Firms might benefit from a large board size in terms of information and expertise 
advantage (Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999). This argument is consistent 
with the resource-dependence theory which suggests that a larger board size would 
                                                          
23
 We do not employ the audit committee characteristics as part of corporate governance features 
mainly because there was doubt as to the direct link between the audit committee and company 
performance with regards of whether their effect on performance due to the existence of the audit 
committee or due to other features of corporate governance (see discussion in Turley and Zaman, 
2004). According to Klein (2002: 378), the primary role of the audit committee under the board of 
directors is overseeing the firm financial reporting process, the review of financial reports, internal 
accounting control, the audit process and recent responsibilities of the audit committee also covers 
risk management issues. This explains the indirect relationship between audit committee 
characteristics and performance. 
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lead to better corporate performance because of the different skills, knowledge and 
expertise brought into the boardroom discussion. 
 
However, Jensen (2010) argues that larger board size is easily controlled by CEOs 
who may take advantage on this situation and use their influence to ensure the board 
decisions in line with their needs. Board size was widely used in previous research 
on the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance (e.g. 
Bhagat and Black, 2002; Elsayed, 2007; Ivengar and Zampeli, 2009; Marimuthu and 
Kolandaisamy, 2009; Jackling and Johl, 2009).  
 
However, empirical studies showed mixed findings on the relationship between 
board size and firm performance. For example, Pearce and Zahra (1992) as well as 
Jackling and Johl (2009) found board size to be positively related to firm corporate 
performance. However, Eisenberg, Sudgren and Wells (1998) and Yermack (1996) 
found a significant negative relationship between board size and performance.  
 
 
In Malaysia, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) studied the impact of corporate governance 
structure on performance of listed companies. Based on sample of 347 companies 
listed on the main board of Bursa Malaysia Securities, they found board size to be 
significantly and positively related with accounting performance. Recently, Mohd 
Ghazali (2010), who studied the impact of ownership and corporate governance 
structure on performance of listed companies in Malaysia, found no significant 
association between board size and performance. We expect large board sizes to 
benefit the GLCs, as they not only provide expertise and experience to the company 
but also can act as boundary spanners for companies.  This is particularly evident in 
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the context of GLCs, where politicians and senior civil servants are normally part of 
the board members. Therefore, a positive relationship between board size and 
performance is expected and the total number of directors on the board per year is 
used to measure board size.  
 
Number of board meetings. The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2007) 
outlined six principal responsibilities of the board such as reviewing and adopting a 
strategic plan for the company, identifying and managing risks, as well as playing an 
important duty in a monitoring role on behalf of shareholders. The number of board 
meeting might indicate the effort of directors as well as regular, close monitoring and 
provision of advice.  It might also indicate an inefficient, poorly run board which 
does not get through its tasks effectively. Industry and business complexity are also 
likely to affect board meeting frequency. Moreover, firms which are planning risky 
ventures (e.g. mergers and acquisitions, entering new markets), or which are in 
financial trouble, are likely to have more board meetings than firms which do not 
face many risks or which are performing well.      
 
Related to this, Jensen (1993) suggested that board meetings should serve as efficient 
monitoring device to resolve firm’s major problem rather than meeting too frequent. 
However, Conger, Finegold and Lawler (1998) suggested that board meetings 
frequency improves board effectiveness since the meeting indicates the effort put in 
by the directors and showed their commitment in monitoring management activities. 
Hence, we predict number of board meeting significantly related to performance. 
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The proportion of independent directors on the board
24
. To ensure the effective 
monitoring role of the board on managerial activities, agency theory suggests that 
board composition should include independent directors and that a higher proportion 
of independent directors leads to a better monitoring role that eventually leads to 
better corporate performance. According to Vance (1983), the independent directors 
are required as part of the board because they can provide unbiased assessment and 
“checks and balances” between other board members that represents shareholders on 
one hand and management on the other hand. Peasnell, Pope and Young (2005) 
suggested that the presence of independent board members who are also senior 
executive managers in other firms and familiar financial reporting issues, has the 
potential to reduce agency costs.  For example, they may be able to constrain 
earnings-management activities in firms and so positively impact firm performance 
in the long run. 
 
In the meantime, the Malaysia Code on Corporate Governance (2007) recommends 
that independent directors should make up at least one third of board membership 
and Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements defines an independent director as “one 
who is independent of management and free from any business or other relationship 
which could interfere with the exercise of independent judgement or the ability to act 
in the best interest of a listed company.” The positive impact of the presence of 
independent directors on the boards to corporate performance can be found from 
numerous empirical studies in different markets such as Baysinger and Butler (1985); 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) and Jackling and Johl (2009), as well as Setia-Atmaja 
(2009). Based on the discussion above and in line to agency theory, this study 
                                                          
24
 Appendix 1 describes definition of board independence based on Bursa Malaysia Main Market 
Listing Requirement 
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predicts that a higher proportion of independent directors on the board the lead to 
better corporate performance. The percentage of independent non-executive directors 
on the board of directors is used to measure this variable. 
 
 (vi) Year and industry dummies  
Because this study employs panel data, it is important to take into account changes in 
the macroeconomic-environment. As corporate performance may have altered 
significantly over the study time period, year dummies that represent a time trend are 
included in the model. The approach is consistent with prior literature such as 
Elsayed (2007). In addition, as firm performance may be affected by industry 
affiliation, and different industries respond differently to macroeconomic 
developments (Hanniffa and Hudaib, 2006), we employ dummies for the five largest 
industries (Trade and Services, Property, Plantations, Consumer Products and 
Industrial Products) in our sample based on Bursa Malaysia Securities sector 
definitions. They account for 95.5 percent of the firms in our sample. According to 
Klapper and Love (2004), controlling for industry effect can help identify 
unobserved heterogeneity at the industry level.  
 
4.2.4 Corporate performance measures 
 
This study examines the relationship between corporate performance and 
government ownership, as well as various governance factors. To determine if there 
are any differences in performance of GLCs that owned by different types of GLICs 
and whether various governance factors have any significant impact to GLCs’ 
performance, accounting and market-based performance measures are used as 
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proxies for corporate performance. Following prior literature (e.g. McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Najid and Rahman, 2011), we use return 
on assets, return on equity and Tobin’s Q as alternate proxies for corporate 
performance. 
  
4.2.4.1 Accounting-based performance measures 
Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are used as proxies for 
accounting-based performance measures. ROA
25
 is measured as net income divided 
by end of year total assets. ROA provides a measure for how efficient management is 
at using its assets to generate earnings. According to Chang and Choi (1988), this 
index is a more accurate measure for emerging economies, where the capital market 
is imperfect and the level of debt-equity ratio is usually high. 
 
Meanwhile, ROE
26
 shows how much profit a company generates with the money 
shareholders have invested. According to Thompson and Yeung (2001), ROE can 
accommodate the effects of different accounting procedures across industries and can 
minimize multi-linearity between companys’ specific characteristics such as size, age 
and profitability.  
 
ROA and ROE are displayed as a percentage; the higher their number, the better the 
company performance. Both of these variables widely employed in measuring firm 
performance by Vafeas (1999); Abdullah (2004); Bhagat and Black (2002); Rahman 
and Haniffa (2005); Ang and Ding (2006); Bhagat and Bolton (2008) and Chu (2009).  
                                                          
25
 ROA = net income/total assets 
  
26
 ROE = net income/total shareholder’s equity 
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They are also frequently used in assessing firm performance by market and financial 
analysts.  
 
 
4.2.4.2 Market-based performance measure 
Accounting-based performance proxies (ROA and ROE) only measure the past and 
current performance of a firm. However, market-based performance captures the 
expected future performance of a firm (Omran, 2009). One of the most common 
measure of firm’s market performance is Tobin’s Q (Welch, 2003).  
 
The Tobin’s Q ratio was introduced by James Tobin, who hypothesized that the 
combined market value of all the companies on the stock market should be about 
equal to their replacement costs. The actual definition of Tobin’s Q by James Tobin 
is the market value of a firm divided by its replacement costs of assets (Lindenberg 
and Ross, 1981). It is usually possible to get an accurate estimate for the market 
value of a firm's assets by summing the values of the securities that a firm has issued, 
such as stocks and bonds. It is much more difficult to obtain an estimate of the 
replacement costs of its assets, unless markets for used equipment exist. However, 
since the information of replacement costs of assets is unavailable for Malaysian 
companies, we follow Elsayed and Paton’s (2005)27 and Chung and Pruitt’s (1994)28 
                                                          
27
 Tobin’s Q = MV(CS)+BV(PS)+BV(LTD)+BV(INV)+BV(CL)-BV(CA)  
                 BV(TA) 
Where;  MV(CS) = market value of the commons stocks BV = book value 
 PS = preferred stocks   LTD = firm long-term debt 
 INV = Inventory    CL = Current liability 
 CA = Current assets    TA = Total assets  
 
28
 Chung and Pruitt (1994) approximated Tobin’s Q, implicitly assuming that the replacement values 
of a firm’s assets such as plant, equipment and inventories were equal to their book values (Ang and 
Ding, 2006)  
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approach and use book value instead. According to Chung and Pruitt (1994), at least 
96.6 percent of the variability of Tobin’s Q is explained by this approximate Q.  
 
While there were advantages of the used of Tobin’s Q as firm’s market performance, 
this measure also had been critics as this ratio only emphasis on tangible assets such 
as plants, machines and inventory but neglects others importance intangibles assets, 
including brands and intellectual property. This is because, expenditures on 
advertising and research and development create intangible assets that may be hard 
to value. Typically, researchers who construct Tobin's q ignore the replacement costs 
of these intangible assets in their calculations. For that reason, q typically exceeds 1. 
In today’s business environment, intangible assets such as goodwill have become a 
major consideration not only for management and companies but for potential 
investors on their decision making process. The importance of such assets as 
determinant of a company’s value is well- recognized by the financial markets and 
become primary concerned in financial reporting standards. 
 
Nevertheless, Tobin’s Q is a more stable approach to estimate firm market value 
since the value of a firm’s assets are not subjected to the same volatility as would 
share prices when valuation proxies such as price to book value or price to earnings 
are used (Ang and Ding, 2006). Therefore, this study employed Tobin’s Q as our 
measure for market performance and as an indicator, a low q ratio implying that the 
firm’s stock is currently undervalued and vice versa.  
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4.2.5  Model specifications and variable measurement 
 
This study uses the following model (performance model) to test the hypotheses 
outlined above:  
 
PERFORMANCEit = α + β1PIF GLICit + β2FGLICit + β3GLIC_shareit+ 
β4Golden Shareit + β5BOD_SCSit+ β6BOD_POLit + 
β7Sizeit + β8Monopolyit+ β9Liquidityit + β10Leverageit + 
β11BODSIZEit + β12BODMEETit + β13BODINEDit+ 
β14Year2005it + β15Year2006it + β16Year2007it  + 
β17Year2008it + β18Servicesit + β19Propertyit + 
β20Plantationsit +  β21Consumerit + β22PIndustrialit  +  εit  
 
 
In line with previous studies on the issue of ownership types and performance       
(see Chen et al., 2009; Ang and Ding, 2006; Ab Razak et al., 2011), we use dummy 
variables for our key variables which are PIF GLIC and FGLIC
29
. For example, PIF 
GLIC is a dummy variable coded 1 for firm years in which the biggest shareholder is 
a PIF GLIC. Due to the use of dummy code (1 and 0), we have to drop one group of 
GLICs.  In our study’s case, we dropped GLCs owned by SEDCs from our 
regression model and they form the control sample for comparative purposes. This 
approach is a standard procedure related to the used of dummy code in comparing 
between variables in a regression model.  
 
 
As previously discussed, BOD_SCS and BOD_POL denote the percentage of board 
members who are senior civil servants and politicians respectively. Meanwhile, 
GLIC_share is calculated as the shareholding percentage of the largest shareholder in 
a GLC. The golden share is a dummy variable coded 1 for firm years in which the 
                                                          
29
 In the additional analysis section, we use actual numerical ownership level of the GLICs as an 
alternative to dummy code. 
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MOF Inc. held a golden share in a firm. Table 4-3 explains the variable definitions 
and operationalisation for all variables employed in the regression model. 
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TABLE 4-3: Variable definitions and operationalisation 
 
Variables Acronym Operationalisation  
Dependent variables:  
Firm performance:  
i. return on assets 
ii. return on equity 
iii. Tobin’s Q 
 
 
ROA 
ROE 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 
Net income divided by total assets 
Net income divided shareholder’s equity 
Firm market value (see section 3.4.4.2) 
Independent variables: 
 
Federal government sponsored 
pension and investment funds  
owned GLCs 
 
Federal government owned GLCs 
 
 
 
PIF GLIC 
 
 
 
FGLIC 
 
 
PIF GLIC is a dummy variable coded 1 for firm 
years in which the biggest shareholder is a PIF 
GLIC 
 
FGLIC is a dummy variable coded 1 for firm 
years in which the biggest shareholder is a FGLIC 
 
GLIC ownership 
 
GLIC_share The shareholding percentage of the largest 
shareholder in a GLC 
Golden share Golden share Golden Share is a dummy variable coded 1 for 
firm years in which the MOF Inc. held a golden 
share in a firm 
Senior civil servants as directors on 
GLCs’ board 
 
BOD_SCS BOD_SCS denote the percentage of board 
members who are senior civil servants  
Politicians as directors on GLCs’ 
board 
 
BOD_POL 
 
BOD_POL denote the percentage of board 
members who are politicians 
 
Control Variables: 
 
Firm size 
 
 
Size 
 
 
 
Natural logarithm of GLC total assets that 
controls for differences in firm size 
 
Market power/monopoly 
 
Monopoly Dummy variable coded 1 for firm years in which 
the MOD Inc. held a golden share in a firm 
 
Liquidity 
 
Liquidity Current assets divided by current liability 
Financial Leverage 
 
Leverage Proportion of debt to shareholder equity 
Board size BODSIZE Total number of board members per year 
Board meeting frequency BODMEET Total number of board meetings per year 
Independent Non-Executive 
director on board 
BODINED The proportion of independent non-executive 
directors to the total number of directors on the 
board 
Year dummies Year_dummy Dummy variables coded 1 for years within the 
test period (2004 to 2008) 
Industry sector Industry Dummy variables coded 1 according to which 
sectors the company belongs to according to 
Bursa Malaysia Securities sector classifications 
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4.2.6  Data analysis procedures
30
 
 
This section discusses data analysis procedures and statistical tests employed in this 
study. Basically, the nature and characteristics of the sample data will determine 
which statistical method should be employed. As a first step, we performed several 
tests in order to fulfil several critical assumptions under the parametric test. Five 
important assumptions under parametric analysis are assumption of normality, 
linearity, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. This is important 
to ensure that the model is able to predict part of the variability in the data and the 
test is extremely critical for the validity of the interpretation of the regression 
estimates (Gujarati, 2003). Under the violation of these assumptions, the main 
analysis under parametric test that is ordinary least square (hereafter OLS) can be 
statistically inefficient or even give misleading inferences (Baltagi, 2005; Greene, 
2008). 
 
In the second step, we discuss the empirical results from our statistical analyses.   To 
summarize the data in a clear and understandable way, analysis starts with a 
descriptive statistic containing mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, 
maximum, skewness and kurtosis of 224 firm-year observations in the study. Then, 
we performed univariate analysis that involve Pairwise correlation matrix, two 
sample T-test of differences in means and Mann-Whitney U-test of differences in 
medians for our main variables which is the different type of GLICs.   
 
 
                                                          
30
 All continuous variables were winsorized at the top and bottom at 1% in order to reduce the effect 
of outliers and this method is consistent with previous studies such as Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian 
(2008) and Dhaliwal et al. (2009).  
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In the next step, we performed multivariate analysis to see the impact of our key 
variables on performance after controlling firm specific characteristics such as 
corporate governance, profitability, agency cost and industry. As the problem of 
endogeneity can limit the validity of empirical testing models (Chenhall and Moers, 
2007) we performed a statistical test namely “Durbin-Wu-Hausman test” to detect 
the presence of endogeneity. The endogeneity of ownership structure and 
performance is a serious concern for a regression model. This is because if firm 
ownership structure based on input is related to corporate performance, then the 
residuals in regression would be correlated with the ownership variables and the 
coefficient estimates would be biased.  
 
 
In addition, since the issue of ownership structure as argued and proved by various 
studies has the potential of reverse causality, as corporate performance might 
influence shareholders’ investment behaviour (Demstez and Lehn, 1985; Demstez 
and Villonga, 2001; Chang, 2003 and Al-Farooque, Zijl, Dunstan and Karim, 2007), 
we considered what drives ownership concentration of GLICs using an alternative 
model. We also performed various additional analyses including robustness checks to 
provide reasonable assurance for the current findings as well as to tackle several 
minor issues. Finally, we end our chapter with discussion on the contribution from 
the study, its limitations and our recommendations for future research. 
 
4.2.7  Data diagnostic 
 
Most of the multivariate regression in the prior literature used the OLS estimator to 
examine the relationship between a single dependent variable and several 
independent variables (predictors). Before using OLS estimation, there are five 
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fundamental assumptions need to be fulfilled for OLS regression models to be valid 
(Gujarati, 2003; Hair et al., 2010). These assumptions include:   
 
(i) Normality - The errors (residuals) should be normally distributed 
(ii) Linearity - The relationship between the predictors and the response variable 
should be linear.  
(iii) Homoscedasticity - The errors variance should be constant   
(iv) Independent - The errors associated with one observation are not correlated 
with errors of other observation.  
(v) Multicollinearity - There is no exact collinearity among predictors. 
 
Each of these assumptions are tested using various statistic analyses and the next five 
sub-sections outline the results and discussions. 
 
i) Assumption of normality  
One of the important assumptions underlying OLS regressions is that the data must 
be drawn from normally distributed populations.  It is assumed that residuals in a 
model are randomly and normally distributed with a mean of zero. Following the 
example of checking normality of residuals by Chen, Ender, Mitchell and Wells 
(2003), we conducted both graphical and numerical tests
31
 for testing normality and 
detect the presence of outliers. The graphic tests used Kernel density estimate, 
normal probability plot and quantiles plot. Meanwhile, for numerical test we 
employed the statistical test namely Shapiro-Wilk test (Swilk test) and Inter-quartile 
range test to check this assumption. According to Chen et al., (2003), the Swilk test 
                                                          
31
 Numerical test is the test that expressed in or counted by numbers 
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is the most powerful normality test available as it is able to detect a small departure 
from normality. 
 
 
The graphic test using Kernel density estimate is presented in Figure 4-1. In the test, 
the normal density line should be overlaid on the kernel plot as an indication of data 
normality. However, the results show a serious deviation from normal and indicated 
that the residuals in the model are not normally distributed. The standardized normal 
probability plot test (P-P plot) and quantiles plot test are in Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3 
respectively. While standardized normal probability plot test sensitive to non-
normality in the middle range of the data, the quantiles plot is sensitive to non-
normality near the tails. In both plots, there are clearly significant deviations from the 
normal plot.  This indicates that based on graphic tests, the data of this study are not 
normally distributed.  
 
In the first numerical test, the null hypothesis of Swilk test is that the residuals are 
normally distributed. If the p-value is significant, then the null hypothesis would be 
rejected, suggesting the residuals are not independently distributed. Table 4-4 
confirm that the normality of residuals are not being fulfilled since the p-value is 
significant at p<0.000.  This indicates that the residuals are not normally distributed.  
 
In the second numerical test, the inter-quartile range (IQR) test assumes symmetry of 
distribution. Severe outliers consist of those points which are either 3 inter-quartile-
ranges below the first quartile or 3 inter-quartile-ranges above the third quartile. The 
presence of any severe outliers should be sufficient evidence to reject normality at a 
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5% significance level. In our case, we have severe outliers (Table 4-5) and therefore, 
the assumption of data normality is not fulfilled. 
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FIGURE 4-1: Kernel density estimate test 
 
 
FIGURE 4-2: Standardized normal probability plot test (P-P plot) 
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FIGURE 4-3: Quantiles plot test 
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TABLE 4-4 
Checking Normality - Swilk Test 
 
Variable Observation W V z Prob>z 
 
r 
 
224 
 
0.90565 
 
15.540 
 
6.348 
 
0.00000 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4-5 
Checking Normality of Residuals Using Inter-Quartile Range Test 
 
Mean = -3.70 std.dev.=  4.69 (n= 224) 
Median = 0.3306 pseudo std.dev.=  3.387 (IQR=  4.569) 
10 trim = 0.2306 
  
  
low           high 
  
------------------- 
 
inner fences -8.938       9.339 
 
# mild outliers     4              2 
 
% mild outliers 1.79%       0.89% 
   
 
outer fences -15.79       16.19 
 
# severe outliers      3              0 
 
% severe outliers 1.34%       0.00% 
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ii) Assumption of linearity 
This assumption suggests that the model should have linear parameters where the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables follows a straight line or 
linear. To check the linearity assumption, the graphs of standardised residuals plotted 
against each of the independent variables in the regression model and visual method 
determine whether a linear pattern exists between the variables. 
 
Augmented partial residual plot for non-dummy independent variables (GLIC_share, 
BOD_SCS and BOD_POL) in Figure 4-4, Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 respectively, 
shows that data points asymmetrically scattered from the ordinary regression line in 
the plot with serious outliers. Further investigation on the pattern of the relationship 
between response variable (using ROA as an example) and predictors using Graph 
matrix test is performed as presented in Figure 4-7, Figure 4-8 and Figure 4-9 for the 
above variables. The Graph matrix test shows the entire pattern (e.g. GLIC_share vs 
ROA, BOD_SCS vs ROA and BOD_POL vs ROA) seems not uniform thus 
confirmed the non-linear relation between these variables with one of the 
performance measures. Therefore, the assumption of a linear relationship between 
response variables and predictors is not fulfilled. 
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FIGURE 4-4: Augmented partial residual plot for GLIC SHARE 
 
 
FIGURE 4-5: Augmented partial residual plot for BOD_SCS 
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FIGURE 4-6: Augmented partial residual plot for BOD_POL 
 
 
FIGURE 4-7: Graph Matrix GLIC SHARE vs ROA 
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FIGURE 4-8: Graph Matrix BOD_SCS vs ROA 
 
 
FIGURE 4-9: Graph Matrix BOD_POL vs ROA 
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iii) Assumption of homoscedasticity  
Another important assumption in a regression model is that the standard deviation (or 
variance) of error terms is constant or homogeneous where the error terms all have 
the same variance (Gujarati, 2003). In the case of unequal variance 
(heteroscedasticity), the OLS estimators are no longer efficient and would make the 
usual hypothesis-testing procedure of dubious value (Gujarati, 2003). The presence 
of outliers and skewness in the distribution of one or more regressors included in the 
model are among the sources of heteroscedasticity. To test the presence of 
heteroscedasticity problem, scatter plots, White’s test and Breusch-Pagan test are 
performed as recommended by Chen et al., (2003) and Baum (2006).  
 
Figure 4-10 illustrates the heteroscedasticity test using a scatter plot. The plot shows 
that most of the x value (in our case ROA value) is not concentrated around the mean 
of y in our main model and the pattern of distribution also does not looks like an oval 
shape (the rules of homoscedasticity may have been violated if the other geometric 
shape other than oval shape appears) with extreme outliers in both directions of y 
line. Since the scatter plot alone does not show strong evidence of the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, further investigation is needed using numerical tests. 
 
The numerical tests for heteroscedasticity employed in this study are White’s Test 
and Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test which is widely used to detect 
heteroscedasticity. In White’s Test, if the p-value is significant, then the null 
hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is homogenous would be rejected, 
suggesting that heteroscedasticity exists. Meanwhile, in Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-
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Weisberg test, a large chi-square value plus significant p-value of chi-square would 
indicate the present of heteroscedasticity.  
 
Table 4-6 presents the results of White’s tests. The results suggest that no 
heteroscedasticity in all model as the p-value is insignificant (p>0.01) suggesting no 
heteroscedasticity. However, further investigation using Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-
Weisberg test (Table 4-7) shows a significant p-value (p<0.01) in ROA model 
(p=0.0532) and significant p-value (p=0.0000) together with a large chi-square value 
(37.33) in Tobin’s Q model, indicating the presence of heteroscedasticity in two of 
our regression models, namely ROA and Tobin’s Q model.  
 
 
FIGURE 4-10: Heteroscedasticity Test for ROA model – Diagnostic plot 
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TABLE 4-6: 
Numerical Test for Heteroscedasticity using White’s Test 
 
 White’s Test 
 
H0 = The variance of the residuals is homogenous 
Reject H0 if p-value is significant 
 
Source chi2 Df p-value (significant) 
 
ROA MODEL 
 
   
Heteroskedasticity 
Skewness  
Kurtosis 
 
Total 
 
222.71 
37.38 
2.45 
 
262.53 
220 
22 
1 
 
243 
0.4363 
0.0215 
0.1175 
 
0.1858 
 
ROE MODEL 
 
   
Heteroskedasticity 
Skewness  
Kurtosis 
 
Total 
 
220.14 
20.40 
3.88 
 
244.42 
220 
22 
1 
 
243 
0.4846 
0.5578 
0.0490 
 
0.4623 
 
TOBIN’S Q MODEL 
 
   
Heteroskedasticity 
Skewness  
Kurtosis 
 
Total 
 
223.87 
28.27 
1.80 
 
253.94 
220 
22 
1 
 
243 
0.4147 
0.1670 
0.1800 
 
0.3019 
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TABLE 4-7: 
Numerical Test for Heteroscedasticity using Breusch-Pagan/ 
Cook-Weisberg Test 
 
 Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test 
 
 
H0 = The variance of the residuals is homogenous 
Reject H0 if chi-square is significant 
 
Source chi2 (1) Prob > chi2  
 
ROA MODEL 
 
3.74 
 
0.0532 
 
 
ROE MODEL 
 
2.62 
 
0.1056 
 
 
TOBIN’S Q MODEL 
 
37.33 
 
0.0000 
 
    
 
 
iv) Assumption of no autocorrelation (independent error terms)   
Another important OLS assumption is that error terms are independent. 
Autocorrelation (serial correlation) is a condition where there is correlation between 
error terms of dataset of one period (t) with previous period (t-1). In this situation, 
the error terms are not independent and could give incorrect t values and confidence 
intervals in regression. To test the presence of autocorrelation in the model, we 
performed Durbin-Watson d-statistic. In addition, the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange 
Multiplier tests were also performed to detect the presence of serial correlation in 
regression. As a rule of thumb, if the value of Durbin-Watson d-statistic approaches a 
value of 2 (value of 1 or -1 are perfect autocorrelation), there is no autocorrelation 
among error terms. For Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier tests, a large chi-
square value plus significant p-value of chi-square would indicate the presence of 
autocorrelation. 
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Results of Durbin-Watson d-statistic indicate there is autocorrelation in the model as 
the value approaches 1, particularly in ROE and TOBIN’S Q models. Full results of 
Durbin-Watson d-statistics are as follows: 
ROA model = 1.434129 
ROE model = 1.152762 
TOBIN’S Q model = 0.846083 
 
Further tests using Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier tests in Table 4-8 
confirmed the presence of autocorrelation with a large chi-square value that is highly 
significant (p<0.001).  Therefore we must reject Ho suggesting there are serial 
correlations in the models. Therefore, the OLS assumption of error terms being 
independent is not fulfilled.  
 
TABLE 4-8 
Test for Autocorrelation using Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier Test  
 
Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier Test  
 
 
H0 = no serial correlation 
Reject H0 if chi-square is significant 
 
Lags (1) chi2 df Prob > chi2 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
18.384 
42.983 
76.002 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
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v) Assumption of no multicollinearity  
 
Table 4-12 in Section 4.3.2.1 (p. 143) presents the Pairwise correlation matrix for the 
variables used in the regression analysis. The results show that variables BOD_SCS 
and Golden share are highly correlated with correlation coefficient of more than 
80%. According to Gujarati (2003), the rule of thumb for checking the serious 
problem of multicollinearity is that no correlation between independent variables 
must be greater than 0.80. Since correlation coefficient between BOD_SCS and 
Golden shares exceeds this threshold, further investigation is needed.  
 
To further investigate whether our model would be free from multicollinearity 
problems, we calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF) and conducted a tolerance 
value test. The VIF is used to test whether an independent variable has a strong linear 
relationship with another independent variable. In the presence of multicollinearity, 
the variance of an estimator is inflated and, as a rule of thumb, if the value of VIF of 
a variable exceeds 10 or tolerance value (1/VIF) lower than 0.10, that variable is said 
to be highly collinear (Gujarati, 2003). As shown in Table 4-9, VIF values of all 
variables show figures below 10 and tolerance values above 0.10. The VIF ranges 
between 1.30 and 5.29.  
 
Moreover, our regression results in main findings show that we don’t have a problem 
of “few significant t ratios, but a high overall R2 and a significant F value” (Gujarati, 
2003) as one of the signal of multicollinearity. Therefore, we can conclude that 
multicollinearity is not a problem for this study. 
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TABLE 4-9: Test for multicollinearity 
Variable Variance inflation factor 
(VIF) 
Tolerance value 
(1/VIF) 
 
Services industry 5.29 0.189174 
Golden share 5.13 0.194909 
BOD_SCS 4.10 0.243996 
Properties industry 4.06 0.246030 
FGLIC 3.81 0.262463 
Plantations industry 3.23 0.309406 
PIF GLIC 2.67 0.374991 
Industrial product industry  2.55 0.391585 
Consumer industry 2.52 0.397049 
Monopoly 1.98 0.505379 
Firm size 1.94 0.514816 
BOD_meeting 1.77 0.563757 
Year 2008 1.66 0.602211 
Year 2006 1.64 0.610554 
Year 2007 1.63 0.613531 
Year 2005 1.60 0.623593 
GLIC share 1.57 0.638062 
BOD_POL 1.56 0.640874 
BOD_INED 1.38 0.726367 
Gearing 1.37 0.730092 
Liquidity 1.30 0.769712 
BOD_size 1.30 0.769809 
Mean VIF 2.46  
 
 
 
4.2.8 Dealing with outliers and missing data 
 
Generally we find in our model that most of the assumptions under parametric test 
cannot be met. As previously discussed, one of the main cause of data non-normality 
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and heteroscedasticity problem is the presence of outliers in the data set (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009).  
 
However, the decision to remove outliers from the data set in a regression analysis 
can be difficult becaue it may affect regression interpretation in undesirable ways 
(Wooldridge, 2000) and usually generates new extreme outliers. This issue is 
common as deletion of outliers often results in the generation of further outlying 
cases (Coakes and Steed, 1999).  
 
Alternatively, to soften the impact of outliers, Hamilton (1992) suggested data 
transformation where individual variables with extreme outliers are transformed into 
most commonly used transformations to normalize the data such as logarithm and 
square-root. However, while data transformation makes a distribution less skewed, it 
also alters the relationship between the original variables in the model. Moreover, 
many commonly used transformations require non-negative data or data that is 
greater than zero, which limits their applications.      
 
We observed that the outliers in our data are genuine and drawn from reliable 
sources (e.g. annual reports). In this instance, we rely on Hair et al. (2010) that the 
deletion of outliers is not favourable unless if there is a strong justification based on 
researchers’ evaluation and judgement.  In addition, according to Hair et al., (2010) 
as outliers are deleted, the researcher runs the risk of improving the econometric 
analysis but limiting its generalizability. This is because the outliers of some 
variables might represent a segment of the population and should be retained to 
ensure generalizability to the entire population.  
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Based on the above discussion, we decided not to remove outliers from our dataset. 
However, to mitigate the impact of extreme outliers in our dataset, following Cornett 
et al. (2008) and Dhaliwal et. al, (2009), we winsorized all the continuous variables 
in our dataset at the top and bottom at 1%. In this method, we convert the values of 
data points that are outlyingly high to the value of the highest data point not 
considered to be outliers. All the data points involved in this exercise must be within 
the range of 1% at the top and bottom of dataset.  
In relation to the missing data, we found that there are some random cases where 
data are missing, particularly the financial data (involved less than 10 cases). 
Folllowing Hair et al., (2010), we replace the missing data with the mean of the valid 
data of that particular variable.     
 
 
4.2.9 Robust regression as alternative to the OLS regression methods 
 
As previously discussed, under the violation of parametric assumptions, the OLS 
regression methods are statistically inefficient or even give misleading inferences, for 
example incorrect estimates of coefficients and standard errors (Baltagi, 2005; 
Greene, 2008; Gujarati and Porter, 2009). To deal with the issue, robust regression 
methods seem alternatives to the OLS regression methods when the fundamental 
assumptions are unfulfilled by the nature of the data. Hamilton (1992) argued that 
robust regression method have better statistical properties than OLS in term of 
efficiency, more accurate confidence intervals and tests. This is for the reason that, 
robust regression methods resist extreme values and do not assume normality. 
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Furthermore, the results of robust regressions generally more convincing because 
they should visualize the entire data and not just a few outliers as OLS regression.   
 
 
One of the robust regressions test under the family of robust regression methods is 
robust (Eicker-Huber-White heteroskedastic-consistent) standard errors
32
 (hereafter 
refered to as robust standard errors). As part of the robust family, robust standard 
errors not only take into account issues concerning heterogeneity and lack of 
normality but also can deal with some observations that exhibit large residuals, 
leverage or influence (Chen et al., 2003). In the robust standard errors option, the 
point estimates of the coefficients are exactly the same as in OLS. 
 
Taking into account the advantages of robust regression over OLS regression method 
under the violation of parametric assumptions, this study applies a robust standard 
errors method in our main analysis to examine the association between ownership 
structure and corporate governance variables with financial performance in our 
model. In our robustness analysis, we also compare results from robust standard 
errors with other regression estimators to ensure our model robust to the 
specifications of various regression estimators.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 In StataSE 10, we use the regress command which includes a robust option (vce) and we select best 
for heteroskedastic (hc3). The selection of hc3 is recommended strongly by Davidson and MacKinnon 
(1993) particularly in the presence of heteroscedasticity and when the study used small sample size 
(MacKinnon and White, 1985; Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993).    
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4.3 Empirical results and analysis 
 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Tables 4-10 and Table 4-11 summarize key descriptive statistics of the variables 
containing mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and 
kurtosis of a 224 firm-year observation in the study for the period of 2004 until 2008.  
The data shows that average mean for ROA and ROE as around 4.49 percent and 
10.73 percent respectively, which is higher than the mean of 2.56 percent for ROA in 
the study by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006). The difference might be because the study 
by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) covered a period from 1996 to 2000, when most firms 
were severely hit by economic downturn during the Asian Financial Crisis that 
started in 1997/98, whereas our study covers the period of post-Asian Financial 
Crisis. Firm values measured by Tobin’s Q reported a mean of 0.85 implying that 
firm stock is currently undervalued. The value is slightly lower than the value of 1.13 
found in the Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) study. This is partly because, until 2006, 
Bursa Malaysia Securities still had some 200 companies trading at a more than 50 
percent discount to their book values following the Asian Financial Crisis (James, 
2006).  
 
The data also show a large difference between accounting performance, ROA and 
ROE (e.g. median ROA=4.12 and median ROE=8.08). However, these are 
comparable to other studies in Malaysia. For example, a recent study by Najid and 
Rahman (2011) on the relationship between government ownership and performance 
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of GLCs in Malaysia found a big difference between the median of ROA and ROE. 
Based on the sample of listed GLCs covering the period of 2001 to 2006, they found 
the all-year median of ROA is 0.0407 as compared to 8.1300 for ROE. Interestingly, 
they also found that this trend exists in non-GLCs where the median of ROA is 
0.0475 compared to 10.5450 for ROE.  
    
In relation to ownership, the data show that the average degree of ownership of 
controlling GLICs (GLIC_share) is about 47.09 percent with maximum of 86.81 
percent. This confirmed earlier findings by Tam and Tan (2007) that ownership 
concentration is prominent and entrenched in Malaysia. However, the average 
ownership stake above is slightly lower than found by Najid and Rahman (2011) in 
their study on the relationship between government ownership and performance of 
Malaysian GLCs where the average ownership stake of controlling GLICs is about 
51 percent. Differences in sample periods may explain the decline in average 
ownership stake of the GLICs above, where Najid and Rahman (2011) use the 6-year 
period of 2001-2006 in their study whereas this study using 5-year period of 2004-
2008. There is the possibility of divestment activities through initiatives under the 
GLC Transformation Programmed which aims to transform GLCs into high-
performing entities to be among the cause of the decrease in the average of GLICs 
shareholdings in GLCs.  
 
The maximum number of senior civil servants and politicians on the board of GLCs 
is 4 and 3 respectively. The data also suggest that there is a high degree of variation 
in the percentage of senior civil servants (BOD_SCS) and politicians (BOD_POL) on 
the boards of directors of GLCs where in some GLCs there is no board of members 
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at all from senior civil servants or politicians but in some GLCs, the percentage up to 
33.33 percent of the total size of the board of directors.  
 
With regards to control variables related to firm’s specific financial data, the mean of 
total assets is £1.2 billion and the mean for liquidity is 2.74 with minimum and 
maximum value of 0.36 and 18.36 respectively. The mean for leverage is 0.60, 
suggesting that on average GLCs have a relatively higher percentage of leverage. 
 
In relation to the control variables related to corporate governance variables, we find 
that the corporate board size ranges between 5 and 12 with an average of 8.30. This 
average size of the board almost the same as that found in studies by Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) of 7.94 and Mohd Ghazali (2010) of 8.83.  
 
However, the average of 8.30 is lower than the average board size of 11.33 in the US 
as documented by Laksmana (2008). In terms of board meeting frequency, there is a 
big difference between the minimum numbers of meetings, 3 times per year with a 
maximum number of meeting, 19 times per year with the average number of 
meetings is about 7.73 times per year. The average board meeting of 7.73 times per 
year indicates that board of GLCs in Malaysia meet less frequently than their 
counterparts in the UK who were reported by Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011) 
meet in average 8.78 times per year. 
 
In term of board composition, the mean number of independent non-executive 
directors on the board for all years is 3.69 (44 percent) which complied with the 
recommendation by Malaysia Code on Corporate Governance (2007) that 
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independent directors should make up at least one third from total number of board 
of directors.  
 
In Table 4-11, the majority of GLCs are owned by federal government sponsored 
pension and investment funds (PIF GLIC) (39 percent), followed by federal 
government owned GLICs (FGLIC) (35 percent), and SEDCs (25 percent). 42 
observations or 18 percent of GLCs have golden share provisions.  
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TABLE 4-10: 
Descriptive statistics for non-dummy variables (N=224) 
Variables Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
ROA  
 
4.49 4.12 5.97 -27.03 20.55 -1.04 9.50 
ROE  10.73 8.08 14.37 -32.55 49.97 0.33 4.27 
Tobin’s Q 0.85 0.68 0.59 -0.04 4.21 1.71 7.76 
GLIC_share 47.09 48.14 15.39 20 86.81 0.06 2.02 
BOD_SCS 3.22 0 7.21 0 33.33 
(no. = 4) 
2.30 7.65 
BOD_POL 3.40 0 7.64 0 33.33 
(no.= 3) 
2.28 7.46 
Size £1.2b £0.36b 1.19 £0.16b £13.9 3.49 16.16 
Liquidity 2.74 1.70 3.06 0.36 18.36 2.93 12.42 
Leverage 0.60 0.35 0.86 0 5.46 2.97 14.06 
BODSIZE 8.30 8 1.57 5 12 0.02 2.63 
BODMEET 7.73 7 3.57 3 19 1.02 3.48 
BODINED 3.69 3 1.14 2 8 1.26 4.65 
 
The variables are the following: ROA (return on assets); ROE (return on equity); Tobin’s Q (market 
value); GLIC_share (the degree of GLIC share ownership in GLC); BOD_SCS (the number of senior civil 
service on the board of GLCs), BOD_POL (the number of politicians on the board of GLCs),   Size (firm’s 
total assets); Liquidity (the proportion of current assets to currents liability); Leverage (the proportion of 
debts to shareholder’s equity); BODSIZE (the numbers of board members per year); BODMEET (the 
number of board meeting per year); BODINED (the number of independent non-executive director on the 
board of GLCs). 
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TABLE 4-11: 
Descriptive statistics for dummy variables 
 
 
Variables 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Skewness 
 
Kurtosis 
 
N 
 
PIF GLIC 0.39 0 0.49 0 1 0.41 1.17 89 
FGLIC     0.35 0 0.47 0 1 0.61 1.38 79 
SEDC 0.25 0 0.43 0 1 1.15 2.33 56 
Golden 
share 
0.18 0 0.39 0 1 1.60 3.56 42 
 
The variables are the following: PIF GLIC (GLCs owned by federal government sponsored pension and 
investment funds), FGLIC (GLCs that owned by federal government owned GLICs); SEDC (GLC that 
owned by State Economic Development Corporations); Golden share (GLCs with golden shares 
provisions).  
 
 
4.3.2 Univariate analysis 
 
4.3.2.1 Pairwise correlation matrix 
 
Table 4-12 presents the Pairwise correlation for the independent variables. It 
indicates that all independent variables are moderately inter-correlated, except the 
variables BOD_SCS and golden share. The high correlation coefficient (0.80) 
between these variables is not unexpected, since one of the means by which the 
Ministry of Finance Incorporated monitors these firms is to appoint senior civil 
servants to their boards to act as the “eyes and ears” of government. However, it 
poses a potential multicollinearity problem. This issue has been discussed previously 
in the data diagnostic section, where after further tests we conclude that the 
multicollinearity is not detrimental to the results of the multivariate analysis. 
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It is interesting to highlight that there is a negative correlation (p < 0.01) between all 
performance measures with GLCs owned by SEDC. Similar results are found in the 
univariate relationship between variable politicians on the board of GLCs and 
performance where all performance measures are negatively correlated with 
politicians.  
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TABLE 4-12: Pairwise correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 ROA 1.000 
 
       
2 ROE 0.79 
(0.00) 
1.000       
3 TOBIN’S Q 0.42 
(0.00) 
0.48 
(0.00) 
1.000      
4 PIF GLIC 0.24 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.02) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
1.000     
5 FGLIC -0.03 
(0.55) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
-0.59 
(0.00) 
1.000    
6 SEDC -0.23 
(0.00) 
-0.28 
(0.00) 
-0.32 
(0.00) 
-0.46 
(0.00) 
-0.42 
(0.00) 
1.000   
7 GLIC Share 0.07 
(0.29) 
0.13 
(0.03) 
-0.13 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.89) 
-0.10 
(0.10) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
1.000  
8 Golden share 0.02 
(0.74) 
0.12 
(0.07) 
0.05 
(0.40) 
-0.39 
(0.00) 
0.65 
(0.00) 
-0.27 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.92) 
1.000 
9 BOD_SCS -0.14 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.46) 
-0.05 
(0.45) 
-0.36 
(0.00) 
0.56 
(0.00) 
-0.21 
(0.00) 
0.13 
(0.03) 
0.80 
(0.00) 
10 BOD_POL -0.15 
(0.02) 
-0.13 
(0.05) 
-0.18 
(0.00) 
-0.32 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.79) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.51) 
0.16 
(0.01) 
11 SIZE -0.04 
(0.45) 
0.16 
(0.01) 
0.17 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.74) 
0.30 
(0.00) 
-0.31 
(0.00) 
0.32 
(0.00) 
0.42 
(0.00) 
12 Monopoly -0.04 
(0.51) 
0.04 
(0.50) 
0.04 
(0.55) 
-0.14 
(0.03) 
0.33 
(0.00) 
-0.20 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
0.55 
(0.00) 
13 Liquidity 0.28 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
0.04 
(0.47) 
0.30 
(0.00) 
-0.17 
(0.00) 
-0.15 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.94) 
-0.08 
(0.21) 
14 Leverage -0.09 
(0.14) 
-0.04 
(0.47) 
-0.09 
(0.16) 
-0.11 
(0.07) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.31) 
0.01 
(0.79) 
-0.06 
(0.32) 
15 BOD_SIZE 0.02 
(0.66) 
0.01 
(0.79) 
-0.03 
(0.65) 
-0.09 
(0.14) 
0.04 
(0.53) 
0.06 
(0.32) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
16 BOD meeting -0.19 
(0.00) 
-0.20 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.54) 
-0.22 
(0.00) 
0.46 
(0.00) 
-0.25 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.70) 
0.45 
(0.00) 
17 BOD INED 0.04 
(0.51) 
0.03 
(0.56) 
0.13 
(0.04) 
-0.00 
(0.89) 
-0.03 
(0.65) 
0.04 
(0.51) 
-0.14 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.87) 
 
 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
 
9 
 
BOD_SCS 
1.000 
 
        
 
10 
 
BOD_POL 
0.01 
(0.87) 
1.000        
 
11 
 
SIZE 
0.35 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.92) 
1.000       
 
12 
 
Monopoly 
0.52 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.28) 
0.31 
(0.00) 
1.000      
 
13 
 
Liquidity 
-0.13 
(0.04) 
-0.08 
(0.23) 
-0.16 
(0.01) 
-0.07 
(0.25) 
1.000     
 
14 
 
Leverage 
-0.09 
(0.16) 
-0.04 
(0.51) 
0.22 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.67) 
-0.18 
(0.00) 
1.000    
 
15 
 
BOD_SIZE 
0.19 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.06) 
0.09 
(0.17) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.30) 
-0.13 
(0.04) 
1.000   
 
16 
 
BOD meeting 
0.40 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
0.32 
(0.00) 
0.42 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.15) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
1.000  
 
17 
 
BOD INED 
-0.02 
(0.65) 
-0.08 
(0.18) 
0.06 
(0.36) 
-0.06 
(0.35) 
-0.13 
(0.03) 
0.12 
(0.06) 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
-0.03 
(0.58) 
1.000 
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4.3.2.2 The impact of different types of GLICs on GLC performance (H1, H2 and H3) 
 
Table 4-13 provides a comparison of differences of mean and median corporate 
performance of GLCs according to different types of controlling GLICs. These 
preliminary tests support our prediction that corporate performance of portfolio 
companies owned by PIF GLIC and FGLIC is higher than corporate performance of 
portfolio companies owned by SEDC. For example, in Panel 1, portfolio companies 
owned by PIF GLIC recorded higher mean and median Tobin’s Q of 0.93 and 0.75 
respectively compared to lower values of Tobin’s Q for portfolio companies owned 
by SEDCs, which have both a mean and median of 0.51. The results are supported 
statistically (p < 0.01) as shown in our Pairwise comparison table in Panel 2 with the 
t-value in the result of Two-Sample t-test of differences in means of 5.6743 and the 
z-value in the results of Mann-Whitney U-test of differences in medians of 4.755. 
Similar trends are found for corporate performance measures by ROA and ROE.  As 
indicated above, these results largely support hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3. 
 
Concerning hypothesis 1, although mean ROA and ROE performance of GLCs 
owned by PIF GLIC (ROA=6.36%, ROE=13.34%) is slightly higher than mean ROA 
and ROE performance of GLCs owned by FGLIC (ROA=5.03%, ROE=12.24%), the 
opposite results were recorded for mean and median Tobin’s Q performance which 
suggests the market performance of GLCs owned by FGLIC outperformed the 
market performance of GLCs controlled by PIF GLIC.  
 
In terms of the median performance of PIF GLIC and FGLIC, the median ROE of 
GLCs owned by PIF GLIC (9.88%) is slightly better than median ROE GLCs 
 145 | P a g e  
 
controlled by FGLIC (9.56%) but opposite results were found for ROA (PIF GLIC = 
6.04%; FGLIC = 6.97%).  
 
Even though the Two-Sample t-test for the differences in means of the ROA 
performance (PIF GLIC versus FGLIC) shows that the difference in means between 
both groups is statistically significant (t-value of 2.1537, p < 0.05), the difference in 
medians between PIF GLIC and FGLIC is not significant. Moreover, both 
differences in means and medians for ROE and Tobin’s Q between these two groups 
of GLICs are also insignificant.    
 
Therefore, based on the above statistics tests, we conclude that while the results 
support hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3, they fail to support hypothesis 1. The results 
of multivariate regression in the next section clarify this issue more clearly. 
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TABLE 4-13 
 
Corporate performance of GLCs by different types of controlling GLICs 
 
Panel 1: Means and medians corporate performance for GLCs with different type of 
GLICs 
 
 
 
PIF GLIC (N=89) FGLIC (N=79) SEDC (N=56) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
ROA 6.36% 6.04% 5.03% 6.97% 2.04% 2.09% 
ROE 13.34% 9.88% 12.24% 9.56% 3.47% 4.87% 
TOBIN’S Q 0.93 0.75 1.00 0.78 0.51 0.51 
 
 
Panel 2: Pairwise comparison of differences in means and medians by different types 
of controlling GLICs using Two Sample t-test and Mann-Whitney U test  
 
 PIF GLIC vs. FGLIC PIF GLIC vs. SEDC FGLIC vs. SEDC 
Mean
a
 Median
b
 Mean
a
 Median
b
 Mean
a
  Median
b
 
ROA 2.1537** 1.619 5.9460*** 5.515*** 2.2163** 3.367*** 
ROE 0.2361 0.408 5.5663*** 5.312*** 4.0384*** 3.769*** 
TOBIN’S Q -0.7487 -0.580 5.6743*** 4.755*** 5.5298*** 5.002*** 
 
Notes: (a) t-value from the two sample t-test of differences in means; and  
(b) z-value from the two-sample Mann-Whitney U-test of differences in 
medians.  
            
Significance level: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed test) 
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4.3.3 Multivariate analysis 
 
The results reported in Table 4-14 support our earlier findings regarding hypotheses 
2 and 3, which suggest that GLCs owned by federal government sponsored pension 
and investment funds and GLCs owned by federal government owned GLICs 
outperform GLCs owned by SEDCs (ROA: PIF GLIC β = 3.99, p < 0.01, FGLIC β = 
3.47, p < 0.01; ROE: PIF GLIC β = 10.59, p < 0.01, FGLIC β = 12.09, p < 0.01; 
Tobin’s Q: PIF GLIC β = 0.29, p < 0.05, FGLIC β = 0.53, p < 0.01)33. 
 
With regard to hypothesis 1, our results indicate that GLCs owned by federal 
government sponsored pension and investment funds outperform GLCs owned by 
federal government owned GLICs when performance is measured using ROA (PIF 
GLIC β = 3.99, p < 0.01, FGLIC β = 3.47, p < 0.01). However, the results are 
reversed when performance is measured using ROE (PIF GLIC β = 10.59, p < 0.01, 
FGLICS β = 12.09, p < 0.01) and Tobin’s Q (PIF GLIC β = 0.29, p < 0.05, FGLIC    
β = 0.53, p < 0.01).  
 
Our findings indicate that the objectives and control structures of GLICs affect how 
government ownership influences the performance of GLCs. One possible 
explanation for our results regarding PIF GLICs and FGLICs might be that the 
increased scrutiny by the parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, the Auditor 
General and the Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance on their activities.  
                                                          
33
 As previously mentioned, SEDC used as a comparative purpose and our multivariate regression that 
included SEDC (not reported in Table 3-14) but excluded FGLIC shows the coefficient for SEDC as 
follows: (ROA: β = -3.47, p < 0.01; ROE β = -12.09, p < 0.01; Tobin’s Q: β = -0.53, p < 0.01) 
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This might be a substitute for the representation of the interests of beneficiaries on 
the boards of federal government-sponsored pension and investment funds.  
 
Our results also show a significant positive association between the proportion of  
shares owned by the controlling GLIC and GLC performance based on accounting 
based performance measures (ROA: β = 6.33, p < 0.05; ROE: β = 20.01, p < 0.01). 
However, market based performance measures show a negative association; the 
result is insignificant (Tobin’s Q: β = -0.34, p > 0.1). These findings support 
hypothesis 4 and suggest that the stakes GLICs control affect both their incentive and 
ability to control the management of GLCs. These results are consistent with findings 
by Lau and Tong (2008) and Najid and Rahman (2011), who also found a positive 
association between GLIC ownership and GLC performance using ROA and ROE as 
performance measures. 
 
With regard to hypothesis 5, our results show a positive and significant association 
between golden share provisions and corporate performance based on accounting 
performance measures (ROA: β = 6.33, p < 0.05; ROE: β = 16.21, p < 0.01). While 
the market performance shows a negative relationship (Tobin’s Q: β = -0.05, p > 
0.1), but the association statistically insignificant. This suggests that GLCs with 
golden shares may benefit from financial support, preferential access to government 
contracts, or tight supervision of management by relevant ministries, the Auditor 
General and the MOF Inc. 
 
Our results differ noticeably from findings on golden share type regulations in China 
(Sun et al., 2002), Egypt (Omran, 2009) and Europe (Boardman and Laurin, 2000), 
which indicate a negative relationship with corporate performance. This 
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inconsistency in findings could be an indication of differences in the objectives and 
organisational characteristics of government organisations that administer golden 
shares. However, the results of previous studies could also be affected by omitted 
variable bias, as they control for a very limited range of government ownership 
characteristics. 
 
With regards to the impact of board membership of senior civil servants and 
politicians in GLCs our findings provide limited support for hypotheses 6 (ROA: β 
= -0.27, p > 0.1; ROE: β = -0.77, p < 0.1, Tobin’s Q: β = -0.02, p < 0.05) and 
hypothesis 7 (ROA: β = -0.05, p > 0.1, ROE: β = -0.11, p > 0.1, Tobin’s Q: β = -0.00, 
p < 0.05), which suggested that senior civil servants’ and politicians’ limited control 
incentives and limited expertise in the supervision and control of managers 
negatively affect firm’s performance.  
 
These findings contradict earlier research on Malaysian firms by Johnson and Mitton 
(2003) and Mitchell and Joseph (2010), which indicated a positive relationship 
between political connections and firm performance. The divergence in results might 
be due to methodological differences, as our model controls not only for the presence 
of politicians on boards but also for golden shares and block ownership by different 
types of GLICs.  
 
Our results also indicate that control variables related to profitability such as liquidity 
and leverage have limited impact on GLCs’ financial performance. Liquidity is 
positively associated across all performance measures but only significantly related 
to ROA (ROA: β = 0.33, p < 0.05, ROE: β = 0.17, p > 0.1, Tobin’s Q: β = 0.01, p > 
0.1). In the meantime, our results show a negative and significant association 
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between leverage and Tobin’s Q but insignificant with both accounting performance 
measures (ROA: β = 0.16, p > 0.1, ROE: β = -0.28, p > 0.1, Tobin’s Q: β = -0.14, p < 
0.01).  The results for leverage indicate that investor more cautious to make 
investment in highly leveraged GLCs. Generally, the results for these variables are in 
line with previous research, which also finds no or no consistent relationships (e.g. 
see Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010; Najid and Rahman, 2011).  
 
Monopoly licences have no association to financial performance across all 
performance measures (ROA: β = -1.02, p > 0.1, ROE: β = -1.86, p > 0.1, Tobin’s Q: 
β = 0.11, p > 0.1). This might suggest that monopoly licenses do not provide GLCs 
with the possibility to exploit customers or suppliers, but rather that the license 
conditions are so restrictive that they negatively affect firm performance. 
 
Firm size is negatively and significantly associated with ROA (ROA: β = -1.83, p < 
0.05, ROE: β = 0.77, p > 0.1) but the direction is reverse with Tobin’s Q (Tobin’s Q: 
β = 0.22, p < 0.05). Previous research suggests that large state owned enterprises tend 
to encounter more government bureaucracy and suffer from more agency problems, 
which impact their corporate performance (Sun et al., 2002; Najid and Rahman, 
2011). 
 
With reference to the control variables related to board characteristics, we find a 
significant negative association between board of directors’ meeting and financial 
performance across all performance measures (ROA: β = -0.38, p < 0.01, ROE: β =    
-1.53, p < 0.01; Tobin’s Q: β = -0.03, p < 0.05). The result is contradictory to our 
expectations and generally suggests that while board of GLCs meet regularly but 
ineffective in playing their role as part of firm’s monitoring mechanism. It also 
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indicates that poorly performing boards might meet frequently because the firms are 
in trouble.  
 
However, other board characteristics variables, namely board size and proportion of 
independent directors, are insignificantly related to firm performance (board size: 
ROA: β = 0.23, p > 0.1, ROE: β = 0.61, p > 0.1; Tobin’s Q: β = 0.01, p > 0.1; 
proportion of independent directors: ROA: β = 0.58, p > 0.1, ROE: β = 2.91, p > 0.1, 
Tobin’s Q: β = 0.65, p > 0.1). Interestingly, while both variable showed consistent 
positive association across all performance measures, that in line with research on 
companies which are suffering from resource constraints and operate in less efficient 
capital markets (Dalton et al., 1999), insignificant association prevents us from 
making this conclusion.   
 
The adjusted R-Square statistics found in this study (ROA: 31.5%, ROE: 32.9% and 
Tobin’s Q: 26.5%) are slightly higher than those reported in previous studies on 
Malaysia. For example, in ROA measurement, Chu and Cheah (2006) reported an 
adjusted R-Square of 25.7% and similar percentage was documented in Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) of 26.5%. For Tobin’s Q, Lau and Tong (2008) documented adjusted 
R-Square of 15.7% and later Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) reported adjusted R-Square 
of 27% that similar to our findings in this study. Recently, Najid and Rahman (2011) 
reported adjusted R-Square of 14.7%. This suggests that taking into account different 
types of GLICs and considering the participation of senior civil servants and 
politicians on the board of directors of GLCs improves the predictive power of the 
empirical model.  
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TABLE 4-14 
Robust standard errors regression of GLCs corporate performance, GLICs 
investment and control variables 
 
Variables  ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
PIF GLIC 3.99 (3.69)*** 10.59 (4.17)*** 0.29 (2.62)** 
FGLIC 3.47 (2.63)*** 12.09 (3.80)*** 0.53 (3.35)*** 
GLIC_share 6.33 (2.41)** 20.01 (3.28)*** -0.34 (-0.85) 
Golden share 6.33 (2.18)** 16.21 (2.63)*** -0.05 (-0.26) 
BOD_SCS -0.27 (-1.40) -0.77 (-1.96)* -0.02 (-2.54)** 
BOD_POL -0.05 (-1.39)  -0.11 (-1.00) -0.00 (-2.18)** 
Size -1.83 (-2.17)** 0.77 (0.38) 0.22 (2.25)** 
Monopoly  -1.02 (-0.60) -1.86 (-0.41) 0.11 (0.81) 
Liquidity 0.33 (2.54)** 0.17 (0.67) 0.01 (1.20) 
Leverage 0.16 (0.30) -0.28 (-0.15) -0.14 (-2.90)*** 
BOD_size 0.23 (0.87) 0.61 (1.08) 0.01 (0.77) 
BOD_meeting -0.38 (-2.72)*** -1.53 (-4.76)*** -0.03 (-2.32)** 
BOD_INED 0.58 (0.16)  2.91 (0.35) 0.65 (1.53) 
Services 5.84 (2.97)*** 7.61 (2.10)** 0.24 (1.56) 
Property 3.61 (2.04)** 2.72 (0.86) 0.06 (0.48) 
Plantations 4.67 (2.43)** 0.93 (0.26) -0.20 (-1.41) 
Consumer 5.19 (2.26)** 0.14 (0.04) -0.00 (-0.01) 
Industrial 5.96 (3.09)*** 10.08 (2.26)** -0.01 (-0.07) 
Year 05 -1.05 (-0.83) -1.86 (-0.70) -0.02 (-0.23) 
Year 06 1.26 (1.24) 3.71 (1.52) 0.11 (0.96) 
Year 07 1.99 (1.76)* 5.71 (2.30)** 0.17 (1.56) 
Year 08 0.69 (0.60)  0.43 (0.15) -0.17 (-1.56) 
Intercept -2.92 (-0.55) -36.95 (-2.86)*** -0.48 (-0.82) 
 F-value
 
5.90*** 5.26*** 5.62*** 
 Adjusted R-Square
 
0.315 0.329 0.265 
Observations 224 224 224 
 
t-statistics reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance level: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 
0.01 
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4.3.4 Tests of endogeneity and reverse causality 
 
If capital, goods, and labour markets are efficient, corporate governance systems of 
individual companies might be endogenously determined. This suggests that market 
pressures force each firm to develop a corporate governance system consisting of 
different corporate governance mechanisms which minimize principal-agent costs 
and are specific to its particular circumstances (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). In this 
case, it would be unlikely to observe a pattern between ownership concentration and 
firm performance which is consistent across the market (Demsetz and Villalonga, 
2001; McConnell, Serveas, and Lins, 2008). 
 
Since emerging economies tend to be characterised by inefficient capital, labour and 
goods markets (Zattoni, Pedersen and Kumar, 2009), it is unlikely that endogeneity is 
a problem in our research. However, since the presence of endogeneity would lead to 
biased results, we applied the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) to 
investigate the presence of endogeneity and the appropriateness of using parametric 
test methods in the regression analysis. Generally, the endogeneity problem arises 
when an explanatory variable is correlated with the error term mainly because of 
model specification errors and it would lead to biased estimators (Adkins and Hill, 
2007).  
 
Following Larcker and Rusticus (2010) the instrumental variables are the lagged 
values of the endogenous variables.
34
 Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests the null hypothesis 
that the residual values of firm performance and ownership concentration are jointly 
                                                          
34
 We assume firm performance and GLIC ownership concentration are endogenous 
 154 | P a g e  
 
equal to zero. If the F-statistic is significant, the null hypothesis would be rejected, 
suggesting that endogeneity is present. Table 4-15 presents the results of the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test. As expected, our results do not indicate an endogeneity problem 
since the F-statistics are insignificant in Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
35
. 
 
TABLE 4-15: Durbin-Wu-Hausman test results  
 
Ho = the residual of performance and GLIC ownership concentration are exogenous 
 
Reject Ho if F-statistic significant 
 
Variables Chi2 value (p-value of F-statistics) 
 
Model 1 (Performance =ROA) 
Return on assets 
GLIC ownership concentration 
 
 
1.66161 (p=0.2169) 
1.00174 (p=0.3470) 
 
Model 2 (Performance = ROE) 
Return on equity 
GLIC ownership concentration 
 
 
0.115724 (p=0.7450) 
0.856669 (p=0.3845) 
 
Model 3 (Performance = Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q 
GLIC ownership concentration 
 
 
5.30459 (p=0.1267) 
4.43223 (p=0.1470) 
 
 
                                                          
35
 Example of procedure in Durbin-Wu-Hausman test using STATA (e.g. Model 1): Firstly, we run  
regression of performance model using ivregress 2sls command and we replaced the value of 
GLIC_share with its lagged value. After that, we used estat endogenous command for Durbin-Wu-
Hausman Test (tests of endogeneity) to examine whether GLIC_share is endogenous in this model. In 
step two, we run regression of GLIC ownership concentration model using ivregress 2sls command 
and we replaced the value of ROA with its lagged value and used similar command of estat 
endogenous for Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test to examine whether ROA is endogenous in this model.    
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While we found no evidence for endogeneity in our models based on Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test, the corporate governance literature frequently acknowledge the 
possibility that corporate performance might influence blockholders’ investment 
behaviour, i.e. the reverse causality effects (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001). In this case, for example, blockholders might invest more in firms 
with better financial performance and therefore accumulate higher stakes. 
 
Relating to this, agency theory predicts a causal relation between ownership 
concentration and performance where the concentrated ownership has the capacity to 
limit the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The theory argues that a 
higher concentration serves large shareholders with stronger incentives and power to 
play an effective role in monitoring management activities thus improved firm 
performance. However, previous studies on ownership structure-performance 
relationship (Demstez, 1983, Demstez and Lehn, 1985, Demstez and Villonga, 2001, 
Chang, 2003 and Al Farooque et al, 2007) argue that the causation could, in some 
circumstances, run in the opposite direction where the performance that caused 
ownership concentration and not vice versa. In the context of GLCs in Malaysia, 
there is possibility that the GLICs used corporate performance as main indicator to 
increase or reduce their shareholding in one particular GLC.  
 
This raises the question: What, other than firm performance, impacts on ownership 
concentration of GLICs. Based on existing literature, we use the following model 
(GLIC ownership concentration model) to investigate the determinants of ownership 
concentration of GLICs in their portfolio companies: 
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GLIC_shareit = α + β1PERFORMANCEit + β2Golden Shareit + β3BOD_SCSit + 
β4BOD_POLit + β5Sizeit + β6Liquidityit + β7Leverageit + 
β8Servicesit + β9Propertyit + β10Plantationsit + 
β11Consumerit + β12PIndustrialit + β13Year2005it + 
β14Year2006it + β15Year2007it + β16Year2008it + εit  
 
In line with previous literature we control for firm performance, firm size, liquidity, 
leverage and industry (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; 
Anderson and Hamadi, 2007) as well as the presence of golden shares and the 
membership of politicians and senior civil servants on GLC boards.  
 
As golden shares provide the Ministry of Finance Incorporated (MOF Inc.) with 
extensive control rights over the firm, golden shares may be a substitute for high 
ownership stakes.  This in turn suggests that in GLCs with golden shares, the 
proportion of shares held by the controlling GLIC is lower than in other GLCs. 
 
Similarly, in companies whose boards are dominated by senior civil servants and 
politicians, their ability to influence board strategies and board proposals submitted 
to the shareholders’ general meeting might substitute for high ownership stakes by 
the controlling GLIC. Alternatively, GLICs may be influenced by senior civil 
servants and politicians to invest in GLICs in which they or their colleagues control 
board seats, to facilitate the firms’ access to capital.  
 
Table 4-16 presents the results of robust standard errors regression on ownership 
stakes of controlling GLICs in GLCs. Although the results suggest that GLIC 
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ownership is statistically significant and positively related to firm performance, with 
regard to ROA and ROE, the correlation coefficients are exceedingly low (ROA: β = 
0.004, p < 0.05; ROE: β = 0.002, p <0.01 and TOBIN’s Q: β = -0.033, p > 0.10). 
This actually explains why the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) did not 
indicate the presence of endogeneity in our earlier model. 
 
As expected, ownership concentration of GLICs is negatively related to the existence 
of golden shares (ROA: β = -0.235, p < 0.01; ROE: β = -0.242, p < 0.01 and 
TOBIN’s Q:  β = -0.205, p < 0.01). This suggests that golden share provisions do 
substitute for GLIC ownership concentration; however, there appears to be no similar 
substitution effect between board membership of senior civil servants and politicians 
and GLIC ownership concentration. Rather, GLICs tend to invest in particular in 
companies with high degrees of board membership by senior civil servants and 
politicians. The results for BOD_SCS are (ROA: β = 0.012, p < 0.01; ROE: β = 
0.012, p < 0.01 and TOBIN’s Q:  β = 0.009, p < 0.01) and BOD_POL (ROA: β = 
0.003, p < 0.01; ROE: β = 0.003, p < 0.01 and TOBIN’s Q:  β = 0.002, p < 0.05). 
 
One interesting finding is that while senior civil servants and politicians appear to 
have no positive impact on firm performance (refer to main analysis results in Table 
4-14), there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and senior 
civil servants and politicians. This could mean either that:  i) The senior civil 
servants and politicians on the board of GLCs can facilitate government investment 
(access to resources) for these firms - though without positively affecting 
performance, which might suggest a poor use of the additional funds; or ii) 
Government investors which own a large stake appoint politicians and senior civil 
servants to the boards to protect their investment, although they do not seem to help 
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as shown by no positive impact of these variables on firm performance as discussed 
above. As such, there is an indication that our earlier argument regarding lack of 
expertise and performance incentives of politicians and senior civil servants serving 
on the boards of GLCs is indeed justified.        
 
While both liquidity and leverage are insignificantly related with GLIC ownership 
concentration, our findings indicate that firm size is positively related to GLIC 
ownership concentration (ROA: β = 0.082, p < 0.01; ROE: β = 0.071, p < 0.01 and 
TOBIN’s Q: β = 0.085, p < 0.01). This contradicts previous research into the 
relationship between firm size and (largely private) ownership concentration in 
developed market economies (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 
2001), but is in line with previous research into GLCs in emerging economies (Ang 
and Ding, 2006; Le and Buck, 2011). Because one of the objectives of GLICs, in 
particular FGLIC and SEDCs, is to use their influence over GLCs to achieve key 
government policies in relation to the development of strategic industries and the 
creation of employment opportunities as well as economic and social restructuring, 
this concentration on larger firms is not surprising in the Malaysian context. 
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TABLE 4-16 
Robust standard errors estimates of the relationship between GLIC ownership 
concentration and GLC performance 
 
Variables 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
ROA 
0.004 (2.35)**   
ROE 
 0.002 (3.04)***  
Tobin’s Q 
  -0.033 (-1.31) 
Golden Share 
-0.235 (-6.60)*** -0.242 (-6.72)*** -0.205 (-5.82)*** 
BOD_SCS 
0.012 (6.09)*** 0.012 (6.18)*** 0.009 (5.59)*** 
BOD_POL 
0.003 (3.78)*** 0.003 (4.00)*** 0.002 (2.19)** 
Size 
0.082 (5.05)*** 0.071 (4.31)*** 0.085 (4.54)*** 
Liquidity 
0.000 (0.19) 0.001 (0.56) 0.002 (0.99) 
Leverage 
-0.003 (-0.35) -0.001 (-0.14) -0.008 (-0.87) 
Services 
0.075 (1.71)* 0.081 (1.93)* 0.111 (2.61)** 
Property 
0.108 (2.70)*** 0.116 (3.05)*** 0.123 (3.13)*** 
Plantations 
0.149 (3.05)*** 0.165 (3.60)*** 0.162 (3.18)*** 
Consumer 
0.066 (1.37) 0.084 (1.80)* 0.096 (1.82)* 
Industrial 
0.091 (1.68)* 0.091 (1.73)* 0.117 (2.23)** 
Year 05 
0.001 (0.05) 0.000 (0.03) -0.004 (-0.15) 
Year 06 
-0.014 (-0.51) -0.015 (-0.55) -0.008 (-0.28) 
Year 07 
-0.002 (-0.08) -0.004 (-0.16) 0.007 (0.26) 
Year 08 
0.044 (1.46) 0.046 (1.55) 0.038 (1.22) 
Intercept 1.009 (9.62)*** 1.061 (9.91)*** 1.011 (8.74)*** 
Adj. R
2
 
0.233 0.246 0.226 
F-value 
7.07*** 6.35*** 5.88*** 
Observations 
224 224 224 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate a significance level: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, 
***p < 0.01 
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4.3.5 Additional analysis and robustness checks
36
 
 
 
4.3.5.1 Different regression estimators 
The result in main findings so far is based on robust standard errors regression 
analysis. However, to provide reasonable assurance that our main findings are robust 
to the specifications of various regression estimators, alternative regression 
estimators namely; robust regression, clustered robust and quantile regression are 
presented in Table 4-17 (Model ROA), Table 4-18 (Model ROE) and Table 4-19 
(Model Tobin’s Q).  
 
Generally, we find that the results of these estimators are consistent with main 
findings in terms of the direction of the relationship between independent and control 
variables with dependents variables in all models. Our key variables, PIF GLIC, 
FGLIC are positively and significantly related across all estimators except that PIF 
GLIC is found insignificant for TOBIN’S Q model using clustered robust regression 
(TOBIN’S Q: β = 0.29, p > 0.1).  
 
The results of other important variables, such as Golden shares, are also consistent 
across all estimators in terms of direction of the association as well as the 
significance of its relationship. Interestingly, while the negative direction of 
BOD_SCS and BOD_POL consistent across all estimators in all models, we find that 
BOD_SCS highly significant for ROA model in Quantile regression estimator (ROA: 
β = -0.28, p < 0.05) which is opposite to its insignificant relationship in the main 
                                                          
36
 Although not reported in additional analysis, all the regressions in this section included variables 
years and industry dummies. 
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findings. In relation to our control variables, they might be different in terms of 
levels of significance, but this does not change the context of the main findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 162 | P a g e  
 
TABLE 4-17 
The results of different regression estimators of GLCs corporate performance, 
GLICs investment and control variables 
(Model ROA, N=224) 
 
 
Variables 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
 
Robust regression 
 
Clustered robust 
 
Quantile regression 
 
PIF GLIC 3.99 (3.93)*** 3.99 (2.64)** 3.25 (2.36)** 
 
FGLIC 3.47 (2.80)*** 3.47 (1.95)* 3.44 (2.06)** 
 
GLIC_share 6.33 (2.56)** 6.33 (1.59) 3.27 (0.99) 
 
Golden share 6.33 (2.39)** 6.33 (2.16)** 6.13 (2.61)** 
 
BOD_SCS -0.27 (-1.56) -0.27 (-1.51) -0.28 (-2.48)** 
 
BOD_POL -0.05 (-1.48)  -0.05 (-1.15)  -0.07 (-1.10)  
 
Size -1.83 (-2.37)** -1.83 (-1.71)* -1.02 (-1.18) 
 
Monopoly  -1.02 (-0.66) -1.02 (-0.55) 0.48 (0.27) 
 
Liquidity 0.33 (2.78)*** 0.33 (2.09)** 0.34 (2.21)** 
 
Leverage 0.16 (0.33) 0.16 (0.32) -0.55 (-1.02) 
 
BODSIZE 0.23 (0.95) 0.23 (0.86) 0.33 (1.14) 
 
BODMEET -0.38 (-2.95)*** -0.38 (-2.50)** -0.32 (-2.08)** 
 
BODINED 0.58 (0.17)  0.58 (0.12)  -0.01 (-0.00)  
 
Intercept 
 
-2.92 (-0.58) 
 
-2.92 (-0.38) 
 
-0.96 (-0.13) 
 
Adj. R
2
/ 
Pseudo R
2
 
 
0.315 
 
0.315 
 
0.264 
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate a significance level: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, 
***p < 0.01 
 
 163 | P a g e  
 
TABLE 4-18 
The results of different regression estimators of GLCs corporate performance, 
GLICs investment and control variables 
(Model ROE, N=224) 
 
 
Variables 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
 
Robust regression 
 
Clustered robust 
 
Quantile regression 
 
PIF GLIC 10.59 (4.39)*** 10.59 (2.78)*** 9.38 (3.42)*** 
 
FGLIC 12.09 (4.03)*** 12.09 (2.74)*** 13.57 (3.99)*** 
 
GLIC_share 20.01 (3.47)*** 20.01 (2.17)** 18.27 (2.69)*** 
 
Golden share 16.21 (2.86)*** 16.21 (1.82)* 13.50 (2.80)*** 
 
BOD_SCS -0.77 (-2.21)** -0.77 (-1.86)* -0.96 (-4.10)*** 
 
BOD_POL -0.11 (-1.07) -0.11 (-0.84) -0.09 (-0.74)  
 
Size 0.77 (0.42) 0.77 (0.29) 0.78 (0.44) 
 
Monopoly  -1.86 (-0.45) -1.86 (-0.26) 6.81 (1.83)* 
 
Liquidity 0.17 (0.73) 0.17 (0.52) -0.00 (-0.02) 
 
Leverage -0.28 (-0.17) -0.28 (-0.16) -1.02 (-0.91) 
 
BODSIZE 0.61 (1.18) 0.61 (0.89) 0.98 (1.67)* 
 
BODMEET -1.53 (-5.21)*** -1.53 (-4.33)*** -1.16 (-3.77)*** 
 
BODINED 2.91 (0.37) 2.91 (0.24) 8.64 (0.98)  
 
Intercept 
 
-36.95 (-3.05)*** 
 
-36.95 (-1.89)* 
 
-40.49 (-2.76)*** 
 
Adj. R
2
/ 
Pseudo R
2
 
 
0.329 
 
0.395 
 
0.172 
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate a significance level: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, 
***p < 0.01 
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TABLE 4-19 
The results of different regression estimators of GLCs corporate performance, 
GLICs investment and control variables 
(Model TOBIN’S Q, N=224) 
 
 
Variables 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
 
Robust regression 
 
Clustered robust 
 
Quantile regression 
 
PIF GLIC 0.29 (2.78)*** 0.29 (1.64) 0.27 (4.23)*** 
 
FGLIC 0.53 (3.53)*** 0.53 (2.06)** 0.28 (3.66)*** 
 
GLIC_share -0.34 (-0.89) -0.34 (-0.51) -0.26 (-1.71)* 
 
Golden share -0.05 (-0.28) -0.05 (-0.16) -0.16 (-1.53) 
 
BOD_SCS -0.02 (-2.85)*** -0.02 (-2.21)** -0.01 (-2.18)** 
 
BOD_POL -0.00 (-2.34)** -0.00 (-1.64) -0.00 (-2.96)*** 
 
Size 0.22 (2.42)** 0.22 (1.44) 0.30 (7.53)*** 
 
Monopoly  0.11 (0.88) 0.11 (0.48) 0.13 (1.54) 
 
Liquidity 0.01 (1.29) 0.01 (0.75) 0.00 (0.08) 
 
Leverage -0.14 (-3.19)*** -0.14 (-2.52)** -0.12 (-5.04)*** 
 
BODSIZE 0.01 (0.82) 0.01 (0.51) 0.01 (1.42) 
 
BODMEET -0.03 (-2.48)** -0.03 (-1.88)* -0.01 (-1.98)* 
 
BODINED 0.65 (1.66)* 0.65 (1.12) 0.13 (0.68) 
 
Intercept 
 
-0.48 (-0.86) 
 
-0.48 (-0.51) 
 
-1.00 (-3.03)*** 
 
Adj. R
2
/ 
Pseudo R
2
 
 
0.265 
 
0.265 
 
0.229 
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate a significance level: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, 
***p < 0.01 
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4.3.5.2 The impact of total government ownership rather than the impact of 
ownership concentration of the controlling GLIC 
Table 4-20 presents the results of robust standards errors regression based on total 
government ownership instead of controlling GLIC ownership. In this context, 
government ownership is calculated by combining the total shareholdings of 
different GLICs in one particular GLC by taking into the account the collaboration 
between GLICs. The purpose of this analysis is determine whether the impact of 
government ownership on corporate performance is significantly different when we 
used the total shareholdings by government instead of shareholdings by one 
particular GLIC as employed in the main findings.  
 
From the results of regression analysis, we find a consistent trend with regards to the 
direction of relationship of our key variables and the control variables on corporate 
performance as well as no major changes in their significant level. However, the 
magnitude of the relationship between the total government ownership variable and 
performance shows a big difference.  
 
In detail, using controlling GLIC ownership in the main analysis, the results for this 
variable suggest a considerable magnitude of coefficient values particularly in 
accounting measures (ROA: 6.33, ROE: 20.01 and TOBIN’S Q: -0.34). However, 
when we employed the total of government ownership, the coefficient of this 
variable value show a very low magnitude of coefficient (ROA: 0.06, ROE: 0.20 and 
TOBIN’S Q:   -0.00)37. This shows that, the controlling GLICs ownership plays an 
                                                          
37
 We also conducted univariate regression analysis between total government ownership and firm 
performance and the magnitude of coefficient almost the same (ROA: 0.03, ROE: 0.17 and Tobin’s 
Q=0.00)  
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important role in determining the performance of their portfolio companies instead of 
higher level of total government ownership
38
, particularly in accounting 
performance. However, in terms of market performance, both types of ownership 
concentration negatively related to Tobin’s Q suggesting that market participants are 
either not interested to invest in listed companies that have high government 
shareholdings or they actually discount accounting information published by GLCs 
as they might be perceived to be more prone to misstate their accounts.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 The degree of government ownership is higher than GLIC ownership as it is combination between 
different types of GLICs  
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TABLE 4-20 
The results of robust standard errors regression of GLCs corporate 
performance and GLICs investment using total government ownership  
rather than GLIC ownership 
 
 
Variables 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
 
ROA 
 
ROE 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
PIF GLIC 3.83 (3.59)*** 10.08 (4.03)*** 0.31 (2.83)*** 
FGLIC 2.99 (2.30)** 10.59 (3.34)*** 0.55 (3.26)*** 
Government share 0.06 (2.59)** 0.20 (3.41)*** -0.00 (-0.10) 
Golden share 6.23 (2.23)** 15.82 (2.65)*** -0.00 (-0.03) 
BOD_SCS -0.26 (-1.38) -0.73 (-1.91)* -0.02 (-2.95)*** 
BOD_POL -0.05 (-1.46)  -0.12 (-1.11) -0.00 (-2.18)** 
Size -2.23 (-2.50)** -0.41 (-0.19) 0.20 (1.76)* 
Monopoly  -1.45 (-0.85) -3.16 (-0.71) 0.10 (0.74) 
Liquidity 0.33 (2.65)*** 0.19 (0.79) 0.01 (1.16) 
Leverage 0.29 (0.53) 0.12 (0.06) -0.14 (-2.80)*** 
BODSIZE 0.16 (0.63) 0.43 (0.74) 0.01 (0.59) 
BODMEET -0.38 (-2.74)*** -1.54 (-4.79)*** -0.02 (-2.16)** 
BODINED 0.44 (0.12)  2.27 (0.28) 0.75 (1.84)* 
Intercept 7.23 (1.74)* -5.16 (-0.45) -0.88 (-1.72)* 
 Adjusted R-Square
 
0.320 0.335 0.259 
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate a significance level: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, 
***p < 0.01 
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4.3.5.3 Regressions for individual years 
In order to investigate whether the results of the pooled regressions in the main 
findings might be biased by the results of any particular year, we repeated the 
regression for individual years. The results of robust standard errors regression by 
year presented in Table 4-21 (ROA), Table 4-22 (ROE) and Table 4-23 (TOBIN’S 
Q).  Generally we find no evidence that the results of the pooled regression are 
driven by results for any one individual year as no extreme value of coefficient 
appeared in all performance measures across the sample year. Therefore, we can 
conclude that our results are robust from the effect of any individual year. As stated 
previously, our study period is during a stable period for the Malaysian economy and 
this might have contributed to these findings. 
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TABLE: 4-21 
 
Robust standard errors regression estimates by year (Model 1 – ROA) 
 
Variables  
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
2004 
(N=46) 
2005 
(N=47) 
2006 
(N=48) 
2007 
(N=44) 
2008 
(N=39) 
Pooled 
(N=224) 
PIF GLIC 0.76 
(0.25) 
0.80 
(0.25) 
4.96 
(1.49) 
6.10* 
(1.90) 
5.56 
(1.29) 
3.99*** 
(3.69) 
FGLIC -0.77 
(-0.11) 
4.33 
(1.04) 
4.09 
(0.97) 
6.78 
(1.64) 
2.34 
(0.51) 
3.47*** 
(2.63) 
GLIC_share 4.52 
(0.38) 
10.47 
(1.22) 
4.07 
(0.55) 
9.88 
(0.90) 
8.31 
(0.90) 
6.33** 
(2.41) 
Golden share 10.60 
(0.95) 
20.13* 
(1.83) 
7.83 
(1.67) 
-0.90 
(-0.14) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
6.33** 
(2.18) 
BOD_SCS -0.25 
(-0.58) 
-1.10 
(-1.51) 
-0.53 
(-1.69) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
0.16 
(0.22) 
-0.27  
(-1.40) 
BOD_POL -0.14 
(-0.81) 
-0.10 
(-0.57) 
-0.03 
(-0.30) 
-0.01 
(-0.11) 
0.25 
(0.72) 
-0.05  
(-1.39)  
Size -1.28 
(-0.50) 
-1.13 
(-0.46) 
-2.36 
(-0.99) 
-1.36 
(-0.58) 
-2.65 
(-0.68) 
-1.83**         
(-2.17) 
Monopoly  0.00 
(0.00) 
-2.63 
(-0.42) 
3.02 
(0.90) 
2.19 
(0.36) 
-1.49 
(-0.20) 
-1.02         
(-0.60) 
Liquidity 0.72 
(2.46)** 
0.21 
(0.84) 
0.24 
(0.73) 
0.42 
(0.63) 
0.27 
(0.25) 
0.33** 
(2.54) 
Leverage 0.62 
(0.32) 
-0.97 
(-0.44) 
-0.90 
(-0.64) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
3.46 
(0.96) 
0.16    
(0.30) 
BODSIZE -0.12 
(-0.17) 
-0.23 
(-0.25) 
0.31 
(0.52) 
0.35 
(0.47) 
0.69 
(0.89) 
0.23    
(0.87) 
BODMEET -0.51 
(-0.84) 
-0.19 
(-0.39) 
-0.29 
(-0.97) 
-0.78* 
(-1.83) 
-0.44 
(-0.43) 
-0.38***         
(-2.72) 
BODINED -10.78 
(-0.62)  
0.64 
(0.05) 
5.61 
(0.50) 
6.00 
(0.47) 
-9.91 
(-0.70) 
0.58    
(0.16)  
Intercept 1.73* 
(0.07) 
-7.74 
(-0.43) 
4.34 
(0.25) 
-7.38 
(-0.41) 
-4.47 
(-0.17) 
-0.48         
(-0.82) 
  
R- Square
 
0.515 0.595 
 
0.571 0.533 0.676 
Adj. R
2
 
0.265 
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate a significance level: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, 
***p < 0.01 
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TABLE: 4-22  
 
Robust standard errors regression estimates by year (Model 2 – ROE) 
 
Variables  
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
2004 
(N=46) 
2005 
(N=47) 
2006 
(N=48) 
2007 
(N=44) 
2008 
(N=39) 
Pooled 
(N=224) 
PIF GLIC 4.31 
(0.53) 
2.97 
(0.37) 
13.10* 
(1.72) 
14.29* 
(1.88) 
16.72 
(1.28) 
10.59 
(4.17)*** 
FGLIC 6.19 
(0.46) 
10.65 
(1.17) 
17.23 
(1.62) 
19.57* 
(1.76) 
4.57 
(0.42) 
12.09 
(3.80)*** 
GLIC_share 25.26 
(0.94) 
24.78 
(1.39) 
16.16 
(0.87) 
26.16 
(1.18) 
31.26 
(1.18) 
20.01 
(3.28)*** 
Golden share 23.39 
(1.00) 
40.84* 
(1.73) 
21.55* 
(1.81) 
3.08 
(0.16) 
14.17 
(0.48) 
16.21 
(2.63)*** 
BOD_SCS -0.77 
(-0.64) 
-2.19 
(-1.67) 
-1.94* 
(-1.94) 
-0.28 
(-0.24) 
-0.18 
(-0.09) 
-0.77         
(-1.96)* 
BOD_POL -0.31 
(-0.84) 
-0.29 
(-0.69) 
-0.08 
(-0.23) 
0.04 
(0.14) 
0.84 
(0.99) 
-0.11         
(-1.00) 
Size 2.50 
(0.36) 
0.52 
(0.09) 
1.02 
(0.18) 
1.78 
(0.29) 
0.40 
(0.04) 
0.77    
(0.38) 
Monopoly  -0.99 
(-0.06) 
1.96 
(0.12) 
5.72 
(0.45) 
3.24 
(0.19) 
0.16 
(0.01) 
-1.86         
(-0.41) 
Liquidity 0.60 
(0.91) 
-0.01 
(-0.02) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
0.24 
(0.17) 
-0.34 
(-0.12) 
0.17     
(0.67) 
Leverage -1.99 
(-0.45) 
-4.23 
(-1.12) 
-4.90 
(-1.00) 
3.14 
(1.30) 
10.08 
(0.94) 
-0.28         
(-0.15) 
BODSIZE -0.36 
(-0.19) 
0.40 
(0.20) 
2.19 
(1.17) 
0.60 
(0.32) 
1.42 
(0.59) 
0.61    
(1.08) 
BODMEET -1.34 
(-1.08) 
-1.28 
(-1.07) 
-1.32 
(-1.64) 
-1.97* 
(-1.87) 
-3.10 
(-1.11) 
-1.53         
(-4.76)*** 
BODINED -10.27 
(-0.27)  
-4.24 
(-0.16) 
6.80 
(0.28) 
15.60 
(0.49) 
-20.56 
(-0.59) 
2.91    
(0.35) 
Intercept -46.34 
(-0.90) 
-31.95 
(-0.78) 
-35.49 
(-0.77) 
-57.23 
(-1.11) 
-59.90 
(-0.82) 
-36.96 ***   
(-2.86)          
 
 
R-Square 0.427 0.551 0.586 0.579 0.679 
 
Adj. R
2
 
0.329 
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate a significance level: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, 
***p < 0.01 
 
 
 171 | P a g e  
 
 
TABLE: 4-23 
 
Robust standard errors regression estimates by year (Model 3 – TOBIN’S Q) 
 
Variables  
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
2004 
(N=46) 
2005 
(N=47) 
2006 
(N=48) 
2007 
(N=44) 
2008 
(N=39) 
Pooled 
(N=224) 
PIF GLIC 0.16 
(0.43) 
-0.03 
(-0.10) 
0.24 
(0.44) 
0.37 
(1.19) 
0.32 
(0.92) 
0.29**     
(2.62) 
FGLIC 0.52 
(1.09) 
0.47 
(1.00) 
0.60 
(0.80) 
0.61* 
(1.75) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.53*** 
(3.35) 
GLIC_share -0.13 
(-0.07) 
-0.45 
(-0.37) 
-0.65 
(-0.40) 
-1.02 
(-1.06) 
-0.00 
(-0.00) 
-0.34         
(-0.85) 
Golden share -0.13 
(-0.17) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
-0.16 
(-0.14) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
0.35 
(0.32) 
-0.05         
(-0.26) 
BOD_SCS -0.02 
(-0.52) 
-0.04* 
(-1.78) 
-0.02 
(-0.36) 
-0.03 
(-0.90) 
-0.04 
(-0.65) 
-0.02**         
(-2.54) 
BOD_POL -0.01 
(-0.87) 
-0.01 
(-1.04) 
-0.00 
(-0.28) 
-0.01 
(-1.43) 
-0.00 
(-0.08) 
-0.00**      
(-2.18) 
Size 0.44 
(1.11) 
0.38 
(1.51) 
0.06 
(0.17) 
0.20 
(0.84) 
0.34 
(0.72) 
0.22** 
(2.25) 
Monopoly  0.04 
(0.11) 
0.20 
(0.52) 
0.40 
(0.50) 
0.47 
(0.90) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.11    
(0.81) 
Liquidity 0.04 
(0.99)** 
0.02 
(1.01) 
-0.00 
(-0.11) 
0.06 
(0.83) 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
0.01    
(1.20) 
Leverage -0.16 
(-1.22) 
-0.22** 
(-2.48) 
-0.06 
(-0.47) 
-0.16 
(-1.58) 
-0.14 
(-0.58) 
-0.14***         
(-2.90) 
BODSIZE 0.05 
(0.92) 
0.05 
(0.86) 
-0.04 
(-0.29) 
-0.03 
(-0.35) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
0.01    
(0.77) 
BODMEET -0.04 
(-1.13) 
-0.01 
(-0.30) 
-0.02 
(-0.64) 
-0.06 
(-1.49) 
-0.02 
(-0.19) 
-0.03**         
(-2.32) 
BODINED 0.02 
(0.02)  
-0.20 
(-0.18) 
0.87 
(0.50) 
1.75 
(1.40) 
-0.14 
(-0.09) 
0.65    
(1.53) 
Intercept -2.16 
(-1.13) 
-1.37 
(-0.76) 
1.33 
(0.47) 
1.23 
(0.67) 
-1.32 
(-0.55) 
-0.48  
(-0.82) 
  
R- Square
 
0.515 0.553 
 
0.282 0.542 0.453 0.265 
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate a significance level: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, 
***p < 0.01 
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4.3.5.4 Additional control variable 
Agency theory asserts that conflicts between shareholders and managers exist partly 
because of the free cash flow issue, in which opportunistic managers tend to spend 
free cash flow unwisely on value destroying investment (Jensen, 1986). This is 
because there is more opportunity to compensate themselves as the firm becomes 
larger due to investments. According to the free cash flow hypothesis, this manager’s 
act may result in an increase in agency costs, inefficient resource allocation and 
wrongful investments that eventually impact firm value negatively.  
 
However, previous studies on the relationship between free cash flow and firm 
performance also suggest a positive association between the variables. For example, 
Szewcyzk, Tsetsekos and Zantout (1996) and Chang, Chen, Hsing and Huang (2007)  
show evidence that investors most favour firms with both substantial free cash flow 
and profitable investment opportunities in share valuation. Recently, empirical study 
by Wang (2010) on Taiwan data finds that free cash flow could render a firm with 
investment opportunities which would generate more values for the firm.  
 
Table 4-24 provides robust standard errors regression when free cash flow is part of 
additional control variables. Generally, the results show that the use of free cash flow 
as an additional control variable causes no major alterations to the key variables in 
main results, except that the significant relationship in golden shares for ROA model 
disappears when free cash flow added into the regression as additional control 
variable. This suggests that the positive link between golden shares and ROA is not 
robust.  
 
 173 | P a g e  
 
TABLE 4-24 
The results of robust standard errors regression of GLCs corporate 
performance and GLICs investment with the additional control variable 
 
 
Variables 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
 
ROA 
 
ROE 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
PIF GLIC 3.93 (3.81)*** 10.52 (4.18)*** 0.29 (2.62)*** 
FGLIC 3.36 (2.60)** 11.96 (3.75)*** 0.53 (3.32)*** 
GLIC share 6.80 (2.62)*** 20.58 (3.36)*** -0.33 (-0.80) 
Golden share 4.82 (1.64) 14.37 (2.09)** -0.10 (-0.43) 
BOD_SCS -0.22 (-1.19) -0.71 (-1.78)* -0.02 (-2.33)** 
BOD_POL -0.06 (-1.72)*  -0.12 (-1.15) -0.00 (-2.29)** 
Size -3.10 (-3.23)*** -0.77 (-0.34) 0.18 (1.50)* 
Monopoly  -0.60 (-0.38) -1.35 (-0.30) 0.12 (0.88) 
Liquidity 0.31 (2.45)** 0.15 (0.61) 0.01 (1.16) 
Leverage 0.24 (0.42) -0.19 (-0.10) -0.14 (-2.85)*** 
Free cash flow 1.06 (2.75)*** 1.29 (1.31) 3.12 (0.76) 
BODSIZE 0.16 (0.63) 0.53 (0.92) 0.01 (0.69) 
BODMEET -0.40 (-2.90)*** -1.56 (-4.84)*** -0.03 (-2.40)** 
BODINED -0.73 (-0.21)  1.29 (0.16) 0.61 (1.51) 
Intercept 5.00 (0.85) -27.27 (-1.95)* -0.24 (-0.40) 
 Adjusted R-Square
 
0.338 0.332 0.259 
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate a significance level: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, 
***p < 0.01 
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4.3.5.5 New definitions of corporate governance measures 
Our main findings suggest that board variables have little impact on corporate 
performance, as only board meetings have a significant link across all performance 
measures, while board size and independent directors are insignificant factors in all 
performance measures. In the main analysis, we used the actual value for board size 
and board meetings as well as proportion of independent directors on board to define 
the board variables.  
 
In this additional analysis, we redefined board measures as follows: 
i) Board size: 1 = high board size, 0 = low board size; the cut off number 
is based on the median of board size as stated in descriptive statistics. 
The new acronym for this variable is BODSIZE1 to differentiate it 
with acronym in other tests; 
ii)   Board meeting: 1 = high board meeting frequency, 0 = low board 
meeting frequency; the cut off number is based on the median of the 
board meeting frequency as stated in descriptive statistics. The new 
acronym for this variable is BODMEET1 to differentiate it with 
acronym in other tests; and 
iii)  Board independence: 1 = high board independence, 0 = low board 
independence; the cut off number is based on the median of the 
number of board independent as stated in descriptive statistics. The 
new acronym for this variable is BODINED1 to differentiate it with 
acronym in other tests. 
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The results in Table 4-25 show that the use of these alternative board definitions 
causes no major changes to the main results, except that the insignificant association 
of BODINED in the main analysis turn to be significant for ROE ( β = 5.22, p < 
0.05) in this redefined model. Interestingly, for the BOD_POL variable, while the 
directions of the relationship (negative sign) remain unchanged and the magnitude of 
coefficient almost similar, the statistically significant association link emerges both 
for accounting measures even at a low degree of significant level (ROA: β = -0.07, p 
< 0.1; ROE: β = -0.20, p < 0.1; TOBIN’S Q: β = -0.01, p < 0.1). This finding 
reinforces our argument that the presence of politicians on the board of GLCs is 
negatively related to firm performance. 
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TABLE 4-25 
The results of robust standard errors regression of GLCs corporate 
performance and GLICs investment with the new definitions of corporate 
governance measures 
 
 
Variables 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
 
ROA 
 
ROE 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
PIF GLIC 3.76 (3.70)*** 9.59 (3.98)*** 0.26 (2.52)** 
FGLIC 2.76 (2.21)** 8.99 (2.95)*** 0.43 (3.11)*** 
GLIC share 6.72 (2.86)*** 22.93 (3.72)*** -0.40 (-1.09) 
Golden share 6.17 (2.13)** 16.40 (2.52)** -0.03 (-0.16) 
BOD_SCS -0.26 (-1.39) -0.80 (-2.00)** -0.02 (-2.40)** 
BOD_POL -0.07 (-1.89)*  -0.20 (-1.82)* -0.01 (-3.46)*** 
Size -1.86 (-2.15)** 0.59 (0.28) 0.22 (2.15)** 
Monopoly  -1.92 (-1.12) -5.69 (-1.17) 0.03 (0.26) 
Liquidity 0.36 (2.72)*** 0.30 (1.10) 0.01 (1.28) 
Leverage 0.11 (0.19) -0.78 (-0.37) -0.14 (-2.77)*** 
BODSIZE1 1.04 (1.35) 1.66 (0.76) 0.05 (0.59) 
BODMEET1 -1.80 (-2.35)** -6.18 (-3.23)*** -0.19 (-2.30)** 
BODINED1 -0.11 (-0.09)  5.22 (2.07)** 0.17 (1.53) 
Intercept -3.48 (-0.69) -46.76 (-3.45)*** -0.28 (-0.56) 
 Adjusted R-Square
 
0.303 0.283 0.258 
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate a significance level: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, 
***p < 0.01 
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4.3.5.6 Alternative measure of different types of GLICs
39
 
In the main findings, this study used a dummy code (1 and 0) to differentiate 
ownership types of different GLICs in Malaysia. The use of dummy codes is 
consistent with many previous studies on the issue of ownership types and 
performance such as by Ang and Ding (2006), Tam and Tan (2007), Chen et al., 
(2009) and Ab Razak et al., (2011).  
 
However, some may argue that the use of actual numerical ownership levels of 
GLICs ownership provides much more information than the use of dichotomous 
variables. To deal with this issue, we re-ran the regression in the main findings by 
replacing the dichotomous variables related to types of GLICs with their actual 
numerical ownership level (controlling GLIC shareholdings percentage). Results 
from the regression presents in Table 4-26. We find that: 
 
i. In terms of statistically significant of the variables, no changes are recorded except 
the significant level (1%, 5% or 10%) has some changes where there are cases of 
significant levels are reduced (e.g. in the main findings GLIC share statistically 
significant with ROA at 5% but in this regression the significant level reduced to 
10%); and 
ii. In terms of coefficient magnitude, we noticed that in some key variables, the 
magnitudes are substantially reduced. For example, in the main findings, the 
coefficient magnitudes of PIF GLIC are 3.99 and 10.59 for ROA model and ROE 
model respectively. However, the coefficient magnitudes of the variables in this 
                                                          
39
 As previously mentioned, SEDC used as a comparative purpose and our multivariate regression that 
included SEDC (not reported in Table 3-26) but excluded FGLIC shows the coefficient for SEDC 
based on actual numerical ownership level of GLICs ownership as follows: (ROA: β = -2.34, p < 0.01; 
ROE β = -10.62, p < 0.01; Tobin’s Q: β = -0.35, p < 0.01) 
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model are 2.34 and 4.07 for ROA model and ROE model respectively. This is a huge 
reduction of coefficient for PIF GLIC particularly in ROE model.  
 
Generally, we find that the results in main findings are robust to the alternative 
measures of different types of GLICs.          
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TABLE 4-26 
The results of robust standard errors regression of GLCs corporate 
performance and GLICs investment using actual numerical value of GLICs 
ownership in GLCs 
 
 
Variables 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
 
ROA 
 
ROE 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
PIF GLIC 2.34 (3.32)*** 4.07 (2.87)*** 0.13 (2.07)** 
FGLIC 2.34 (3.44)*** 10.62 (6.38)*** 0.35 (4.88)*** 
GLIC share 4.44 (1.75)* 11.86 (1.99)** -0.63 (-1.55) 
Golden share 6.02 (2.09)** 12.88 (2.13)** -0.07 (-0.39) 
BOD_SCS -0.27 (-1.41) -0.80 (-2.04)** -0.02 (-2.45)** 
BOD_POL -0.04 (-1.16)  -0.05 (-0.48) -0.00 (-1.86)* 
Size -1.80 (-2.21)** -0.08 (-0.04) 0.18 (1.88)* 
Monopoly  -0.97 (-0.55) -3.65 (-0.85) 0.02 (0.17) 
Liquidity 0.34 (2.61)** 0.33 (1.38) 0.01 (1.46) 
Leverage 0.14 (0.26) -0.66 (-0.35) -0.14 (-3.13)*** 
BODSIZE 0.24 (0.95) 0.96 (1.79)* 0.02 (1.13) 
BODMEET -0.39 (-2.69)*** -1.45 (-4.37)*** -0.02 (-2.11)** 
BODINED 0.82 (0.23)  4.96 (0.63) 0.64 (1.53) 
Intercept -0.11 (-0.02) -23.78 (-1.97)* 0.13 (0.21) 
 Adjusted R-Square
 
0.316 0.335 0.291 
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate a significance level: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, 
***p < 0.01 
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
In many emerging economies and Malaysia in particular, governments increasingly 
expect their investment organisations to use their influence over their portfolio 
companies to promote corporate governance and performance (Malaysia Ministry of 
Finance, 2010; Malaysia Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance, 2006a; 
2006b). The rationale for this policy is to attract both domestic and foreign portfolio 
investors to domestic capital markets, since limited access to external funds has been 
identified as one of the key challenges for economic development of emerging 
economies both at national and at firm level (Tsoukas, 2011; Fan et al., 2011). 
 
However, GLICs tend to be controlled by civil servants and politicians, who often do 
not benefit personally from the performance of the portfolio companies. Moreover, 
GLICs usually have additional, sometimes conflicting objectives, such as supporting 
the government’s economic and social policies. This raises questions about the 
incentives and abilities of government investment organisations to improve the 
corporate governance of their portfolio companies. 
 
As there are different types of GLICs with different objectives and different 
organisational characteristics, it is of interest to governments and private portfolio 
investors, to improve their understanding about whether different types of GLICs 
vary with regard to their impact on corporate performance. 
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Our research on Malaysian GLCs suggests that this is indeed the case. Our findings 
are therefore consistent with research by Chen et al. (2009), on the impact of 
different types of government investment organisations in China. Like them, we find 
that portfolio companies of government investment organisations that are more 
remote from the centre, such as SEDCs, show worse financial performance than 
those owned by more tightly supervised government investment organisations.  
 
Our inconclusive findings regarding whether GLCs controlled by PIF GLIC 
outperform those controlled by FGLIC raise the possibility that supervision by 
powerful neutral regulators might be an effective substitute for the limited economic 
supervision incentives of board members in FGLIC boards.  
 
The fact that GLCs with golden share provisions outperform GLCs without golden 
share provision implies that the link between ownership and performance might not 
be driven just by corporate governance concerns but also by the ability of GLICs to 
act as boundary spanners for firms and provide access to government resources, 
government contracts and advice or sympathy from regulators. This is likely to be of 
particular importance in emerging economies where the economic environment tends 
to be particularly volatile and resource availability tends to be rather limited (Fan et 
al., 2011). 
 
With regard to ownership concentration of GLICs, our research indicates that a 
higher proportion of GLIC ownership is beneficial for GLC performance, rather than 
shifting their portfolio towards better performing GLCs. As GLICs tend to hold 
higher stakes in GLCs in which senior civil servants and politicians hold board seats, 
senior civil servants and politicians might use their links to GLICs to facilitate access 
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to funding for GLCs. However, as board membership by politicians and senior civil 
servants appears to affect the financial performance of GLCs negatively, this 
potential as boundary spanners to resources does not appear to compensate for their 
limited or detrimental impact on the supervision and control of GLCs. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT-LINKED INVESTMENT 
COMPANIES IN MALAYSIA ON THE EARNINGS-
MANAGEMENT OF THEIR PORTFOLIO COMPANIES 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The first project focuses on the relationship between government ownership and 
corporate performance of government-linked companies (GLCs) in Malaysia. In 
detail, it investigates on how the differences between sponsoring government 
organizations called Government-linked investment companies (GLICs) impacted 
the corporate performance of their portfolio companies i.e. GLCs. Measuring 
corporate performance using both accounting (return on assets and return on equity) 
and market performance data (quasi-Tobin’s Q), the research showed consistent 
results. However, the impact of different GLICs on their portfolio firms’ 
performance appeared much more pronounced when performance was measured 
with accounting performance data rather than market performance data
40
.  
 
One potential reason for this might be that capital market participants discount 
accounting information published by GLCs, as they might be perceived to be more 
prone to misstate their accounts in order to manipulate public perception on their 
performance. This raises the question whether GLCs with different types of 
controlling GLIC owners (government blockholders) engage more or less in 
                                                          
40
 This is obvious particularly for variables such as GLIC_share and golden shares.   
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earnings-management, and, more generally, whether GLCs engage more or less in 
earnings-management than firms which are not controlled by government investors. 
Therefore, as a measure for reporting quality, and to get wider idea about corporate 
reporting quality in Malaysian listed companies, we further extend our research by 
also including firms without government-controlled blockholders. The issue of 
earnings-management practices in listed companies controlled by blockholders is 
important, particularly to the minority (foreign) investors, who might either benefit 
from the presence of blockholders or might be exploited by their power to steer the 
company in accordance with their own interests. 
 
 
In relation to this, one of the main characteristics of listed companies in Malaysia is 
the existence of a high concentrated ownership (Tam and Tan, 2007; Classens et al., 
2000) that determines the nature of agency problems in the firms. When ownership is 
widely-held or more diffused as commonly exist in many of Anglo-Saxons countries, 
the agency problem occurs due to conflicts of interest between outside shareholders 
and managers. However, when ownership is concentrated in the hand of one owner 
who has full control over the affairs of the company, the agency problem turns into a 
conflict of interest between the controlling shareholders or blockholders and the 
minority shareholders. But in both scenarios, the essential effect is the same: insiders 
(managers or blockholders), through their ability to control the firm, might pursue 
their own benefits to the detriment of outsiders (Ding et al., 2007). 
 
Despite this, according to recent review of literature by Bhaumik and Gregoriou 
(2010), much of the empirical literature on earnings-management in emerging market 
firms with large blockholders is in the context of China, which provides insight but is 
not necessarily generalisable to other economies. Against this background, this study 
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looks at the agency problem associated with earnings-management from the agency 
perspective where conflicts of interest between blockholders and minority 
shareholders might be the main cause for the earnings-management behaviour among 
Malaysian public listed companies. Considering that there is a different in terms of 
institutional settings and governance structure between developed and emerging 
markets (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003) as well as between emerging markets 
itself, this research might leads to different results from those found in developed 
markets as well in other emerging markets. 
 
 
While many emerging economies have introduced reforms aimed at increasing 
minority shareholder protection and increasing the transparency and efficiency of 
their capital markets, the ability to enforce minority shareholder protection rights 
often remains rather limited (Claessens and Fan, 2002; Rachagan and 
Satkunasingam, 2009). However, as blockholders in listed firms, GLICs can 
potentially mitigate this problem by improving the supervision and control of their 
portfolio firms (Wade, 2004; Lau and Tong, 2008). Malaysia is an interesting case in 
this context, as the government explicitly expects its federal GLICs to facilitate good 
corporate governance and minority shareholder protection in their portfolio 
companies (Malaysia Ministry of Finance, 2010; Malaysia Putrajaya Committee on 
GLC High Performance, 2006a; 2006b). 
 
Efforts to strengthen corporate governance practices in government-linked 
companies is seen as vital to show the commitment of the government as forerunner 
to the practice of good corporate governance. Moreover, in today’s competitive 
environment in Asia, good corporate governance is widely recognised as essential for 
establishing an attractive investment climate characterized by competitive companies 
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and efficient financial markets whereby for many investors, the quality of financial 
reports is central to their investment decisions (OECD White Paper, 2003).  
 
 
In connection, government blockholders (GLICs) might also have an incentive to 
constrain earnings-management in their portfolio companies in order to support 
government initiatives related to foreign investment.  
 
In the past, enquiries into the impact of government ownership on the earnings-
management activities of listed companies largely treated government investment as 
homogeneous (e.g. Yen, Chun, Abidin and Noordin, 2007; Mohd Ali, Mohd Salleh 
and Hassan, 2008; Ding, et al., 2007; Wang and Yung, 2011, Chen and Zhang, 
2012). In reality, most of government investment in emerging economies conducted 
through different government investment organizations with different objectives and 
control structures. This is the case in Malaysia where the government’s investment in 
listed companies is performed through three major categories of GLICs with 
different objectives and control structures which are federal government sponsored 
pension and investment funds, federal government owned GLICs and State 
Economic Development Corporations. 
 
An inquiry into whether and how having different types of government investors 
impacts on earnings-management of their portfolio companies is of importance to 
governments in many emerging economies given the objective to facilitate economic 
growth by mobilising internal savings and by attracting foreign investment (Tsoukas, 
2011) as discussed above. At the same time, this research is of particular interest of 
foreign institutional investors who pursue investment opportunities in emerging 
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economies in the search for increased profitability and global portfolio risk 
management (Leuz, Lins and Warnock, 2008). In addition, it is interesting to 
examine whether Malaysian GLICs that are explicitly charged with improving the 
corporate governance can translate this mission in terms of mitigating earnings-
management activities in their portfolio companies. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 5.2 explains the data and 
the research approach employed. Section 5.3 discusses the empirical results and 
finally section 5.4 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
5.2 Research Approach 
 
5.2.1 Sample selection  
 
The initial sample consists of all listed firms on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia 
Securities from 2004 to 2008. Data required for earnings-management estimation and 
other financial data for control variables were collected from DataStream, while 
corporate governance data were collected based on actual published annual reports. 
The sample excluded companies in financial industry such as banks, securities and 
unit trust companies as they are subject to different compliance and regulations 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ab Razak et al., 2011) and more importantly their 
behaviour of accruals differs from other industries (Klein, 2002; Park and Shin, 
2004; Mohd Ali et. al, 2008). Newly listed firms (listed in 2008) are excluded due to 
inadequate data to estimate discretionary accruals and distressed companies under 
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the Practice Note 17 (PN17)
41
 are also excluded consistent with others studies on 
earnings-management in Malaysia (e.g. Aman, Iskandar, Pourjalali and Teruya, 
2006; Mohd Ali et al., 2008).  
 
Table 5-1 illustrates the process of sample selection in this study. The final sample 
consists of 2,696 firm-year observations. Previous studies in Malaysia on issues 
related to earnings-management using a sample size much smaller than this study. 
Aman et al. (2006) used a sample of 892 firm-year observations of companies listed 
on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia Securities between 1990 to 1999 in their study 
of the reasons for earnings-management. Bradbury, Mak and Tan (2006) employed 
113 listed companies on their research on the association between corporate 
governance characteristics and abnormal accruals in Malaysia. In the meantime, 
Mohd Ali et al. (2008) examined the effect of ownership structure on earnings-
management activities using a sample size of 1,001 companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia Securities between 2002 and 2003. Recently, Masruki and Azizan (2010) 
were satisfied with 271 sample companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa 
Malaysia Securities between 1999 to 2002 in the study in relation to the impact of 
Asian Financial Crisis on earnings-management and operating performance in 
Malaysia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41
PN17 stands for Practice Note 17/2005 and is issued by Bursa Malaysia Securities; relating to companies that 
are in financial distress. Companies that fall within the definition of PN17 will need to submit their proposal to 
the Approving Authority to restructure and revive the company in order to maintain the listing status.  
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TABLE 5-1: The sample selection process 
 
 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
Total companies listed on the Main 
Board of Bursa Malaysia Securities 
642 636 649 646 622 
Companies that are classified by 
Bursa Malaysia Securities in the 
financial industry*  
(57) (60) (63) (64) (55) 
Industries less than six firms**  (6) (6) (6) (6) (6) 
Listed companies starting in 2008 # (9) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Companies in PN4 status   (38) (20) (13) (15) (36) 
Incomplete data set ## 
 
(17) (7) (4) (3) (8) 
Total firms (Pool=2696) 515 543 563 558 517 
 
 
* e.g. Banking sector, insurance, securities, closed fund, other financial sector.  
** Industry represented by fewer than six companies removed from the sample because it is necessary 
to calculate the coefficient for earnings-management based on industries with six or more companies. 
In our case, companies in hotel (5 companies) and mining (1 company) are involved. 
# Due to the earnings-management computation requires data from the previous year (lagged data), 
the company listed beginning in 2008 is not included in the sample. 
## Companies information is not available either due to annual reports are not available because of 
merger and acquisitions, delisting, PN17 status or no data available on Datastream, Thomson One 
Banker or FAME. 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Year of observations 
 
As the first project and this second project are interrelated, for the purpose of 
consistency the same study period was employed. In addition, as explained in the 
first empirical chapter, the observation period between 2004 to 2008 was chosen to 
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reflect a phase of economic stability in Malaysia in the sense that the period is after 
the Asian financial crisis and prior to the global financial crisis which started in the 
second half of 2008 (Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2010) and significantly affected the 
Asian economies (IMF, 2008). This period is also an important period because of the 
changes in accounting standards in Malaysia with the major changes in Malaysia 
Accounting Standards occurred in 2007 which was based on IFRS framework before 
full convergence with IFRS fully implemented starting 1 January, 2012. 
 
 
Table 5-2 reports the distribution of sample firm-year observation by industry. As 
can be seen, half of the firms in the sample belong to both industrial products and 
trading/services industries followed by properties and consumer products industries. 
 
 
 
TABLE 5-2: The sample distribution according to industry classification   
 
Industry group Number of firms Percentage (%) 
Construction 196 7.27% 
Consumer products 413 15.32% 
Industrial Products 715 26.52% 
Infrastructure project company 36 1.34% 
Plantations 201 7.45% 
Properties 423 15.69% 
Trading/Services  639 23.70% 
Technology 73 2.71% 
 Total 2696 firms 100% 
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5.2.3 Blockholder-controlled firms 
 
Generally, research investigating the impact of block ownership on performance and 
earnings-management in developed markets tends to use a variety of thresholds, 
generally ranging from 5 percent to 20 percent (Renneboog, 2000; Zhong, Dribbin 
and Zheng, 2007; Jaggi, Leung and Gul, 2009). Similar to our first empirical chapter, 
we used a threshold of 20 percent of shareholdings to identify blockholder-controlled 
firms.  
 
As discussed in project one, listed companies in Malaysia are characterized by a 
highly concentrated ownership structure with the predominant role of the insider 
investors or blockholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Liew, 2007). By holding a 
significant proportion of shares of the company, they effectively control the whole 
company. They usually participate in the firm’s management directly or indirectly 
through their representatives on the board of directors or close key managers, and 
influence most of the management decisions (Tam and Tan, 2007). As such, because 
this study would like to examine blockholders’ influence on earnings-management 
activities in firm, it must ensure that the relevant blockholders indeed have the ability 
to influence or pressure the management to engage in earnings-management 
activities. In line with previous research on ownership structure and earnings-
management such as that by Jaggi et al. (2009), the 20 percent threshold is suitable 
for this purpose. According to Holderness (2003) in his survey of blockholders and 
corporate control, 20 percent is the best available estimate of the current level on 
inside ownership at public corporations.  
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Table 5-3 presents the sample distribution according to the different types of 
ownership. Following Ding et al., (2007)
42
, we considered blockholders other than 
government blockholders as private blockholders. This approach is consistent with 
the recent studies on earnings-management such as by Wang and Yung (2011) and 
Halioui and Jerbi (2012). Moreover, study on the relationship between ownership 
structure and performance such as those by Chen et al., (2009) in China and Ab 
Razak et al., (2011) in Malaysia also used the same approach.  
 
As can be seen, majority of companies owned by private blockholder and the 
combination of all types of blockholders (PIF GLIC, FGLIC, SEDC and Private 
Blockholders) represent about 81.1% from the total sample size. These findings are 
consistent with Claessens et al., (2000) which found that ownership concentration in 
Malaysia is the third largest among the nine East Asian Countries. Claessens, Fan 
and Wong (2002) also documented that the blockholder ownership is prevalent in 
Malaysian economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42
 Ding et al. (2007) investigate the impact of both ownership concentration and different ownerships 
types on earnings-management of Chinese listed companies where they separated block ownership 
into two types of ownerships which are government blockholder and private blockholder 
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TABLE 5-3: The sample distribution according to types of ownership 
 
Industry Group 
 
Number of firms  
(N=2699) 
 
 
 
Percentage (%) 
 
 PIF GLIC 85* 3.15% 
FGLIC 79 2.93% 
SEDC 56 2.08% 
Private Blockholder 1965 72.89% 
Non Blockholder 511 18.95% 
  Total 2696 firms 100% 
 
* Number of observations under group of PIF GLIC decreased by four observations as compared with 
the number of companies in the same group in the first empirical because they were listed in the 2008. 
 
 
5.2.4 Control variables 
Given that the earnings-management practices in firm are likely to be influenced by 
factor other than ownership; various control variables are included in order to ensure 
that the model is able to capture the effect of earnings-management.  
 
(i) Secondary blockholders (SECONDBLOCK).  
Maury and Pajuste (2005) developed a model in relation to the effects of multiple 
blockholders in constraining opportunistic behaviour of the largest blockholder. 
Using a sample of Finnish listed firms over the period from 1993 to 2000, they 
showed that the firms owned by large blockholder are prone to private benefit 
extraction if they are not monitored by another strong blockholders. As discussed 
earlier, while a large blockholder is able to create more value due to the reduction of 
agency problem resulting from the conflict between shareholders and managers, a 
new conflict between them and minority shareholders may form in which large 
blockholders try to extract private benefits from companies. These benefits may 
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harm minority shareholders. Given that the existence of large blockholders is 
common in Malaysian public listed companies, conflict between them and the 
minority shareholders is inevitable. Therefore, the existence of secondary 
independent blockholders is likely to help to control and mitigate the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers as well as large blockholder and thus predicted to reduce 
earnings-management activities in firms. Zhong et al. (2007) examined the effect of 
monitoring by outside blockholders on earnings-management and argue that 
secondary blockholders have more incentive to monitor firm’s management for their 
long-term benefits. This is because if small external shareholders who own small 
portion of a firm’s shares (e.g. less than five percent) are not satisfied with the 
performance of the firm, they can sell their shares quickly; this is not the case for 
external blockholders since selling a large block of shares often decreases share 
prices. Therefore, Zhong et al. (2007) argued that external blockholders generally 
have to adopt a long-term strategy to benefit from their ownership in firms and have 
more incentive to play active role in monitoring the management. This argument may 
also be applied in the context of second blockholder. Hence, a negative relationship 
is expected between the relative shareholdings of second blockholder to the largest 
shareholder and earnings-management. 
 
(ii) Corporate governance variables.  
Agency theory suggests that effective corporate governance systems are expected to 
reduce agency problems and could constrain manager’s opportunistic behaviour 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Rhoades et. al (2000) suggested that the selection of 
appropriate corporate governance mechanisms inside an organization helps to align 
the interest of shareholders and managers. As contended in agency theory, board of 
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directors, as the highest-level of control mechanism in the organization play an 
important role to align and control the managers’ activities since the board has power 
to compensate decision making by managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Related to 
this, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that the board of directors is one of the major 
devices that limits agency costs and the most important internal control monitoring 
mechanisms in firms that ratify the decisions initiated by management, thus creating 
and effective separation between “decision management” and “decision control”.    
 
Related to this, corporate governance mechanisms also are potentially effective to 
limit the extent of agency costs and would be helpful in mitigating managers' 
propensity to manipulative earnings (Siregar and Utama, 2008; Jaggi et al., 2009). As 
such the function of board of directors and audit committee are very crucial to 
mitigate earnings-management activities in firms.  Therefore, several corporate 
governance variables related to board and audit committee are selected to control for 
their probable effects on earnings-management.  
 
Board of directors’ characteristics 
 
Board size (BODSIZE). To date there is no consensus on the optimal size of the 
board of directors of the company that can effectively mitigate earnings-management 
activities in firms. Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand (1999) argued that larger 
board size gives benefits in terms of information and expertise advantage. In a 
similar vein, Xie et al. (2003) suggested that larger boards may be able to draw from 
a broader range of experience; they found that larger boards are associated with 
lower levels of discretionary current accruals, indicating that a larger board is more 
effective in monitoring such accruals than a smaller board. Ghosh, Marra and Moon 
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(2010) found that firms with smaller boards have larger discretionary accruals, which 
suggests that larger boards with greater knowledge and experience are more effective 
in monitoring financial reporting. Until now there is no consensus yet about the 
optimal size of a board that can effectively mitigate earnings-management activities 
in firms. 
 
However, Jensen (2010) argued that a larger board is less likely to function 
effectively and may more easily be controlled by CEO that may take advantage in 
this situation and use his influence to ensure that board decisions are in line with his 
needs. Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) favoured a smaller board size as 
they may be less encumbered with bureaucratic problems and may be more 
functional and provide better financial reporting oversight. A study by Jaggi et al., 
(2009) in Hong Kong markets reported an insignificant relationship between large 
board size and earnings-management activities and similar results are found in 
Kouki, Elkhaldi and Souid (2011). More recently Lin (2011) found that small boards 
have a greater change to mitigate earnings-management than larger boards in Taiwan 
listed companies. In Malaysia, a study by Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006) 
found a significant positive relationship between board size and earnings-
management; this indicates the larger the board, the more ineffective their function in 
monitoring management behaviour. Therefore, we predict that there is a positive or a 
negative association between board size and earnings-management. 
 
Board of directors meeting frequency (BODMEET). Vafeas (1999) suggests active 
boards that meet more frequently are more likely to perform their duties in 
accordance with shareholders’ interests and to put more effort into monitoring the 
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integrity of financial reporting. Chen, Firth, Gao and Rui (2006) examined a sample 
of 169 firms under Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) enforcement 
actions from 1999 to 2003 and suggested that a higher frequency of board meetings 
reduces chances for fraud. This is because regular meetings allow the directors to 
identify and resolve potential problems, particularly those that are related to the 
quality of financial reporting. Hence, we predict a negative relationship between 
board meeting frequency and earnings-management. 
 
Proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board (BODINED). 
To ensure the effective monitoring role of the board of managers’ activities, agency 
theory suggests the board of directors’ composition should include independent 
directors that are independent from management. According to Vance (1983), 
independent directors are needed as they can give unbiased monitoring and 
assessment as well as provide “checks and balances” between board of directors that 
represents shareholders in one part and management in the other part. Peasnell et al. 
(2005) suggested that independent directors who are senior executive managers in 
other firms, where they are fully aware with financial reporting issues, have the 
potential to detect earnings-management activities in firms. Their study on the 
association between earnings-management and board composition using 
discretionary accruals as proxy for earnings-management found a significant 
negative relationship between income increasing accruals and proportion of 
independent board. Therefore, we predict a negative association between the 
proportion of independent directors on the board of directors and earnings-
management. 
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CEO duality (DUALITY). Agency theory argue that the positions of Chairman and 
CEO should be separated as same person who holds both positions creates a conflict 
of interest that could negatively affect the interests of the shareholders (Bowen, 
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 2002). Study by Johari et al., (2008) on the 
relationship between DUALITY and performance of listed companies on the Main 
Board of Bursa Malaysia Securities in the year of 2002 and 2003 found that a small 
percentage of firms (10.3%) from their final sample of 234 firms encompass CEO 
duality. Generally, when the same individual dominates the decision making and 
firm’s operation, it may cause conflict of interest and higher business risk (Abdullah, 
2004). Bowen et al. (2002) indicated that separation of roles between CEO and 
chairman is important to prevent earnings-management activities where they find 
that earnings smoothing activities are higher for firms with CEO duality. Davidson et 
al., (2004) examined a sample of 173 firms with duality-creating succession 
announcements and 112 non-duality successions from the years of 1982-92 and 
found that, following duality-creating successions, income-increasing earnings-
management occurs to a greater extent than in non-duality successions. In Malaysia, 
a study by Mohd Saleh et al. (2005) provided evidence that firms with CEO duality 
is positively related with earnings-management.  
 
On the other hand, an empirical study in Malaysia markets by Johari et al., (2008) 
found that CEO duality does not influence the practices of earnings-management. 
Some researchers also support the combined post of CEO and Chairman such as 
Weir et al., (2002) who suggested that the advantage of having the same person serve 
both post is that he or she will have a better understanding and knowledge about the 
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firm operation and environment. Therefore, we predict that there is a positive or a 
negative association between DUALITY and earnings-management. 
 
 
Audit committee characteristics  
 
An audit committee is a sub-committee of the board of directors that has oversight 
responsibility for the firm’s financial reporting process to enhance the credibility of 
audited financial statements. It also provides a formal communication channel 
between the board, the internal monitoring system and the external auditor. 
According to Carcello and Neal (2000), the audit committee plays an important 
monitoring role in assuring the quality of financial reporting and corporate 
accountability. In addition to the benefits that firms can derive from the 
establishment of audit committee, prior studies suggest that the size, meeting 
frequency of audit committees as well as independent audit committee member may 
impact the monitoring effectiveness (e.g. DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault and 
Reed, 2002; Walker, 2004).  
 
Audit committee size (ACSIZE). Vafeas (2005) favours larger audit committee as 
smaller audit committee may result in insufficient members in the committee to 
monitor management activities, thus reducing its effectiveness to monitor 
management that might increase earnings-management activities in firms. Yang and 
Krishnan (2005) investigated the association between audit committee size and 
quarterly earnings-management in 896 US firms in the years of 1996 to 2000. They 
found that the larger the size of the audit committee, the more effective they are in 
monitoring financial reporting, thus reducing earnings-management in the form of 
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discretionary accruals. Ghosh et al., (2010) found that firms with smaller audit 
committees have larger discretionary accruals, which suggests that larger audit 
committee with greater breadth of knowledged are more effective in monitoring 
financial reporting. Ibrahim, Raman and Saidin (2009) reported that the size of audit 
committees in Malaysia is significantly positively related to companies producing 
accurate unaudited year-end quarterly accounts. Hence, based on the emphasis on the 
important of audit committee’s function in Malaysia by MCCG and regulators, this 
study predicts a negative relationship of ACSIZE and earnings-management. 
 
Audit committee meeting frequency (ACMEET). An audit committee that meets 
frequently might reduce the incidence of earnings-management because by meeting 
frequently with the internal auditor, they will remain informed and knowledgeable 
about accounting and auditing issues (Raghunandan, Rama and Scarbrough, 1998). 
Related to this, a study on the relationship between audit committee meeting 
frequency and earnings-management by Xie et al. (2003) based on a sample of 282 
firm-year observations of firms listed on the S&P 500 for the year of 1992, 1994 and 
1996 found that audit committee meeting frequency is associated with reduced levels 
of discretionary accruals in firms. Similar results are suggested by Abbott, Parker 
and Peters (2002) who found that audit committees of firms restating their financial 
statements in the US are not likely to meet at least four times a year.  
 
However, other studies such as by Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) found that 
there is no relationship between the number of audit committee meetings and the 
level of earnings-management. In emerging market, a study by Inaam et al., (2012) in 
Tunis Stock Exchange suggested that the more frequent the audit committee meet, 
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the better the opportunity to detect earnings-management. In Malaysia, Abdul 
Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006) suggested a negative but insignificant relationship 
between this variable and earnings-management and Mohd Saleh et al., (2007) later 
on found that listed firms which held more audit committee meetings recorded fewer 
earnings-management practices compared with other firms. Based on effective 
monitoring hypothesis and empirical studies at international and domestic level, this 
study predicts a negative relationship between audit committee meeting frequency 
and earnings-management activities. 
 
Proportion of independent non-executive directors on the audit committee 
(ACINED). The independency of a non-executive director is an essential quality that 
contributes to effective monitoring function of committee under board (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). An independent audit committee is expected to provide unbiased 
assessment and judgement and to be able to monitor management effectively. 
Empirical study by Klein (2002) showed that increase in the proportion of 
independent directors in audit committee help reducing the earnings manipulations 
by managers. Abbott et al., (2004) documented a negative association between the 
occurrence of earnings restatement and audit committee consisting of only 
independent directors. The independent members of audit committee also associated 
with lower earnings-management in firms in the studies by Xie et al., (2003); Bedard 
et al., (2004) and Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005). Hence, this variable 
expected to have a negative relationship with earnings-management where the higher 
proportion of independent audit committee, the lower the earnings-management in 
firms. 
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Financial expertise of the audit committee (ACEXPERT). The Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (2007) suggests that all members of the audit committee 
should be financially literate and at least one should be a member of an accounting 
association or body. This recognizes the importance of audit committee financial 
expertise as a means of strengthening the monitoring and oversight role that the audit 
committee plays in the financial reporting process. Previous empirical studies 
suggest that audit committee with relevant financial expertise is helpful in the 
mitigation of financial misstatement (Abbott et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2004) and 
useful in mitigating earning management activities in firms (Xie et al.,2003; Abbott, 
Parker and Peters, 2004; Bédard et al., 2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Carcello et 
al., 2006). Recently, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) suggested that audit committee financial 
expertise is also effective in promoting higher accrual quality. Nevertheless, the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance do not specify what it meant by 
financially literate. However, following DeFond et al. (2005), we used the 
accounting and financial qualifications and experience including all form of formal 
education, professional qualification and working experience related to accounting 
and finance subjects to identify the variable. As this variable widely recognised as 
effective monitoring variable, we predicts a negative relationship between audit 
committee financial expertise and earnings-management. 
 
(iii) Control for other variables 
 
Firm size (SIZE). Two opposing views exist on the role of firm size in mitigating 
earnings-management practices. The first view stressed that the larger the firm size, 
the less earnings-management as the large-sized firms may have more sophisticated 
internal control systems and have more competent internal auditors as compared to 
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small-sized firms. An effective internal control system contributes to the reliability of 
financial information disclosed to the public and reducing the likelihood of 
manipulating earnings by management. Moreover, large-sized firms are usually 
audited by auditors from Big-Four accounting firms that tend to have more 
experienced auditors who could help prevent earnings misrepresentation (Siregar and 
Utama, 2008). Additionally, large-sized firms may be less likely to manage earnings 
relative to smaller counterparts because they are followed by more financial analysts. 
Empirical study in Hong Kong markets by Jaggi et al. (2009) report that large firms 
consistently show lower earnings-management.  
 
In contrast, an opposing view suggests that large-sized firms are more likely to 
manage earnings than small-sized firms since they face more pressures to meet or 
beat the analysts' expectations (Barton and Simko, 2002). In addition, the larger the 
firm size, the more bargaining power they have in negotiations with auditors. Nelson, 
Elliott and Tarpley (2002) documented that auditors are more likely to waive 
earnings-management attempts by large clients. Since there are two opposing views 
regarding the effect of firm size on earnings-management, this study predicts that 
there is a positive or a negative association between firm size and earnings-
management. 
 
Previous year performance (LAGROA). Profitability, measured by lagged return 
on assets is included to control the relationship between earnings-management and 
ownership structure. According to Myers, Myers and Skinner (2007), firms that had 
preceding positive earnings are more likely to manipulate earnings to maintain this 
consistent performance in order to meet shareholders’ and market expectations. 
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Hence, the performance in previous years influences the managers’ tendency to 
manipulate earnings to avoid reporting negative earnings or the decreases in 
earnings. Empirical study by Jo and Kim (2007) on the relationship between 
disclosure quality and earnings-management in the US suggest that firm profitability 
measured by ROA is highly and positively related to earnings-management. Similar 
results appear in the study by Wang and Yung (2011) on the impact of state 
ownership on earnings-management in China where they find a positive and 
significant relationship between ROA and earnings-management. These findings 
imply that profitable firms tend to manipulate accounting figures more than non-
profitable firms. Therefore, a lagged ROA is predicted to have a positive relationship 
with earnings-management.   
 
Financial leverage (LEVERAGE).  The Bank Negara Malaysia or Central Bank of 
Malaysia (2007), reported that businesses in Malaysia are relying more on the bank 
borrowing for short-term financing to fund their working capital and mainly used 
bonds for long-rem financing. Related to this, leverage measured as a proportion of 
debts to total assets might influence earnings-management in two ways. On the one 
hand, firms with high leverage may be at risk of bankruptcy if they are unable to 
make payments on their external debt financing. Moreover, they might have problem 
to find new lenders and if they need to take out new loan where the willing lenders 
will scrutinize several measures on whether the firm is borrowing too much and will 
demand the company to keeps its debt within reasonable boundaries. In the 
meantime, when firms get their financing through bonds market, firms need to 
maintain credit ratings for their bonds or facing with the increases in bonds coupon 
rates. In such conditions, firms might engage in income-increasing earnings-
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management due to their concerns over breaking loan covenants (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994; Dichev and Skinner 2002; Beatty and Weber 2003) or to avoid 
increases in bonds coupon rates.  A study by Kim and Yi (2006) in Korea markets 
reported a significant positive association between leverage and discretionary 
accruals suggesting that companies with high leverage tend to engage in earnings-
management more aggressively than those with low leverage.  
 
On the other hand, higher leverage can also be used to prevent opportunistic 
managers from engaging in earnings-management activities through additional 
monitoring activities by lenders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Related to this, debt 
contracts can also act as strong mechanism for solving agency problems as they may 
prevent managers from investing in value-destroying projects (Bolton and 
Scharfstein; Stulz, 1990) that eventually may lead to earnings-management practices 
in order to cover up losses from the investment in such projects. 
 
Moreover banks, for example, have access to information about the borrower that 
can be used to mitigate agency costs associated with high leverage (Fama, 1985; 
James, 1987) such as the earnings-management activities. In addition, banks also 
have expertise in risk management that can help them to identify earnings-
management behaviour by managers and thus reduce managers' motivation to engage 
in earnings-management. Ahn and Choi (2009) examined the effect of bank 
monitoring on a borrowing firm’s earnings-management behaviour in the US and 
found that a borrowing firm’s earnings-management decreases as the magnitude of a 
bank loan increases. They argued that the extent of earnings-management in 
borrowing firms is directly related to the measure of credit risk by banks which is the 
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reliability of its financial statements. For example, when borrowing firms engage in 
aggressive earnings-management, they are also likely to have lower quality earnings 
that have an adverse effect on their credit risk. This situation gives banks strong 
incentives to monitor diligently for borrower income manipulation to avoid loan 
default risk and as the strength of bank monitoring increases, firm’s earnings-
management decreases. In similar vein, the rating agencies might scrutinise firms’ 
earnings statement if a firm’s debt is mainly funded by bonds.  
 
In Malaysia, Ismail and Weetman (2008) reported a highly significant negative 
relationship (at 1% level) between leverage and earnings-management and suggest 
that highly geared firms in Malaysia manage earnings less than lower geared firms 
due to close scrutiny by the banks who are acting both as creditors and advisers. This 
study predicts that there is a positive or a negative association between LEVERAGE 
and earnings-management. 
 
Analyst following (ANALYST). On one hand, monitoring by financial analyst is an 
outside governance mechanism that can help to curb earnings-management activities 
in firms. Financial analysts have an advantage in monitoring activities to the extent 
that enables to help in reducing the agency costs associated to the separation of 
ownership and control through the dissemination of information, which can reduce 
information asymmetry between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).   
 
Yu (2008) found that earnings-management tends to be lower in companies followed 
by more financial analysts and Gavious (2007) suggested that financial analysts are 
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knowledgeable and able to spot earnings-management practices. This is because they 
are specially trained to analyze accounting numbers produced by companies. As 
such, managers are reluctant and anxious to manipulate earnings in the presence of a 
financial analyst (Yu, 2008). Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2007) suggested that in the 
US, financial analysts are among the quickest monitors of fraud and able to detect 
fraud twice as much as auditors pre-Sarbanes Oxley.  
 
 
On the other hand, they can also provide a boost to earnings-management behaviour 
by setting too high earnings targets that are hard for companies to achieve and thus 
push managers to manage their earnings (Hunton, Libby and Mazza, 2006; Iatridis 
and Kadorinis, 2009). Jensen (2005) highlighted this issue earlier: 
 
“Earnings-management has been considered an integral part of every top 
manager’s job. But when managers smooth earnings to meet market 
projections, they’re not creating value for the firm; they’re both lying and 
making poor decisions that destroy value” (Jensen, 2005: 3) 
 
Therefore, the effect of analysts following earnings-management may be as 
monitors, where they may curb earnings-management, but at the same time they also 
could encourage managers to engage in earnings-management to reach or exceed 
their earnings forecasts. Hence, we predict there are both positive and inverse 
relationships regarding analysts following earning management. Consistent with 
Chang, D’Anna, Watson and Wee (2008), we measured this variable using the 
number of analyst following of one particular listed firm.  
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Total accrual (TACCLTA). As previously discussed, discretionary accrual is the 
most popular method used by managers to manipulate earnings (Goncharov, 2005; 
Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Usually, the starting point to measure discretionary accrual 
is to calculate total accruals in financial reports that comprising non-discretionary 
accruals and discretionary accruals (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). To control 
for the possibility that companies with large total accruals have a higher ability to use 
discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings than firms with lower total accruals, we 
included firm’s absolute value of total accruals as a control variable. Related to this, 
prior studies find that there is a positive relationship between total accruals and 
discretionary accruals where the higher total accruals the higher discretionary 
accruals (Velury, 2003; Bukit and Iskandar, 2009). Therefore, following Jo and Kim 
(2007) we used absolute value of total accrual
43
 as one of our control variables and 
predict a positive relationship of total accruals and earnings-management. 
 
Investment opportunity (COINVESTMENT). Based on 3,622 firm-year 
observations of Taiwan listed firms, Chen, Elder and Hung (2010) find that, firms 
with more investment opportunities are more likely to engage in earnings-
management. This is because a company that has investment opportunities which are 
difficult to monitor due to existing internal control system cannot keep pace with the 
scale of company growth resulting from investment, which in turn provides an 
opportunity for managers to engage in earnings-management activities (Doyle, Ge 
and Mcvay, 2007). In relation to this, Jo and Kim (2007) used gross property, plant 
and equipment as one of the proxies for investment opportunities and they find a 
positive association between this variable and earnings-management. Hence, we 
                                                          
43
 Net income after extraordinary items (-) net cash flow from operations  
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predict a positive relationship between investment opportunities with earnings-
management and following Jo and Kim (2007), we used gross property, plant and 
equipment dividing by lagged total assets as proxies of investment opportunities.   
 
Free cash flow (FCF). Agency theory asserts that conflict between shareholders and 
managers exists partly because of the free cash flow issue; opportunistic managers 
tend to spend free cash flow unwisely on value-destroying investment (Jensen, 
1986). This is because there are more opportunity to compensate themselves as firm 
becomes larger resulting from the investments.  As a result, managers might engage 
in earnings-management to increase reported earnings to cover up the poor 
performance resulting from their value destroying investment. Chung, Firth and Kim 
(2005) examined whether managers of low-growth companies with high free cash 
flows have incentive to boost reported earnings by choosing income-increasing 
discretionary accruals. Using a large sample size of 22,576 firm-year observations 
over the period 1984–1996 (firms in COMPUSTAT), they found that companies 
with high free cash flow use income-increasing discretionary accruals to camouflage 
the earnings impact of non-value-maximizing investments and other expenditures. 
Based on theory and empirical evidence, we predict a positive relationship between 
free cash flow and earnings-management.  
 
Loss (LOSS). Firms incurring losses are expected to have greater incentive to 
manipulate earnings compared to their counterparts with positive earnings (Moreira 
and Pope (2007). Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2000) suggested that negative 
earnings convey a signal to outsiders evaluating the firms particularly the credit 
rating agency and stock analyst that could affect firms’ credit rating and their cost of 
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debt. Empirical studies, for example by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and 
DeGeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999), suggest that firms manage their earnings to 
avoid earning losses or earnings decreases. From the perspective of managers, 
acompany that suffers loss will put their position at risk. This motivates them to 
manipulate earnings to secure their position (Ertimur, 2004) especially if they do not 
have enough voting power to maintain the position. Therefore, we predict a positive 
association between firms incurring losses and earnings-management. 
 
Auditor quality (BIG4). In general, well-qualified external auditors reduce the cost 
of using financial statements because they reduce the burden for shareholders to 
make their own investigations to determine the reliability and accuracy of financial 
data contained in financial reports. This is because well-qualified external auditors 
are better able to detect errors or accounting manipulation made by the company 
against shareholders who are not trained for that purpose and they tend to have more 
experienced auditors who could help prevent earnings misrepresentation in firms 
(Siregar and Utama, 2008). They also have strong incentives to provide or maintain a 
high audit quality level as these audit firms have a greater number of clients and 
more opportunity to deploy significant resources to auditing and can suffer more 
significant losses such as termination by clients and related loss of reputation 
particularly when they do not report a discovered breach (Caneghem 2004; Chung, 
Firth and Kim, 2005). Related to this, Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam 
(1998) investigated the relationship between auditor quality and earnings-
management and find that the clients of the Big-6 auditors (now Big-4) use less 
discretionary accruals than the clients of other auditors. Hence, we controlled for the 
probable effect of well-qualified external auditors and expected firms audited by Big-
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4 auditors to engage less in earnings-management activities and we predict a 
negative relationship between BIG4 and earnings-management  
 
Firm age (FIRMAGE). Firm age may be related to earnings-management behaviour 
as long-established company is expected to have better appreciation of the market 
environment and comparatively have good control over its operations (Jaggi, 1997).  
 
High expectations by market participants can put pressure on the company to achieve 
earnings targets which are the same or even higher. Therefore, company management 
is expected to have a greater incentive to manage their reported earnings to show a 
consistent/better growth and maintain their reputations in the business. 
 
In addition, a long-established company has good control over its operations and thus 
is expected to have a higher capacity to use accrual accounting in managing their 
earnings (Ismail and Weetman, 2008). Therefore, this study predicts a positive 
relationship between FIRMAGE and earnings-management. 
 
 (iv) Additional control variables 
 
Because this study employs panel data, it is important to take into account changes in 
the macroeconomic-environment. As such, year dummies (YEAR DUMMY) are part 
of the additional control variable. Changes in accounting standards (IFRS) might also 
influence earnings-management activities in firms. As previously discussed, 
beginning in 2004, Malaysia gradually aligned its accounting standards with IFRS 
and in 2007, the standards were revised to be virtually identical with IFRS. Previous 
studies on the effects of changes in accounting regulations on earnings-management 
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show encouraging results. Chan et al., (2009) reported a significant reduction of 
accrual anomaly in the UK from pre-to-post-FRS3 periods. Zeghal et al., (2011) also 
suggested a reduction in earnings-management level in French listed companies 
following the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Wan Ismail et al., (2010) also showed 
that reported earnings by public firms in Malaysia are more value relevant after the 
adoption of FRS. However, contrary to the results above, Rudra and Bhattacharjee 
(2012) found that the Indian firms adopting IFRS are more likely to smooth earnings 
compared to other non-adopting firms. Therefore, based on this discussion, it is 
important to control for the effects of changes in accounting regulations as part of the 
control variable.        
 
This study also controls for industry (INDUSTRY) effects as industry type might 
influence manager’s earnings-management activities. For example, empirical studies 
by Sun and Rath (2009) using 4,844 firm-year observations during the period of 
2000 to 2006 in Australia, suggest that earnings-management is prevalent across 
several industries. They reported that firms in energy, metals and mining, industrials, 
and information technology are found to engage in income-decreasing earnings-
management while firms in health care and telecommunication and utilities sectors 
are associated with income increasing earnings manipulation. As such, this study 
controls for this variable as different industry might act differently to earnings-
management.   
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5.2.5 Earnings-management measures 
As discussed in earlier sections, this study is concerned about the issue of significant 
discrepancy between accounting and market performance of GLCs from the results 
in the first empirical chapter as this could be a signal of market participants might 
discount the GLCs’ share prices after detecting earnings-management activities in 
GLCs’ financial reporting to manipulate the public's perception on their 
performance.  
 
As widely discussed in accounting literature, reported earnings in firm’s financial 
reports are normally used by investors as an indicator of firm’s overall financial 
performance.  According to Francis, Schipper and Vincent (2003), reported earnings 
numbers are more closely associated with share prices than cash flow, sales and other 
financial statement data. This is because investors consider reported earnings as 
value relevant and useful in determining future returns and firms with more 
persistent earnings have more accurate equity valuations, which implies greater 
decision usefulness. As such investors normally make the investment decisions based 
on the earnings performance (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). The positive link between 
reported earnings and the shares price has been reported in many empirical studies 
such as by Kothari (2001); Gelb and Zarowin (2002); Chambers, Jennings and 
Thompson (2003); Monahan (2005); Butler, Kraft and Weiss (2007) etc.  
 
Therefore, taking into account of the importance of reported earnings in determining 
the value of the firms compared with other components in the financial report, this 
study employs earnings-management as one of the proxies of account misstatement 
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to investigate whether earnings-management activities are the main cause of this 
issue. 
 
There are several instruments that can be used by management to manipulate the 
accounts of companies through earnings-management. This includes taking 
advantage of the flexibility in the method of accounting, income smoothing or using 
accrual accounting (Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000).  
 
Indeed, according to Goncharov (2005), accrual is the most popular method used by 
managers to engage in earnings-management activities. This is for the reason that, 
discretionary accrual is the financial component that under the discretion of 
management that can be done easily through accounting decisions and does not 
require the creation of a new business transaction. This provides managers with 
opportunities to manipulate earnings. According to Young (1999), managers tend to 
manipulate earnings through discretionary accruals due to low cost and difficult to 
detect.  Nevertheless, the used of discretionary accruals as proxy for earnings 
management also criticized as whether discretionary-accruals models are able to 
effectively separate accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary components and 
thereby detect earnings management. This is actually still an open empirical 
question. 
 
The accruals can be divided into non-discretionary accruals and discretionary 
accruals. Non-discretionary accruals refer to normal accruals or non-managed 
accruals where it is a normal part of earnings that results from the neutral application 
of accounting rules. It is normally used by the user of financial reports to reflect 
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business condition, that is, sales growth that cannot be controlled by managers 
(Islam, Ali and Ahmad, 2011). Meanwhile, discretionary accruals, better known as 
abnormal accruals or managed accruals, are non-obligatory expenses such as an 
anticipated bonus for management that is yet to be realized but is recorded in the 
account book. This is the accrual component under the discretion of management 
which often provide them with opportunities to manipulate earnings (Dechow, 1994). 
According to Sun and Rath (2009), a large part of the literature related to the 
detection of earnings-management is based on discretionary accruals.  
 
Healy and Wahlen (1999: 6) define earnings-management as: 
 
Occur[ing] when managers use judgement in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported numbers. 
 
Consistent with these definitions that earnings-management reflects opportunistic 
behaviour of the management and following key studies in earnings-management 
that focusing on accruals manipulation (e.g. Klein, 2002: Xie et al., 2003), this study 
investigates how much of the total accruals consisted of earnings-management that 
are measured by absolute value of discretionary accruals. In other words, 
discretionary accruals are used as proxy to earnings-management in this study. In 
accordance to Becker et al. (1998), the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
measures the level of opportunistic earnings-management activities and extreme 
reporting decision exercises by managers. The use of absolute value of discretionary 
accruals is consistent with Klein (2002) and Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995). 
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McNichols (2000) identified three research designs in the earnings-management 
literature to measure the discretionary accruals which are aggregate accruals method, 
the specific accruals method and the earning-based distribution method. According to 
him, the designs of earnings-management research are varied and the advantages of 
each method are depending on the study objectives. If the study aims to examine the 
magnitude of earnings-management, the aggregate accruals method is most 
appropriate (McNichols, 2000: 333). This is because the specific accruals method 
may represent only a small portion of the discretionary component of income and 
therefore may fail to reflect earnings-management in cases where other discretionary 
components are manipulated (McNichols and Wilson, 1988). Moreover, this method 
is unable to analyse simultaneously aggregated effects of accounting levers used by 
managers in managing earnings (McNichols 2000, Fields, Lys and Vincent, 2001, 
Francis 2001).  
 
Meanwhile the earning-based distribution method (known as the frequency 
distribution method) focuses on the behaviour of earnings where it provides specific 
predictions related to which firms will manage earnings (to avoid earnings decreases 
or losses) or certain thresholds (to report positive profits) rather than merely 
measuring the magnitude or the extent of opportunistic earnings-management 
activities (McNichols, 2002). In other words, the frequency distribution method 
cannot infer earnings-management activities, which are the main concern of this 
study.  
 
 217 | P a g e  
 
Since this study aims to examine the relationship of block ownership and earnings-
management, the magnitude of earnings-management is a crucial component. 
Therefore, the aggregate accruals method will be used in this study as the method for 
covering more comprehensive research design in capturing the discretionary 
components. 
 
There are several models in the aggregate accrual method such as Healy’s (1985) 
model, De Angelo’s (1986) model, Jones’s (1991), modified Jones model by 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and the performance-adjusted model by 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005). Both the Healy and De Angelo approaches 
assume the non-discretionary accruals component is constant and all earnings-
management activities can be captured by total accruals. However, Kaplan (1985) 
argued that the assumption is unrealistic since the level of non-discretionary accruals 
should change from period to period in response to changes in economic 
circumstances. Therefore, both approaches tend to detect earnings-management with 
errors (Sun and Rath, 2009).  
 
As an alternative, the last three models (cross-sectional Jones model, cross-sectional 
modified Jones model and performance-adjusted model) control the variations of 
non-discretionary accruals by taking into account the changes in total assets, 
revenues, receivables and the firm’s performance. These models that relate to 
accruals are favourable as accounting accrual is the most popular earnings-
management method among managers (Perry and Williams, 1994; Dechow et al., 
2010)   
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From these three models, the cross-sectional modified Jones model is the most 
powerful in detecting earnings manipulation in the event of managers exercising their 
discretion over revenue recognition (Dechow et al., 1995; Guay, Kothari and Watts, 
1996). Related to this, Ronen and Yaari (2008) performed data simulation based on 
original Jones model and concluded that this model yields biased coefficients and 
thus provide misleading results.  This is mainly because its assumptions that the firm 
does not manage earnings in the estimation period. The Modified Jones model in fact 
deals to the problem through the treatment in account receivables.   
 
However, the used of discretionary accruals as proxy for earnings management also 
criticized as the model measures the unexpected accruals or abnormal accruals 
calculated as the difference between the total accruals and estimated normal accruals. 
A limitation of the modified Jones model is that the unexpected accruals have to be 
calculated or estimated. There is a risk of estimation errors and potentially biased 
results. Another limitation of the modified Jones model is that it only measures the 
effect of earnings management through the change in accruals, while earnings 
management can also be applied through manipulation of the cash flow component 
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Young (1999) argues that the modified Jones model suffers 
from systematic measurement error when depreciation is included in the 
measurement of accruals, resulting into a biased measurement of the abnormal 
accrual. 
 
The used of cross-sectional modified Jones model in detecting earnings-management 
in the form of discretionary accruals is indeed resembles previous research in this 
area, including Gavious (2007); Jiraporn, Miller, Yoon and Kim (2008); Cornett et 
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al. (2008), Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) etc. In addition, in the additional 
analysis, earnings-management was estimated using the original Jones Model (Jones, 
1991) and Performance-Adjusted Discretionary Accruals (Kothari et al., 2005).  
 
5.2.5.1 The Modified Jones Model (MJONES) and Jones Model (JONES) 
 
There are several steps to get the absolute value of discretionary accruals (DAC) 
under the cross-sectional modified Jones model and Jones Model. The first step is to 
calculate total accruals (TAC). There are two main approaches to calculate total 
accruals, namely using the traditional approach through the use of balance-sheet
44
 
(Healy, 1985; Dechow et al., 1995) or using cash flow approach (Subramanyam 
1996; Becker et al., 1998; Xie et al., 2003). Both approaches are widely used in 
earnings-management studies (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). However, Hribar and Collins 
(2002) find that using the balance-sheet approach to calculate the total accruals 
containing the measurement errors might lead to erroneous conclusion of the existing 
earnings-management when no such earnings-management was detected. They find 
that the estimation error arising from the balance sheet approach has been transmitted 
to the discretionary accruals thus resulting in wrong findings and conclusion when 
this method is apply. 
 
                                                          
44
 Under the balance sheet approach, the accruals are measured as follows (Hribar and Collins, 2002: 
107):  
 
TACt= ΔCAt – ΔCLt – ΔCasht + ΔDEBT – DEP  
 
where TAC=total accruals; ΔCAt=the change in current assets during year t; ΔCLt=the change in 
current liabilities during year t; ΔCasht=the change in cash and cash equivalent during period t; 
ΔDEBT=the change in debt included in current liabilities during period t and DEP=depreciation and 
amortization expenses during period t. All variables are scaled by lagged total assets.  
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Findings in Hribar and Collins (2002) with regard to measurement errors under the 
balance-sheet approach is supported by Ronen and Yaari (2008:436). To avoid such 
circumstances as highlighted by both studies above, this study employed the cash 
flow approach in calculating the total accruals where the total accruals are computed 
as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operation less the net cash 
flows from operating activities (Hribar and Collins, 2002: 109). Second, to estimate 
the DAC, two steps are involved in this process. Step one is the estimation of non-
discretionary accruals (NDAC) for both models. The equation for NDAC according 
to MJONES is (see Ronen and Yaari, 2008: 434): 
NDACit = ά1(1/TAit -1) + ά2 [(ΔREVit - ΔRECit)/TAit -1)] +  ά3 (PPEit/TAit -1)] + eit      
Whereby: 
 NDACit = Non-discretionary accruals of firm i in year t-1; 
 TAit -1   = total assets of firm i in year t-1; 
 ΔREVit = change in revenues of firm i in year t; 
 ΔRECit = change in account receivable of firm i in year t; 
 PPEit = gross property plant and equipment of firm i in year t; 
 eit = error term of firm i in year t; 
 
The equation for NDAC according to MJONES is (see Kothari et al. (2005): 
 
NDACit = ά1(1/TAit -1) + ά2 (ΔREVit / TAit -1) +  ά3 (PPEit/TAit -1)+ eit      
 
Whereby: 
NDACit = Non-discretionary accruals of firm i in year t-1; 
TAit -1   = total assets of firm i in year t-1; 
ΔREVit = change in revenues of firm i in year t; 
PPEit = gross property plant and equipment of firm i in year t; 
eit = error term of firm i in year t; 
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The coefficients ά1, ά2, ά3 for both models above are estimated using OLS regression. 
To do this, data are gathered in the same industries and years. Using a similar 
approach by Athanasakou, Strong and Walker (2009), industries that are less than six 
companies removed from the sample due to not having a sufficient quorum to 
calculate the coefficient. To obtain the coefficient parameters, the equation below 
was regressed using OLS regression: 
 
 
 
Whereby: 
TACit 
 
 
 
= 
 
TAC/TA = ά1(1/TAit -1) + ά2 (ΔREVit / TAit -1) +  ά3 (PPEit/TAit -1)+ 
eit      
 
 
Total accruals of firm i in year t-1; 
TAit -1   = total assets of firm i in year t-1; 
ΔREVit = change in revenues of firm i in year t; 
PPEit = gross property plant and equipment of firm i in year t; 
eit = error term of firm i in year t; 
 
The final step is to estimate the error term in the model (eit), which represents the 
discretionary component of accrual. This error term is the difference between the 
TAC and the NDAC. 
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DACit =TACit-NDACit 
Whereby: 
DACit= discretionary accruals for firm i in year t;  
TACit,=total accruals;  
NDACit = non-discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
 
 
5.2.5.2 The Performance-Adjusted Discretionary Accrual model (DAROA)   
 
 
Kothari et al. (2005) suggested that the firms’ performance variable can be included 
in the discretionary accruals regression as additional variable. Following their 
approach, DAROA was calculated by incorporating lagged ROA into the MJONES. 
The similar steps as the calculation of MJONES and JONES are involved. First, it 
begins with the estimation of coefficients for ά1, ά2, ά3 and ά4 for each industry in 
each year by using OLS regression to extract the non-discretionary accrual. 
Industries that are less than six companies removed from the sample due to not 
having a sufficient quorum to calculate the coefficient parameters (Athanasakou et 
al., 2009). To obtain the coefficient, the equation below was regressed using OLS 
regression: 
 
 
 
TAC/TA = ά1(1/TAit -1) + ά2 (ΔREVit / TAit -1) +  ά3 (PPEit/TAit -1)+ ά4ROAit -1+ eit      
 
 
Whereby: 
TACit = Total accruals of firm i in year t-1; 
TAit -1   = total assets of firm i in year t-1; 
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ΔREVit = change in revenues of firm i in year t; 
PPEit = gross property plant and equipment of firm i in year t; 
ROAit = Return on Assets of firm i in year t-1 
eit = error term of firm i in year t; 
 
The coefficient parameters from this regression are then used to calculate NDAC 
using DAROA in the equation below:  
 
NDACit = ά1(1/TAit -1) + ά2 [(ΔREVit- ΔRECit)/TAit -1)] +  ά3 (PPEit/TAit -1)] + ά4 
(ROAit-1)+eit      
Whereby: 
 NDACit = Non-discretionary accruals of firm i in year t; 
 TAit -1   = total assets of firm i in year t-1; 
 ΔREVit = change in revenues of firm i in year t; 
 ΔRECit = change in account receivable of firm i in year t; 
 PPEit = gross property plant and equipment of firm i in year t; 
 ROAit = Return on Assets of firm i in year t-1 
 eit = error term of firm i in year t; 
 
Finally, the error terms are estimated by taking the different between total accruals 
and the non-discretionary accruals, which represents the discretionary component of 
accruals as follows: 
DACit =TACit- NDACit 
Whereby: 
DACit= discretionary accruals for firm i in year t;  
TACit,=total accruals;  
NDACit = non-discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
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Since this study is focusing on the magnitude of earnings-management, we employ 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals as the dependent variable
45
. According to 
Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006: 791), in this approach, “the direction of 
earnings-management is disregarded to include the combined effect of income 
increasing and income decreasing earnings-management.” Moreover, the used of 
absolute value of discretionary accruals is in-line with prior studies in earnings-
management (e,g. DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Warfield et al., 1995; Becker et al., 
1998; Klein, 2002; Kothari et al., 2005; Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006; Yu, 
2008).  
 
5.2.6 Model specifications and variable measurement 
 
In examining the relationship between ownership structure and earning management, 
the following model is employed (earnings-management model): 
 
EMit = α + β1CONCENTRATIONit+ β2PIF GLICit + β3FGLICit + β4SEDCit + β5PRIVATEit+ 
β6MANSHAREit + β7SECONDBLOCKit+ β8BODSIZEit+ β9BODMEETit+ 
β10BODINEDit+ β11DUALITYit + β12ACSIZEit+ β13ACMEETit+ β14ACINEDit+ 
β15ACEXPERTit+ β16SIZEit+ β17LAGROAit+ β18LEVERAGEit +  β19ANALYSTit+ 
β20TACCLTAit+ β21COINVESTMENTit+ β22FCFit+ β23LOSSit + β24BIG4it+ 
β25FIRMAGEit + β26IFRSit + β27Year2005it+ β28Year2006it+ β29Year2007it + 
β30Year2008it+ β31Constructionit + β32Consumerit + β33Industrialit +  
β34Infrastructureit + β35Plantationsit  + β36Propertiesit +   β37Servicesit  +  εit 
 
 
In line with previous studies on the issue of ownership types and earnings-
management (e.g. Ding et al., 2007; Wang and Yung, 2011), we use dummy 
                                                          
45
 This is except our explanation in descriptive statistic section where we need to discuss the direction 
of earnings-management. 
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variables for our key variables which are PIF GLIC, FGLIC, SEDC and PRIVATE. 
For example, PIF GLIC is a dummy variable coded “1” for firm years in which the 
biggest shareholders is a PIF GLIC and “0” otherwise.  
 
Table 5-4 explains the variable definitions and operationalisation for all variables 
employed in the regression model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 226 | P a g e  
 
TABLE 5-4: Variable definitions and operationalisation 
 
Variables Acronym Operationalisation 
Dependent variables:  
Earnings-management proxy by 
discretionary accrual 
 
EM 
 
Discretionary accrual estimated using:  
(i) Cross-sectional modified Jones Model  
(ii) Cross-sectional Jones Model  
(iii) Performance-adjusted model   
Independent variables: 
Ownership concentration (%) 
 
CONCENTRATION 
 
The shareholding percentage of the largest 
shareholder in a company 
Federal government sponsored 
pension and investment funds  
owned GLICs 
PIF GLIC Dichotomous with 1 if PIF_GLIC is the 
largest shareholder and 0 otherwise 
Federal government owned 
GLICs 
FGLIC Dichotomous with 1 if FG_GLIC is the 
largest shareholder and 0 otherwise 
State government owned GLICs SEDC Dichotomous with 1 if SEDC is the largest 
shareholder and 0 otherwise 
Private blockholder PRIVATE Dichotomous with 1 if private blockholder is 
the largest shareholder and 0 otherwise 
Managerial ownership (%) MANSHARE The shareholding percentage managerial 
(CEO and board) in a company as stated in 
annual report 
Control Variables: 
Second blockholder 
 
SECONDBLOCK 
 
The shareholding percentage of second 
largest shareholder as stated in firm’s annual 
report 
Board size BODSIZE Total number of directors on the board of the 
company 
Board meeting frequency BODMEET Total number of the board meeting during 
the financial calendar 
Independent directors BODINED The proportion of independent non-
executive directors to the total number of 
directors on the board 
CEO duality DUALITY Dichotomous with 1 if firm with CEO 
duality and 0 otherwise 
Audit committee size ACSIZE Total number of audit committee members 
in the company 
Audit committee meeting 
frequency 
ACMEET Total number of audit committee meeting 
during the financial calendar 
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Independent audit committee ACINED The proportion of independent audit 
committee to total number of audit 
committee members 
Audit committee financial 
expertise 
ACEXPERT The proportion of audit committee members 
with an accounting or finance background 
Total assets (proxy of firm size) SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
One-year lagged for firm’s 
financial performance measure by 
return on assets 
LAGROA Calculated as net income/total assets 
 
Financial leverage (%) LEVERAGE The percentage of total debt to total assets of 
the company 
Monitoring by financial analysts 
 
ANALYST Measured using the number of the analyst 
following a firm 
Total accruals TACCLTA Absolute value of total accruals (where total 
accrual is calculated as; net income – net 
cash flow from operation activities/lagged 
total assets)  
Company’s investment  COINVESTMENT Gross property, plant and equipment divided 
by lagged total assets. This is a proxy for 
investment opportunity 
 
Free Cash Flow FCF Operating cash flow minus capital 
expenditures 
Firms with negative earnings 
 
LOSS Dichotomous according to the firm’s income 
before extraordinary items: 1 if the firms 
recorded negative earnings and 0 otherwise 
Big Four auditors BIG4 Dichotomous with 1 if firm engaged Big 
Four auditors and 0 otherwise 
Firm age 
 
FIRMAGE The number of years a company’s shares 
have been traded on the Bursa Malaysia 
Securities 
Changes in accounting standards 
 
IFRS Dummy variables for changes in  accounting 
standards within the test period (1=year 
2007 and 2008; 0=otherwise)  
Year dummies YEAR DUMMY Dummy variables for years within the test 
period  
Industry type  INDUSTRY Dichotomous according to which sectors the 
company belongs to according to Bursa 
Malaysia Securities sector classifications 
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5.2.7 Data analysis procedures
46
 
 
This section discusses data analysis procedures and statistical tests employed in this 
study. Basically, the nature and characteristics of the sample data will determine 
which statistical method should be employed. As a first step, we performed several 
tests in order to fulfil several critical assumptions under the parametric test. Five 
important assumptions under the parametric analysis are assumptions of normality, 
linearity, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. This part is 
important to ensure the model is able to predict part of the variability in the data and 
the test is extremely critical for the validity of the interpretation of the regression 
estimates (Gujarati, 2003). Under violation of these assumptions, the main analysis 
under a parametric test that is ordinary least square (hereafter OLS) can be 
statistically inefficient or even give misleading inferences (Baltagi, 2005; Greene, 
2008). 
 
In the second step, we discuss the empirical results from our statistical analyses.   To 
summarize the data in a clear and understandable way, the analysis starts with 
descriptive statistic containing mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, 
maximum, skewness and kurtosis of 2696 firm-year observations in the study. Then, 
we performed univariate analysis that involve Pairwise correlation matrix, two 
sample T-test of differences in means and Mann-Whitney U-test of differences in 
medians for our main variables which is the different type of block ownership.   
 
 
                                                          
46
All continuous variables were winsorized at the top and bottom at 1% in order to reduce the effect of 
outliers and this method is consistent with previous studies such as Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian 
(2008) and Dhaliwal et al. (2009).  
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In the next step, we perform multivariate analysis to see the impact of our key 
variables on performance after controlling firm specific characteristics such as 
corporate governance, profitability, agency cost and industry. As the problem of 
endogeneity in the form of simultaneity can limit the validity of empirical testing of 
the model (Chenhall and Moers, 2007), we perform a Durbin-Wu Hausman test 
(Hausman, 1978) to detect the presence of endogeneity. The endogeneity of 
ownership structure and earnings-management is a serious concern for a regression 
model. This is because if the level of shareholding in firms either by blockholders or 
management is based on input related to earnings-management, then the residuals in 
regression would be correlated with the ownership variables and the coefficient 
estimates will be biased.  
 
 
We also perform various additional analyses including robustness checks to provide 
reasonable assurance for the current findings as well as to tackle several minor 
issues. Finally, we end our chapter with discussion on the contribution from the 
study, its limitations and our recommendations for future research. 
 
5.2.8 Data Diagnostics  
 
Most of the multivariate regression in the prior literature used the OLS estimator to 
examine the relationship between a single dependent variable and several 
independent variables (predictors). Before using OLS estimator, however, there are 
five fundamental assumptions need to be fulfilled for OLS regression models to be 
valid (Gujarati, 2003; Hair et al., 2010). These assumptions include:   
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(i) Normality - The errors (residuals) should be normally distributed 
(ii) Linearity - The relationship between the predictors and the response variable 
should be linear.  
(iii) Homoscedasticity - The errors variance should be constant   
(iv) Independent - The errors associated with one observation are not correlated 
with errors of other observation.  
(v) Multicollinearity - There is no exact collinearity among predictors. 
 
Each of this assumption will be tested using various statistic analyses and the next 
five sub-sections outlined the results and discussions. 
(i) Assumption of normality  
One of the important assumption underlying OLS regressions is that the data must be 
drawn from normally distributed populations and it is assumed that residuals in a 
model are randomly and normally distributed with mean zero. Following checking 
normality of residuals by Chen, Ender, Mitchell and Wells (2003), we conducted 
both graphical and numerical tests for testing normality and detect the presence of 
outliers. The graphic tests using Kernel density estimate, normal probability plot and 
quantiles plot. Meanwhile, for numerical test we employed the Shapiro-Wilk test 
(Swilk test) and Inter-quartile range test. The Swilk test is the most powerful 
normality test available as it is able to detect small departure from normality and 
suitable for small sample size (Chen et al., 2003) such as that employed in this study. 
 
The graphic test using Kernel density estimate is presented in Figure 5-1. In the test, 
the normal density line should be overlaid on the kernel plot as an indication of data 
normality. However, the results show serious deviation from normal and indicate that 
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the residuals in the model are not normally distributed. The standardized normal 
probability plot test (P-P plot) and quantiles plot test are in Figure 5-2 and 5-3.While 
standardized normal probability plot test is sensitive to non-normality in the middle 
range of data, the quantiles plot is sensitive to non-normality near the tails. In both 
plot, there are clearly significant deviation from the normal plot, thus indicated that 
based on graphic tests, the data of this study is not normally distributed.  
 
In the first numerical test, the null hypothesis of Swilk test is that the residuals are 
normally distributed. If the p-value is significant, then the null hypothesis would be 
rejected, suggesting the residuals are not independently distributed. Table 5-5 
confirm that the normality of residuals are not been fulfilled since the p-value is 
significant at p<0.000 indicating the residuals are not normally distributed. In the 
meantime, inter-quartile range (IQR) test assumes symmetry of the distribution. 
Severe outliers consist of those points that are either 3 inter-quartile-ranges below the 
first quartile or 3 inter-quartile-ranges above the third quartile. The presence of any 
severe outliers should be sufficient evident for us to reject normality at a 5% 
significance level. In our case, we have severe outliers (Table 5-6) and therefore, the 
assumption of data normality is not fulfilled. 
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FIGURE 5-1: Kernel density estimate test 
 
FIGURE 5-2: Standardized normal probability plot test (P-P plot) 
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FIGURE 5-3: Quantiles plot test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
R
e
s
id
u
a
ls
-40 -20 0 20 40
Inverse Normal
 234 | P a g e  
 
 
TABLE 5-5 
Checking Normality - Swilk Test 
 
Variable Observation W V z Prob>z 
 
r 
 
2696 
 
0.74059 
 
403.440 
 
15.426 
 
0.00000 
 
 
 
TABLE 5-6 
Checking Normality of Residuals Using Inter-Quartile Range Test 
 
Mean = 1.500 std.dev.=  10.52 (n= 2696) 
Median = -1.528 pseudo std.dev.=  6.447 (IQR=  8.697) 
10 trim = -0.832 
  
  
low           high 
  
------------------- 
 
inner fences -18.18       16.61 
 
# mild outliers 2185 
 
% mild outliers 0.78%       3.15% 
   
 
outer fences -31.22       29.66 
 
# severe outliers 1632 
 
% severe outliers 0.59%       1.19% 
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5.4.2 Assumption of linearity 
This assumption suggests that the model should have linear parameters where the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables follows a straight line or 
linear. To check the linearity assumption, the graphs of standardised residuals plotted 
against each of the independent variables in the regression model and visual method 
determined whether linear pattern exist between the variables. 
 
Augmented partial residual plot for non-dummy independent variables 
(CONCENTRATION and MANSHARE) in Figure 5-4 and Figure 5-5 respectively 
show that data points almost symmetrically distributed around the ordinary 
regression line in the plot with several outliers. Further investigation on the pattern of 
the relationship between response variable and predictors using Graph matrix test is 
performed as presented in Figure 5-6 and Figure 5-7. The Graph matrix test shows 
the entire pattern (CONCENTRATION versus MJONES and MANSHARE versus 
MJONES) seems pretty uniform thus confirmed the linear relation between these 
variables with earnings-management measures. Therefore overall, the assumption of 
linear relationship between response variables and predictors has been fulfilled. 
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FIGURE 5-4 : Augmented partial residual plot for CONCENTRATION 
 
 
FIGURE 5-5 : Augmented partial residual plot for MANSHARE 
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FIGURE 5-6 : Graph Matrix CONCENTRATION vs MJONES 
 
FIGURE 5-7 : Graph Matrix MANSHARE vs MJONES 
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(iii) Assumption of homoscedasticity  
Another important assumption in a regression model is the standard deviation 
(variance) of the error terms is constant or homogeneous where the error terms all 
have the same variance (Gujarati, 2003: 387). In the case of unequal variance 
(heteroscedasticity), the OLS estimators no longer efficient and would make the 
usual hypothesis-testing procedure of dubious value (Gujarati, 2003: 415). The 
presence of outliers and skewness in the distribution of one or more regressors 
included in the model are among the sources of heteroscedasticity. To test the 
presence of heteroscedasticity problem, scatter plot, White’s test and Breusch-Pagan 
tests are performed as recommended by Chen et al. (2003) and Baum (2006).  
 
Figure 5-8 illustrated test of heteroscedasticity using scatter plot. The plot shows that 
most of the x value is not concentrated around the mean of y in our main model and 
the pattern of distribution also does not looks like an oval shape (the rules of 
homoscedasticity may have been violated if the other geometric shape other than 
oval shape appears) with extreme outliers in both directions of y line. Since the 
scatter plot alone does not show strong evidence of the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, further investigation is needed with intention to ensure the model 
is BLUE (best linear unbiased estimator).  
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FIGURE 5-8 : Heteroscedasticity Test for MJONES model – Diagnostic plot 
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a very large chi-square value (81233.16) indicating the presence of heteroscedasticity 
in our regression models.  
 
TABLE 5-7: Numerical Test for Heteroscedasticity 
 (i) White’s Test 
 
H0 = The variance of the residuals is homogenous 
Reject H0 if p-value is significant 
 
Source chi2 df p-value (significant) 
    
Heteroskedasticity 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
 
Total 
 
2666.89 
1492.16 
1.11 
 
4160.17 
651 
36 
1 
 
688 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.2912 
 
0.0000 
 (ii) Breusch-Pagan Test for heteroskedasticity 
 
 
H0 = The variance of the residuals is homogenous 
Reject H0 if chi-square is significant 
 
Source chi2 (1) Prob> chi2  
 
Heteroskedasticity 
 
81233.16 
 
0.0000 
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(iv) Assumption of no autocorrelation in the model  
Another important OLS assumption is the error terms are independent. 
Autocorrelation (serial correlation) is a condition where there is correlation between 
error terms of dataset of one period (t) with previous period (t-1). In this situation, 
the error terms are not independent and could give incorrect t values and confidence 
intervals in regression. To test the presence of autocorrelation in the model, we 
perform Durbin-Watson d-Test. In addition, the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange 
Multiplier tests are also performed to detect the presence of serial correlation in 
regression. As a rule of thumb, if value of Durbin-Watson d-Test approaches a value 
of 2 (value of 1 or -1 are perfect autocorrelation), there is no autocorrelation among 
error terms. For Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier tests, a large chi-square value 
plus significant p-value of chi-square would indicate the presence of autocorrelation. 
 
Results of Durbin-Watson d-Test indicate there was a moderate autocorrelation in 
model as the value of Durbin-Watson d-statistics is 1.467059. Further test using 
Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier tests in Table 5-8 confirmed the presence of 
autocorrelation with a large chi-square value that highly significant (p<0.001) thus 
we have to reject Ho suggesting there are serial correlation in the model. Therefore, 
the OLS assumption of error terms being independent is not fulfilled.  
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TABLE 5-8: Test for Autocorrelation using Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange  
Multiplier Test  
 
Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier Test  
 
 
H0 = no serial correlation 
Reject H0 if chi-square is significant 
 
Lags (p) chi2 Df Prob> chi2 
 
1 
2 
3 
 
 
48.682 
70.169 
79.342 
 
1 
2 
3 
 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
 
 
 
v) Assumption of no multicollinearity  
Table 5-13 of pairwise correlation matrix indicates that all independent variables are 
moderately inter-correlated with the maximum correlation coefficient is recorded at 
39%, which is between firms owned by private blockholders and their ownership 
concentration. However, the correlation coefficient among some of our control 
variables shows a relatively high percentage of correlation between 
COINVESTMENT and TASSETS (0.89), between FCF and TASSETS (0.88) as 
well as between COINVESTMENT and FCF (0.85). The high correlation coefficient 
among these variables is not unexpected as firms with substantial assets will make 
more investments to generate higher returns for the company that translates to the 
high amount of cash (free cash flow). Round continues where excess cash will be 
used to make more investments in order to generate greater returns to shareholders.  
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However, the high correlation coefficient poses a potential of multicollinearity 
problem. According to Gujarati (2003), the rule of thumb for checking the serious 
problem of multicollinearity is that no correlation between independent variables is 
greater than 0.80. Since correlation coefficient between these variables exceeds this 
threshold, further investigation is needed.  
 
To further investigate whether our model would be free from multicollinearity 
problems, we calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF) and conducted a tolerance 
value test. The VIF is used to test whether an independent variable has a strong linear 
relationship with another independent variable. In the presence of multicollinearity, 
the variance of an estimator is inflated and as a rule of thumb, if the value of VIF of a 
variable exceeds 10 or tolerance value (1/VIF) lower than 0.10, that variable is said 
be highly collinear (Gujarati, 2003:362). As shown in Table 5-9, VIF values of all 
variables show figures below 10 and tolerance values above 0.10. The VIF ranges 
between 1.03 and 8.03 with an average of 2.64. Meanwhile the tolerance value is in 
the range between 0.1244 and 0.9750. Moreover, our regression results in the main 
findings show that we don’t have a problem of “few significant t ratios, but a high 
overall R
2 
and a significant F value” (Gujarati, 2003:354) as one of the signal of 
multicollinearity problem. Therefore, we can conclude that multicollinearity is not a 
problem in our data analysis.  
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TABLE 5-9: Test for multicollinearity 
 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance Value (1/VIF) Test Results 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
 
Industrial 8.03 0.124478 
Services 7.56 0.132354 
TASSETS 7.51 0.133128 
COINVESTMENT 6.15 0.162602 
FREECASHFLOW 6.12 0.163498 
Properties 5.81 0.172037 
Consumer 5.73 0.174508 
Plantations 3.54 0.282331 
Construction 3.47 0.288224 
ACINED 2.56 0.390099 
IFRS 2.52 0.397176 
ACSIZE 2.36 0.424406 
PrivateBlock 2.29 0.436733 
Concentration 1.96 0.510542 
Year2006 1.67 0.597358 
Year2005 1.67 0.600307 
Year2007 1.66 0.603170 
Analyst 1.56 0.641836 
Infrastructure 1.51 0.661556 
FGLIC 1.45 0.687291 
PIF GLIC 1.43 0.701623 
BODSIZE 1.39 0.721490 
BODMEET 1.34 0.744329 
BODINED 1.30 0.770259 
TACCLTA 1.30 0.772103 
ACMEET 1.29 0.774382 
LOSS 1.28 0.782371 
LAGROA 1.28 0.784281 
SEDC 1.27 0.786892 
MANSHARE 1.22 0.821430 
LEVERAGE 1.19 0.841209 
FIRMAGE 1.17 0.854613 
SECONDBLOCK 1.15 0.867713 
ACEXPERT 1.06 0.943159 
BIG4 1.06 0.946074 
DUALITY 1.03 0.975008 
 
Mean VIF 
 
2.64 
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5.2.9 Dealing with outliers and missing data 
 
Generally we find most of the assumptions under parametric test cannot be met. As 
discussed in the normality test that outliers are the main cause of data non-normality, 
we used general measures of influence to confirm the presence of outliers in our 
models. Figure 5-9 shows Scatterplot Matrix Graph of the interaction between main 
response variable (MJONES) with the non-dummy independent variables 
(CONCENTRATION and MANSHARE). We find that, in every plot, there are 
scattered trend of data point where some of the data points far away from the rest of 
the data points. This suggests that our dataset has a serious problem with outliers that 
will affect the results of regression analysis. 
 
To soften the impact of outliers, Hamilton (1992) suggested data transformation 
where individual variables with extreme outliers transformed into most commonly 
used transformations to normalize the data. However, while data transformation 
makes a distributions less skewed, but it also alters the relationship between the 
original variables in the model. Moreover, many commonly used transformations 
require non-negative data or data that is greater than zero, which limits their 
applications.  
 
We observed that the outliers in our data are genuine and drawn from reliable 
sources (e.g. annual report). In this instance, we rely on Hair et al. (2010) that the 
deletion of outliers is not favourable unless if there is a strong justification based on 
researchers evaluation and judgement.  In addition, according to Hair et al., (2010) as 
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outliers are deleted, the researcher runs the risk of improving the econometric 
analysis but limiting its generalizability. This is because the outliers of some 
variables might represent a segment of the population and should be retained to 
ensure generalizability to the entire population.  
 
Based on the above discussion, we decided not to delete outliers in order to conserve 
data. However, to mitigate the impact of extreme outliers in our dataset, following 
Gavious, (2007), Cornett et al. (2008) and Dhaliwal et. al, (2009), we winsorized all 
the continuous variables in our dataset at the top and bottom at 1%. In this method, 
we convert the values of data points that are outlyingly high to the value of the 
highest data point not considered to be outliers. All the data points involved in 
exercise must be within the range of 1% at the top and bottom of dataset. Although 
this method does not cause data to be normal but it can reduce the influence of 
extreme data. 
In relation to the missing data, we find there are some random cases where the data 
are missing, particularly the financial data. Folllowing Hair et al., (2010), we replace 
the missing data with the mean of the valid data of that particular variable.     
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FIGURE 5-9: 
Scatterplot Matrix Graph (MJONES VS non-dummy independent variables) 
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5.3 Empirical results and analysis 
 
 
5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 5-10 presents the descriptive statistics for all related variables used to 
investigate the association between ownership structure and earnings-management 
for the sample of 2696 firm-year observations of Malaysian listed companies. 
 
The descriptive statistics show that the mean and median of our main measure of 
discretionary accruals which is the Modified Jones Model are 0.0111 and 0.0140 
respectively. This result is consistent with the study conducted by Rahman and Ali 
(2006) on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings-management 
of top 100 companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia Securities, which 
shows that the mean and median discretionary accruals of 0.0132 and 0.013 
respectively.   
 
To confirm the existence of earnings-management practices among the companies in 
our sample, following Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006), we perform a 
statistical test which is one sample T-test for different measures of earnings-
management for the period of study. Table 5-12 presents the results of the test. As 
seen from the results, we find that the p-values of discretionary accruals are 
significantly different from 0 at 1% level in all measures of discretionary accruals. 
Therefore, we have preliminary evidence that, on average, companies listed on the 
Main Board of Bursa Malaysia from 2004 until 2008 manage their reported earnings 
upward (income increasing earnings-management). 
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Refer back to Table 5-10, with regards to ownership concentration, on average the 
largest blockholder hold 39.27 percent of the firm’s equity. This average percentage 
is slightly higher as compared to Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) who find the mean 
shareholdings of the single largest shareholder of listed companies on Bursa 
Malaysia Securities between 1996 and 2000 is 31 percent but almost similar to Abdul 
Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006) that document the mean of ownership 
concentration of 36.76 percent. Different in sample size and period of study might 
explain the differences. The maximum shareholding by a single blockholder is 86.81 
percent with the minimum threshold of 20 percent. In total, 2185 firm-years 
observations that represent 81.04 percent from the total sample of firms are control 
by a single largest blockholder. It confirmed the findings by Tam and Tan (2007) and 
Liew (2007) that Malaysian ownership structure is characterized by a highly 
concentrated ownership structure with the predominant role of the blockholders 
regardless of ownership types.  
 
With respect to the managerial ownership, the descriptive statistics show that on 
average managerial equity ownership of public listed firms in Malaysia is 10.93 
percent which is very similar to that obtained by Mohd Ali et al. (2008) of 9.898 
percent. With regards to firm-specific characteristics, the average of firm size proxy 
by TASSETS is £303 million and average MCAP
47
 in the sample is £194 million and 
they are normally followed by an average of two ANALYST (mean value of 1.8278), 
                                                          
47
 We used total assets as proxy for firm’s size in earnings-management model (equation 1) and 
market capitalization as a proxy for firm’s size in ownership concentration model (equation 2). 
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which is very low as compared to the developed capital market. For example, in the 
USA, Byard et al. (2006) find the mean number of analyst of 13.83. 
 
The average shareholdings held by second highest shareholder is 11.35 percent; that 
is substantial enough to act as part of monitoring mechanisms primarily to monitor 
the activities of the major shareholders that may act in concert with the chief 
executive officer to manipulate company’s accounts to their interests. Firm’s 
leverage measured using debt to total assets suggesting that in average firms in our 
sample have a relatively moderate percentage of leverage (23.28 percent). The 
percentage is slightly higher than findings in Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali 
(2006) of 21 percent but similar to Bradbury et al. (2006) of 23.4 percent. 
Meanwhile, the average of TACCLTA is 0.0205 with maximum value of 2.3645 and 
the average FIRMAGE is 15 years.  
 
In relation to the control variables related to corporate governance variables, we find 
that the corporate board size ranges between 3 and 15 with an average of 7.61. This 
average size of the board almost is the same as that found in studies by Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) of 7.94 and Mohd Ghazali (2010) of 8.83.  However, this mean is 
lower than the average board size of 11.33 in the US as documented by Laksmana 
(2008). In terms of board meeting frequency, there is a big difference between the 
minimum numbers of meetings, 2 times per year with a maximum number of 19 
times per year with the average number of meetings is about 5.36 times. This average 
indicates that boards of GLCs in Malaysia meet less frequently than their 
counterparts in the UK who reported by Zaman et al., (2011) meet in average 8.78 
times per year. In term of board composition, the mean percentage of independent 
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non-executive directors on the board for all years are 42.29 percent which complied 
with the recommendation by Malaysia Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG, 
2007) that independent directors should make up at least one third of the board 
membership. However, this percentage is lower than the 47 percent reported by Li et 
al (2008) for the UK and much lower compared to Laksmana (2008) who reported 
that 79 percent of boards are comprised of independent directors in US firms in the 
year 2002.  
 
The mean ACSIZE is 3.51 which complied with the MCCG (2007) that requires the 
board to establish an audit committee comprising at least three members. Majority of 
audit committee members are independent directors (ACINED) as shown by high 
mean value of 2.576 or 73.39 percent from the average ACSIZE that is again 
complied with the requirement in MCCG. Meanwhile, in average audit committee 
meet 5 times a year (4.8271 in Table 4-11). Mean for audit committee financial 
expertise is 1.337 with minimum of 1 and maximum of 4 suggesting that each listed 
firms in the sample have at least one financial expertise in their audit committee even 
though the MCCG requires all members of the audit committee should be financially 
literate and at least one should be a member of an accounting association or body.  
 
Table 5-11 presents the descriptive statistics of dichotomous variables (the 
descriptive statistics for ownership types and industry sectors have been explained in 
the previous section). We find that only small percentage of firms in our sample (365 
firms or 13.5 percent) combined the roles of CEO and chairman (DUALITY). The 
low percentage of DUALITY in our sample compared to the 45 percent recorded by 
Mohd Saleh et.al. (2005) using the data in 2001, shows a high level of compliance 
with the recommendations in MCCG that CEO should not serve as a chairman of the 
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company. About 10 percent or 274 firms in our sample recorded loss in their 
financial statements, which is remarkably lower than the findings in Bradbury et al. 
(2006) of 20 percent. This shows that there is a significant recovery in the firm’s 
performance as the study by Bradbury et al. (2006) using data in the year 2000 where 
most of the firms have just started to recover from the effects of the Asian Financial 
Crisis.  
 
Meanwhile, descriptive statistics also shows that majority of our sample was audited 
by the Big-4 audit firms (1834 firms or 68.02 percent). This percentage is consistent 
with Johari et al. (2008) that found an average 69.2 percent of listed firms in their 
sample are audited by Big-4 audit firms. Based on cut-of date of 2007 when most of 
the firms embraced to IFRS, we found that about 40 percent of firms in our sample 
included in the category of companies that follow IFRS in preparing their financial 
statements. Sample distribution by year shows equal distribution of observations 
where each year with 20 percent of the total sample.  
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TABLE 5-10: Descriptive statistics
48
  
 
Variables N MEAN STD. DEV. 25% PERC MEDIAN 
 
75% PERC 
 
MIN MAX 
 
JONES 2696 0.0101 
 
0.1216 -0.0428 0.0118 0.0659 -2.4064 1.0349 
MJONES 2696 0.0111 0.1516 -0.0430 0.0140 0.0701 -5.0500 1.0461 
DAROA 2696 -0.0020 0.1675 -0.0557 0.0009 0.0573 -5.3471 2.771 
ABS. JONES*
49
 2696 0.0795 0.0925 0.0262 0.0565 0.1029 0.0000 2.4064 
ABS MJONES* 2696 0.0829 0.1273 0.0267 0.0574 0.1054 0.0000 5.0500 
ABS DAROA* 2696 0.0861 0.1437 0.0254 0.0566 0.1079 0.0000 5.3471 
CONCENTRATION 2185 39.2786 14.2971 27.23 36.67 50.20 20.00 86.81 
MANSHARE 2696 10.9337 15.5540 0.14 3.09 15.955 0 70.98 
TASSETS 
 
2696 £303m 
 
£963m 
 
£41m 
 
£87m 
 
£201 
 
£1.7 
 
£2.05b 
 
MCAP 
 
2696 £194m 
 
£688m 
 
£16m 
 
£33m 
 
£107m 
 
£0.7m 
 
£892m 
 
SECONDBLOCK 2696 11.3571 6.7605 6.05 10 15.355 0.27 45.96 
 
LAGROA 2696 3.6846 9.9739 1.1869 4.1605 7.8270 -115.047 50.7569 
                                                          
48
 All continuous variables were winsorized at the top and bottom at 1% in order to reduce the effect of outliers and this method is consistent with Cornett et al. (2008) and 
Dhaliwal et al. (2009). See our discussion on how we deal with outliers in Appendix 2, item 5.5. 
49
 * refers to the absolute value 
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LEVERAGE 2696 23.2876 19.6048 6.47 20.99 35.29 0 153.05 
ANALYST 2696 1.8278 4.0903 0 0 1.5 0 24 
TACCLTA 2696 0.0205 0.1332 -0.0291 0.0132 0.0628 -2.5089 2.3645 
COINVESTMENT 2696 £205m £935m £18m £43m £107m £12m £1.8b 
FCF 2696 £21m £96 £1.8m £3.2m £11m -£13.5m £172m 
FIRMAGE 2696 15.3757 12.2762 6 12 22 1 47 
BODSIZE 2696 7.6146 1.8700 6 7 9 3 15 
BODMEET 2696 5.3657 1.9932 4 5 6 2 19 
BODINED  2696 42.2970 10.9578 40 33.33 50 0 100 
ACSIZE 2696 3.5174 0.6948 3 3 4 2 7 
ACMEET 2696 4.8271 1.3140 4 5 5 1 17 
ACINED  2696 2.5760 0.6135 2 3 3 1 5 
ACEXPERT 2696 1.3371 0.5564 1 1 2 1 4 
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TABLE 5-11: Descriptive statistics for dichotomous variables 
 
Variables N MEAN STD. 
DEV. 
25% 
PERC 
MEDIAN 
 
75% 
PERC 
 
MIN MAX 
 
PIF GLIC 85 0.0319 0.1757 0 0 0 0 1 
FGLIC 79 0.0293 0.1686 0 0 0 0 1 
SEDC 56 0.0207 0.1426 0 0 0 0 1 
PRIVATE  1965 0.7288 0.4447 0 1 1 0 1 
NON BLOCK 511 0.1893 0.3918 0 0 0 0 1 
DUALITY 365 0.1353 0.3421 0 0 0 0 1 
LOSS 274 0.1016 0.3022 0 0 0 0 1 
BIG4 1834 0.6802 0.4664 0 1 1 0 1 
IFRS 1055 0.3913 0.4881 0 0 1 0 1 
YEAR 2004 515 0.1927 0.3945 0 0 0 0 1 
YEAR 2005 543 0.2067 0.4050 0 0 0 0 1 
YEAR 2006 563 0.2086 0.4064 0 0 0 0 1 
YEAR 2007 558 0.2012 0.4010 0 0 0 0 1 
YEAR 2008 520 0.1908 0.3930 0 0 0 0 1 
CONSTRUCTION 196 0.0730 0.2602 0 0 0 0 1 
CONSUMER 413 0.1530 0.3601 0 0 0 0 1 
INDUSTRIAL 715 0.2653 0.4416 0 0 1 0 1 
INFRA 36 0.0133 0.1147 0 0 0 0 1 
PLANTATIONS 201 0.0745 0.2626 0 0 0 0 1 
PROPERTIES 423 0.1567 0.3636 0 0 0 0 1 
SERVICES 639 0.2371 0.4254 0 0 0 0 1 
TECHNOLOGY 73 0.0270 0.1623 0 0 0 0 1 
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TABLE 5-12: One Sample T-test for dependent variables (MEAN=0) 
 
 MEAN STD. DEV. T-test 
JONES 0.0101 
 
0.1216 4.3397*** 
MJONES 0.0111 0.1516 3.8132*** 
DAROA -0.0020 0.1675 -0.6228 
ABSOLUTE JONES 0.0795 0.0925 44.6291*** 
ABSOLUTE  MJONES 0.0829 0.1273 33.8231*** 
ABSOLUTE DAROA 0.0861 0.1437 31.1068*** 
 
***are significant at p<0.01, **are significant at p<0.05, *are significant at p<0.10,  
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5.3.2 Univariate analysis 
 
5.3.2.1 Pairwise correlation matrix 
 
Table 5-13 presents the Pairwise correlation for main dependent variable (MJONES), 
independent and control variables used in the regression analysis. The correlation 
analysis matrix indicates that all independent variables are moderately inter-
correlated with the maximum correlation coefficient is recorded at 39 percent, which 
is between PRIVATEBLOCK and CONCENTRATION.  
 
However, the correlation coefficient among some of our control variables shows a 
relatively high percentage of correlation between COINVESTMENT and TASSETS 
(89 percent), between FCF and TASSETS (88 percent) as well as between 
COINVESTMENT and FCF (85 percent). The high correlation coefficient among 
these variables is not unexpected as firms with substantial assets will make more 
investments to generate higher returns for the company that translates into the high 
amount of cash (FCF). The cycle continues where excess cash will be used to make 
more investments in order to generate greater returns to shareholders. 
 
The high correlation coefficient poses a potential of multicollinearity problem and 
this issue has been discussed and resolved previously in data diagnostic section 
(section 5.2.8, item v) where after further investigation we conclude that the 
multicollinearity is not detrimental to the results of our multivariate analysis.   
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5.3.2.2 Complementary vs. substitutive tests  
 
The firm’s ownership structure and corporate governance can be used as tools to 
monitor earnings-management behaviour and reduce agency costs as suggested in 
agency theory. On one hand, monitoring activities by blockholders might reduce 
information asymmetry in firms (Hope, Langli and Thomas, 2012). On the other 
hand, other corporate governance mechanisms also are potentially effective to limit 
the extent of agency costs by aligning manager and shareholder interests and would 
be helpful in mitigating managers' propensity to manipulative earnings (Siregar and 
Utama, 2008; Jaggi et al., 2009). Therefore, both ownership structure and corporate 
governance mechanisms are monitoring tools that may have complementary or 
substitutive effects in curbing earnings-management. Based on this consideration, it 
is important to understand the following: (i) whether ownership structures and 
corporate governance mechanisms have a complementary or substitutive relationship 
in respect to constraining earnings-management; and (ii) whether internal and 
external control mechanisms complementary or substitutive to each other in 
mitigating earnings-management. 
 
(i) The links between ownership structures and corporate governance mechanisms 
in mitigating earnings-management  
Empirical evidence on the relationship between ownership and corporate governance 
mechanism in mitigating earnings-management shows inconclusive results. For 
example, Kim and Lu (2011) examine the relationship between CEO ownership and 
firm value. Based on panel data from 1992 through 2006 from various databases 
(ExecuComp, Compustat and CRSP), they find that CEO ownership and external 
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governance are substitutes for mitigating agency problems when CEO ownership is 
low. Other previous studies also suggest that governance mechanisms are not 
independent of each other but are substitutes (e.g. Rediker and Seth, 1995; Kini, 
Kracaw and Mian, 1995).  
 
On the contrary, Koh (2003), found that at the higher institutional ownership levels, 
institutional investors can act as a complementary corporate governance mechanism 
in mitigating aggressive earnings-management activities.  
 
Walsh and Seward (1990) suggested that all internal and external governance factors 
address the same agency problems; hence, they are interlinked and interrelated. In 
fact, an empirical study by Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2006) found that internal and 
external governance are complementary to each other.  
 
To address the issue discussed above, referring to Vafeas (2005), a complementary 
link (i.e. ownership and corporate governance mechanisms depend on each other to 
work) is detected when the correlation shows a positive relationship and substitutive 
roles (i.e. ownership and corporate governance mechanisms not depend on each other 
to work) identified when the direction of the correlation is negative. In the Pairwise 
correlation matrix (Table 5-13), we find that at the higher ownership concentration 
levels, blockholders can act as a complementary to corporate governance 
mechanism. This shows by a positive relationship between CONCENTRATION and 
BODMEET, BODINED, ACSIZE and ACINED. However, on the flip side, this 
relationship might just an indication of blockholders power in influencing corporate 
governance mechanisms in firms.  
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With regard to ownership types, we find that both federal government GLICs, 
namely PIF GLIC and FGLIC constantly show a substitutive relationship with board 
and audit committee characteristics (e.g. BODSIZE, BODMEET, BODINED, 
ACSIZE, ACMEET, ACINED
50
 and ACEXPERT). The results are mixed for SEDC 
suggesting neither substitutive nor complementary relationship. Interestingly, 
PRIVATEBLOCK shows a complementary relationship with majority of corporate 
governance variables (BODSIZE, BODMEET, BODINED, ACSIZE, ACINED).  
 
Overall the results indicate that GLICs, particularly at the federal level, play a 
dominant role in corporate decisions and impose optimal monitoring activities on 
their portfolio companies that can substitute the role of board and audit committee in 
mitigating earnings-management activities. Meanwhile, private blockholders can act 
as a complementary corporate governance mechanism in mitigating earnings-
management practices in firms they invest in. However, considering that family 
control is a common characteristic of public listed companies in Malaysia (Chu and 
Cheah, 2006), the presence of family members on the board may results in an 
increase of earnings-management in the firms controlled by them. Many prior studies 
suggest that family-owned firms positively associated with earnings-management 
practices particularly in the countries with weak investor protection (e.g. Leuz et al., 
2003; Jara and Lopez, 2011). In fact, a recent study by Ishak, Haron, Salleh and 
Rashid (2011) on earnings-management practices of family-controlled firms in 
Malaysia found that the proportion of family members in corporate boards was 
positively associated with earnings-management proxied by discretionary accruals.          
                                                          
50
 Only FGLIC shows a negative relationship with ACINED but PIF GLIC shows a positive sign.   
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In relation to the role of secondary blockholder, we find their presence can serve as 
an effective control mechanism in monitoring activities by the main blockholder. 
This is evidenced by a substitutive relationship (negative relationship) between 
secondary blockholder and most of board and audit committee characteristics, 
namely BODSIZE, BODMEET, BODINED, ACSIZE and ACINED.  This finding 
suggests an encouraging role of secondary blockholder in emerging economies with 
lack of minority shareholders protection.   
 
(ii) The links between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms in 
mitigating earnings-management  
With regards to the links between internal and external control mechanisms, we find 
that BIG4 as an external control mechanism has a complementary relationship with 
internal governance mechanism. It has positive links to all internal governance 
mechanism namely BODSIZE, BODMEET, BODINED, ACSIZE, ACMEET, 
ACINED and ACEXPERT. This indicates that more independent and better quality 
boards and audit committees tend to appoint auditors from reputable firms.  
 
On the contrary, substitutive relationships are signified between other external 
control mechanisms, ANALYST and internal governance mechanism. This could be 
drive by firm size where large firm tends to be followed by analyst following than 
small firms and investors may rely on their analyses. As can be seen from the table, 
corporate governance variables related to audit committee and ANALYST are 
correlated with firm size.  
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 TABLE 5-13: Pairwise correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 MJONES 1.000 
 
         
2 CONCENTRATION -0.04 
(0.01) 
1.000         
3 PIF GLIC -0.02 
(0.12) 
0.15 
(0.00) 
1.000        
4 FGLIC -0.02 
(0.29) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.10) 
1.000       
5 SEDC -0.03 
(0.05) 
0.13 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.17) 
-0.02 
(0.18) 
1.000      
6 PRIVATEBLOCK -0.00 
(0.89) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
-0.29 
(0.00) 
-0.28 
(0.00) 
-0.23 
(0.00) 
1.000     
7 MANSHARE 0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.25 
(0.00) 
-0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
1.000    
8 BODSIZE 0.04 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
-0.00 
(0.62) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.49) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.25) 
1.000   
9 BODMEET -0.02 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.38) 
-0.00 
(0.86) 
-0.02 
(0.15) 
-0.01 
(0.56) 
0.01 
(0.49) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
1.000  
10 BODINED -0.03 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.41) 
-0.01 
(0.31) 
-0.02 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.43) 
0.01 
(0.39) 
-0.01 
(0.51) 
-0.26 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
1.000 
11 DUALITY -0.01 
(0.50) 
-0.01 
(0.54) 
-0.02 
(0.25) 
-0.00 
(0.81) 
0.01 
(0.34) 
-0.00 
(0.79) 
-0.00 
(0.72) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.47) 
12 ACSIZE 0.01 
(0.42) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.55) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.54) 
0.37 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
13 ACMEET -0.00 
(0.63) 
-0.00 
(0.85) 
-0.01 
(0.54) 
-0.02 
(0.28) 
-0.01 
(0.39) 
-0.01 
(0.56) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.45 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
14 ACINED 0.00 
(0.87) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.99) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.14) 
0.33 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
15 ACEXPERT 0.01 
(0.58) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
-0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.34) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.10) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
16 TASSETS 0.16 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
0.31 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.68) 
-0.13 
(0.00) 
-0.13 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.27) 
-0.02 
(0.17) 
-0.01 
(0.54) 
17 LAGROA -0.04 
(0.01) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.36) 
-0.02 
(0.25) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.97) 
0.01 
(0.45 
-0.00 
(0.94) 
18 LEVERAGE 0.11 
(0.00) 
-0.15 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.13) 
0.02 
(0.28) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.80) 
-0.00 
(0.80) 
0.00 
(0.80) 
-0.02 
(0.21) 
19 ANALYST -0.03 
(0.05) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.13 
(0.00) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.01) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.76) 
-0.01 
(0.36) 
-0.01 
(0.46) 
20 TACCLTA -0.11 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.71) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.65) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.00 
(0.87) 
0.00 
(0.83) 
21 COINVESTMENT -0.03 
(0.06) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
0.32 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.58) 
-0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.44) 
-0.02 
(0.25) 
-0.01 
(0.51) 
22 FREECASHFLOW 0.17 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
0.30 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.26) 
-0.14 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.64) 
-0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.28) 
23 LOSS 0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.15 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.44) 
0.01 
(0.30) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.00 
(0.90) 
-0.00 
(0.99) 
-0.00 
(0.70) 
24 BIG4 0.00 
(0.76) 
0.00 
(0.95) 
0.00 
(0.78) 
0.00 
(0.75) 
-0.01 
(0.37) 
-0.02 
(0.20) 
0.00 
(0.99) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.88) 
25 FIRMAGE -0.02 
(0.13) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.37) 
-0.00 
(0.90) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.28 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.00 
(0.93) 
0.00 
(0.87) 
26 IFRS 0.00 
(0.78) 
0.00 
(0.82) 
0.02 
(0.28) 
0.00 
(0.98) 
0.01 
(0.56) 
-0.00 
(0.93) 
-0.00 
(0.66) 
0.00 
(0.80) 
0.02 
(0.26) 
-0.00 
(0.83) 
27 
 
SECONDBLOCK 0.00 
(0.92) 
-0.14 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.80) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.91) 
-0.01 
(0.38) 
-0.00 
(0.95) 
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  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
11 DUALITY 1.000 
 
         
12 ACSIZE -0.04 
(0.02) 
1.000         
13 ACMEET 0.02 
(0.18) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
1.000        
14 ACINED -0.03 
(0.09) 
0.73 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
1.000       
15 ACEXPERT -0.01 
(0.47) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
1.000      
16 TASSETS 0.00 
(0.61) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
1.000     
17 LAGROA -0.00 
(0.89) 
0.00 
(0.70) 
0.00 
(0.86) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.27) 
1.000    
18 LEVERAGE 0.01 
(0.33) 
-0.00 
(0.94) 
0.00 
(0.78) 
-0.03 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.26 
(0.00) 
1.000   
19 ANALYST -0.01 
(0.59) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.22) 
0.51 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
1.000  
20 TACCLTA 0.02 
(0.28) 
0.00 
(0.65) 
0.01 
(0.50) 
0.00 
(0.98) 
-0.00 
(0.93) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.76) 
0.02 
(0.17) 
1.000 
21 COINVESTMENT 0.01 
(0.35) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
0.89 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
0.45 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
22 FREECASHFLOW -0.00 
(0.98) 
-0.04 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.01) 
0.88 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.53 
(0.00) 
-0.19 
(0.00) 
23 LOSS 0.02 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.56) 
-0.00 
(0.82) 
-0.01 
(0.47) 
-0.00 
(0.69) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.32 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
-0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.28 
(0.00) 
24 BIG4 -0.01 
(0.60) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.70) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.19) 
-0.02 
(0.19) 
0.02 
(0.16) 
-0.00 
(0.74) 
25 FIRMAGE 0.00 
(0.64) 
0.00 
(0.65) 
0.00 
(0.79) 
-0.02 
(0.16) 
-0.00 
(0.84) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.63) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
26 IFRS -0.02 
(0.17) 
-0.02 
(0.14) 
0.00 
(0.84) 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.76) 
0.00 
(0.73) 
0.00 
(0.80) 
0.01 
(0.44) 
0.01 
(0.41) 
0.03 
(0.10) 
27 
 
SECONDBLOCK -0.00 
(0.88) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.81) 
-0.01 
(0.32) 
0.01 
(0.43) 
-0.01 
(0.53) 
-0.01 
(0.55) 
-0.00 
(0.83) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
 
 
  21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
21 COINVESTMENT 1.000 
 
      
22 FREECASHFLOW 0.85 
(0.00) 
1.000      
23 LOSS -0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.07 
(0.00) 
1.000     
24 BIG4 0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.31) 
1.000    
25 FIRMAGE 0.06 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.47) 
1.000   
26 IFRS 0.01 
(0.33) 
0.00 
(0.91) 
0.01 
(0.45) 
0.02 
(0.16) 
0.00 
(0.71) 
1.000  
27 
 
SECONDBLOCK -0.01 
(0.59) 
-0.02 
(0.15) 
-0.01 
(0.36) 
-0.00 
(0.86) 
-0.14 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.72) 
1.000 
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5.3.2.3 Ownership types and earnings-management (hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 4)  
 
Table 5-14 provides a comparison of differences in mean and median earnings-
management in firms controlled by different GLICs and private blockholders. Panel 
1 shows the earnings-management based on different measures (MJONES, JONES 
and DAROA) and different ownership types. With regards to the earnings-
management practices of GLCs controlled by different GLICs, we find that mean 
earnings-management of GLCs owned by FGLIC is 8.8% and 25.32% higher than 
earnings-management of GLCs owned by PIF GLIC and SEDC respectively based 
on MJONES measure. Similar results are obtained using JONES (mean: PIF 
GLIC=6.16; FGLIC=6.76; SEDC=4.90) and DAROA (mean: PIF GLIC=6.81; 
FGLIC=7.33; SEDC=5.34). Meanwhile, median earnings-management of FGLIC 
also 7% and 18% higher than median PIF GLIC and SEDC based on MJONES 
measure. Generally, we find that mean and median earnings-management of GLCs 
owned by FGLIC to be higher than mean and median earnings-management of GLCs 
owned by PIF GLIC and SEDC. This is contrary to our expectations. We expected 
GLCs owned by SEDC to show higher earnings-management than their counterparts 
at federal levels. However, consistent with our prediction, PIF GLIC recorded lower 
earnings-management than FGLIC except for median earnings-management 
measured by DAROA (median: PIF GLIC=4.95; FGLIC=4.55). When we compare 
the mean and median earnings-management of GLCs owned by different GLICs with 
the firms owned by PRIVATE, in line with our expectations, firms owned by 
PRIVATE recorded higher earnings-management both for mean and median across 
all measures of earnings-management. 
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To test whether the differences in mean and median earnings-management among 
different types of blocholders ownership as explained above are statistically 
significant, we conducted Pairwise comparison using two statistical tests namely 
Two-sample t-test for differences in means and Mann-Whitney U test for differences 
in medians. Panel 2 in Table 5-14 presents the results of these tests. 
 
Based on both tests, these preliminary results largely do not support our prediction 
that earnings-management of portfolio companies owned by PIF GLIC is lower than 
earnings-management of portfolio companies owned by FGLIC (hypothesis 1). 
Concerning hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3 that earnings-management are lower in 
portfolio companies owned by PIF GLIC and FGLIC as compared to portfolio 
companies owned by SEDC, the results reject both of these hypotheses as they are 
statistically insignificant. Therefore, based on the above statistics tests, we conclude 
that our preliminary results fail to support hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 
3.  
 
Also, hypothesis 4 predicts that earnings-management of listed firms controlled by 
PRIVATE is higher than earnings-management of GLCs controlled by different 
GLICs (PIF GLIC, FGLIC and SEDC). Panel 1 shows that earnings-management 
values are indeed higher in firms owned by PRIVATE than in GLCs both for mean 
and median across all measures of earnings-management. Statistic tests using Two-
sample t-test for differences in means and Mann-Whitney U test for differences in 
medians generally support the findings.   
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As seen in Panel 2, the statistics test of the differences in median earnings-
management between PRIVATE and all GLICs using Mann-Whitney U test 
suggesting that median earnings-management PRIVATE statistically significant with 
median earnings-management PIF GLIC, FGLIC and SEDC across all measures of 
earnings-management except for DAROA. The results as follow:  (i) PIF GLIC vs 
PRIVATE (MJONES: z-value = 2.449, p < 0.05; JONES: z-value = 2.310, p < 0.05; 
DAROA: z-value = 1.376, p > 0.1); (ii) FGLIC vs PRIVATE (MJONES: z-value = 
1.892, p < 0.1; JONES: z-value = 1.756, p < 0.1; DAROA: z-value = 1.641, p > 0.1) 
and; (iii) SEDC vs PRIVATE (MJONES: z-value = 3.369, p < 0.01; JONES:          
z-value = 3.155, p < 0.01; DAROA: z-value = 2.558, p < 0.05). 
 
Meanwhile, the statistics test of differences in mean earnings-management between 
PRIVATE and all GLICs using Two-sample t-test in suggesting that mean earnings-
management PRIVATE statistically significant with mean earnings-management of 
PIF GLIC and SEDC across all earnings-management measures but statistically 
insignificant with FGLIC. The results are as follows:  (i) PIF GLIC vs PRIVATE 
(MJONES: t-value = 2.9600, p < 0.01; JONES: t-value = 2.6187, p < 0.05; DAROA: 
t-value = 2.3226, p < 0.05); (ii) FGLIC vs PRIVATE (MJONES: t-value = 1.5641, 
p > 0.1; JONES: t-value = 1.3100, p > 0.1; DAROA: t-value = 1.1641, p > 0.1) and; 
(iii) SEDC vs PRIVATE (MJONES: t-value = 5.3083, p < 0.01; JONES: t-value = 
4.9027, p < 0.01; DAROA:    t-value = 4.6076, p < 0.01).  
 
Therefore, based on the above statistics tests for differences in mean and median of 
different types of blockholders, we conclude that our preliminary results largely fail 
to support hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3 but support hypothesis 4.   
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TABLE 5-14: Earnings-management of firms by different types of blockholders 
  
Panel 1: Means and medians earnings-management
51
 of firms with different type of 
controlling blockholders 
 
 
PIF GLIC  
(N=85) 
FGLIC  
(N=79) 
SEDC  
(N=56) 
PRIVATE 
(N=1965) 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
MJONES 6.20 4.44 6.80 4.78 5.01 3.91 8.27 5.98 
JONES 6.16 4.66 6.76 4.75 4.90 3.93 8.00 5.78 
DAROA 6.81 4.95 7.33 4.55 5.34 4.43 8.61 5.82 
 
Panel 2: Pairwise comparison of differences in means and medians earnings-
management according to different type of controlling blockholders using Two 
Sample t-test and Mann-Whitney U test  
 PIF GLIC vs. FGLIC PIF GLIC vs. SEDC FGLIC vs. SEDC 
Mean
a
 Median
b
 Mean
a
 Median
b
 Mean
a
  Median
b
 
MJONES 0.5277 0.423 1.3065 0.961 1.6209 1.425 
JONES 0.5213 0.387 1.3835 1.032 1.6763* 1.349 
DAROA 0.3997 0.295 1.4846 0.2535 1.5803 0.786 
 
 PIF GLIC vs. PRIVATE FGLIC vs. PRIVATE SEDC vs. PRIVATE 
Mean
a
 Median
b
 Mean
a
 Median
b
 Mean
a
  Median
b
 
MJONES 2.9600*** 2.449** 1.5641 1.892* 5.3083*** 3.369*** 
JONES 2.6187** 2.310** 1.3100 1.756* 4.9027*** 3.155*** 
DAROA 2.3226** 1.376 1.1641 1.641 4.6076*** 2.558** 
 
Significance level: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed test) 
Notes: (
a
) t-value from the two sample t-test of differences in means; and  
(
b
) z-value from the two-sample Mann-Whitney U-test of differences in 
medians.  
                                                          
51
 Measure by absolute value of discretionary accruals times by 100.  
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5.3.3 Multivariate analysis 
 
5.3.3.1 Robust regression analysis (Analysis 1) 
 
As described in data diagnostic analysis, our data fail to fulfil all assumptions under 
parametric tests. For OLS parametric tests to produce accurate results, the 
assumptions underlying them must be sufficiently satisfied. This is because, with the 
violation of parametric assumptions, the OLS regression methods are statistically 
inefficient or even give misleading inferences. For example, incorrect estimates of 
coefficients and standard errors (Baltagi, 2005; Greene, 2008; Gujarati and Porter, 
2009) can lead to substantive errors in the interpretation of data. Several prominent 
statisticians and researchers have described the use of OLS in the face of assumption 
violations as invalid (e.g. Zimmerman, 1998 and Wilcox, 2001).  
 
 
As alternatives, we first used robust regression instead of OLS regression. Hamilton 
(1992) argued that robust regression method have better statistical properties than 
OLS in terms of efficiency, more accurate confidence intervals and tests. Cohen, 
West and Aiken (2003) also suggested that robust regression should perform better 
than OLS under the violations of parametric assumptions. Furthermore, the results of 
robust regressions are generally more convincing because they should visualize the 
entire data and not just a few outliers as OLS regression.   
.   
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One of the robust regressions test under the family of robust regression methods is 
robust (Eicker-Huber-White heteroskedastic-consistent) standard errors
52
 (hereafter 
robust standard errors). As part of robust family, robust standard errors not only take 
into account issues concerning heterogeneity and lack of normality but it also can 
deal with some observations that exhibit large residuals, leverage or influence (Chen 
et al., 2003). In the robust standard errors option, the point estimates of the 
coefficients are exactly the same as in OLS. 
 
Taking into account the advantages of robust regression as discussed above, we first 
apply this regression in our initial analysis to examine earnings-management 
responds to ownership structure and corporate governance variables in our model. 
The results are presented in Table 5-15. We separate the regression based on 
different models to examine the impact of different variables on earnings-
management. Model 1 examines the impact of firm’s specific variables on earnings-
management, model 2 incorporates corporate governance variables related to the 
audit committee, model 3 incorporates corporate governance variables related to 
board, model 4 includes corporate governance variables both for the audit committee 
and the board, model 5 test the impact of ownership structure and managerial 
ownership on earnings-management, model 6 examine the impact of ownership 
structure and blockholders ownership concentration on earnings-management and 
finally model 7 include all the variables in one regression analysis.       
 
 
                                                          
52
In StataSE 10, we used regress command includes a robust option (vce) and we select best for 
heteroskedastic (hc3). The selection of hc3 is recommended strongly by Davidson and MacKinnon 
(1993) particularly in the presence of heteroscedasticity.  
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However, we realize that robust standard errors regression still does not take into 
account the effect of endogeneity problem. This is because, although the use of this 
regression can solve the issue of violation of parametric assumptions, it cannot solve 
the problem of endogeneity in a regression analysis. Therefore, if our robust standard 
errors regression indeed suffers from an endogeneity problem, we certainly cannot 
rely on its results. In this case we will only use the information in robust standard 
errors regression for comparison purposes and not as our main findings. The next 
section discusses more details of this issue and provides statistical tests to examine 
whether our model was affected by the presence of endogeneity.      
 
 
 271 | P a g e  
 
 
TABLE 5-15: Robust standard errors regression of earnings-management, blockholders’ investment and control variables  
Assumption: Earnings-management, ownership concentration by blockholder and managerial ownership are exogenous 
 
Dependent variable = MJONES MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 MODEL 6 MODEL 7 
 
Ownership Structure Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
CONCENTRATION      -0.03 
(-1.36) 
-0.02 
(-1.16) 
PIF GLIC     -3.58 
(-1.61) 
-2.87 
(-1.47) 
-2.83 
(-1.45) 
FGLIC     -2.14 
(-0.86) 
-1.57 
(-0.71) 
-1.47 
(-0.67) 
SEDC     -3.87*** 
(-4.00) 
-3.15*** 
(-3.00) 
-3.06*** 
(2.91) 
PRIVATE     -0.06 
(-0.13) 
0.62 
(0.92) 
0.55 
(0.83) 
MANSHARE     0.02* 
(1.78) 
 
 
0.02 
(1.64) 
2ndBLOCK     -0.02 
(-0.89) 
-0.03 
(-1.10) 
-0.03 
(-1.18) 
Governance Variables        
BODSIZE 
 
  0.25* 
(1.82) 
0.30* 
(1.96) 
0.28* 
(1.90) 
0.28* 
(1.91) 
0.28* 
(1.90) 
BODMEET 
 
  -0.09 
(-1.16) 
-0.08 
(-0.91) 
-0.09 
(-0.99) 
-0.08 
(-0.90) 
-0.08 
(-0.96) 
BODINED (%) 
 
  -0.01 
(-0.89) 
-0.00 
(-0.42) 
-0.00 
(-0.57) 
-0.01 
(-0.59) 
-0.01 
(-0.59) 
DUALITY 
 
  -0.23 
(-0.43) 
-0.22 
(-0.40) 
-0.24 
(-0.43) 
-0.25 
(-0.45) 
-0.24 
(-0.44) 
 
 272 | P a g e  
 
ACSIZE  0.33 
(0.92) 
 0.11 
(0.31) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.355) 
ACMEET  -0.08 
(-0.59) 
 -0.03 
(-0.25) 
-0.05 
(-0.33) 
-0.04 
(-0.27) 
-0.04 
(-0.30) 
ACINED  -0.40 
(-0.91) 
 -0.50 
(-1.06) 
-0.36 
(-0.77) 
-0.33 
(-0.73) 
-0.31 
(-0.67) 
ACEXPERT  0.19 
(0.59) 
 0.23 
(0.70) 
0.14 
(0.44) 
0.16 
(0.50) 
0.15 
(0.46) 
Firm-Specific Variables 
 
       
TASSETS 
 
2.22* 
(1.93) 
2.22* 
(1.93) 
2.23* 
(1.93) 
2.23* 
(1.93) 
2.27** 
(1.96) 
2.27** 
(1.96) 
2.28** 
(1.97) 
LAGROA 
 
0.01 
(0.58) 
0.01 
(0.57) 
0.01 
(0.60) 
0.01 
(0.62) 
0.01 
(0.54) 
0.01 
(0.71) 
0.01 
(0.65) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.05*** 
(3.46) 
0.05*** 
(3.46) 
0.05*** 
(3.46) 
0.05*** 
(3.48) 
0.05*** 
(2.94) 
0.04*** 
(2.74) 
0.04*** 
(2.76) 
ANALYST 
 
-0.71** 
(-2.22) 
-0.71** 
(-2.22) 
-0.71** 
(-2.23) 
-0.71** 
(-2.23) 
-0.70** 
(-2.29) 
-0.71** 
(-2.29) 
-0.70** 
(-2.29) 
TACCLTA 
 
9.62 
(1.24) 
9.61 
(1.24) 
9.48 
(1.22) 
9.45 
(1.22) 
9.35 
(1.20) 
9.48 
(1.23) 
9.40 
(1.21) 
COINVESTMENT 
 
-3.21** 
(-2.15) 
-3.21** 
(-2.15) 
-3.20** 
(-2.15) 
-3.21** 
(-2.15) 
-3.20** 
(-2.19) 
-3.20** 
(-2.19) 
-3.20** 
(-2.19) 
FREECASHFLOW 
 
0.00** 
(2.27) 
0.00** 
(2.27) 
0.00** 
(2.27) 
0.00** 
(2.30) 
0.00** 
(2.30) 
0.00** 
(2.30) 
0.00** 
(2.30) 
LOSS 5.65*** 
(5.53) 
5.64*** 
(5.49) 
5.64*** 
(5.49) 
5.63*** 
(5.46) 
5.63*** 
(5.43) 
5.52*** 
(5.17) 
5.55*** 
(5.25) 
BIG4 0.21 
(0.55) 
0.21 
(0.55) 
0.17 
(0.44) 
0.18 
(0.47) 
0.14 
(0.36) 
0.15 
(0.40) 
0.15 
(0.38) 
FIRMAGE -0.08*** 
(-2.67) 
-0.08*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.08*** 
(-2.66) 
-0.08*** 
(-2.67) 
-0.06*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.07*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.06*** 
(-2.60) 
IFRS 0.61 
(1.01) 
0.62 
(1.02) 
0.94 
(1.62) 
0.60 
(1.00) 
0.62 
(1.02) 
0.64 
(1.05) 
0.61 
(1.01) 
YEAR2005 
 
-0.10 
(-0.14) 
-0.08 
(-0.12) 
-0.07 
(-0.10) 
-0.04 
(-0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(-0.11) 
-0.08 
(-0.12) 
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YEAR2006 
 
0.87 
(1.47) 
0.88 
(1.48) 
0.90 
(1.50) 
0.92 
(1.53) 
0.87 
(1.47) 
0.92 
(1.51) 
0.88 
(1.47) 
YEAR2007 
 
0.29 
(0.47) 
0.29 
(0.47) 
0.32 
(0.52) 
0.34 
(0.54) 
0.35 
(0.55) 
0.32 
(0.52) 
0.35 
(0.56) 
YEAR2008 
 
0.31 
(0.54) 
0.30 
(0.45) 
0.30 
(0.44) 
0.32 
(0.46) 
0.33 
(0.46) 
0.31 
(0.54) 
0.33 
(0.46) 
CONSTRUCTION 
 
-1.14 
(-0.80) 
-1.11 
(-0.77) 
-1.03 
(-0.70) 
-1.00 
(-0.67) 
-0.93 
(-0.59) 
-0.90 
(-0.56) 
-0.88 
(-0.54) 
CONSUMER PRODUCT 
 
-1.31 
(-0.96) 
-1.32 
(-0.96) 
-1.19 
(-0.88) 
-1.16 
(-0.85) 
-1.23 
(-0.89) 
-1.24 
(-0.88) 
-1.21 
(-0.86) 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT 
 
-1.33 
(-1.03) 
-1.35 
(-1.04) 
-1.25 
(-0.96) 
-1.27 
(-0.97) 
-1.38 
(-1.03) 
-1.34 
(-0.98) 
-1.34 
(-0.98) 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
-3.76 
(-1.18) 
-3.74 
(-1.20) 
-3.74 
(-1.16) 
-3.77 
(-1.19) 
-3.80 
(-1.19) 
-3.79 
(-1.19) 
-3.79 
(-1.19) 
PLANTATIONS 
 
-2.50* 
(-1.83) 
-2.42* 
(-1.77) 
-2.23 
(-1.62) 
-2.15 
(-1.56) 
-2.17 
(-1.54) 
-2.13 
(-1.48) 
-2.13 
(-1.49) 
PROPERTIES 
 
-1.53 
(-1.13) 
-1.50 
(-1.09) 
-1.29 
(-0.91) 
-1.26 
(-0.87) 
-1.40 
(-0.97) 
-1.34 
(-0.90) 
-1.34 
(-0.90) 
TRADING/SERVICES 
 
 
-1.69 
(-1.30) 
-1.68 
(-1.30) 
-1.52 
(-1.18) 
-1.57 
(-1.21) 
-1.61 
(-1.21) 
-1.59 
(-1.18) 
-1.56 
(-1.17) 
_cons 7.87*** 
(5.78) 
7.86*** 
(4.54) 
6.92*** 
(3.75) 
6.91*** 
(3.51) 
7.60*** 
(3.74) 
8.50*** 
(4.04) 
8.05*** 
(3.90) 
        
N 
 
2696 2696 2696 2696 2696 2696 2696 
F Statistics 
 
4.81 4.24 4.15 3.73 3.73 3.65 3.62 
PROB>F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARE 
 
0.3035 0.3028 0.3045 0.3039 0.3083 0.3082 0.3086 
 
***are significant at p<0.01, **are significant at p<0.05, *are significant at p<0.10  
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5.3.3.2 Endogeneity test 
 
As discussed above, while robust regression can solve the issue of violation of 
parametric assumptions, it cannot solve the problem of endogeneity in a regression 
analysis. To deal with this issue, we first identify whether the MJONES, 
CONCENTRATION and MANSHARE may suffer from the endogeneity problem by 
performing the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test on each of these variable to detect for 
endogeneity
53
. Following Larcker and Rusticus (2010), the instrumental variables are 
the lagged values of the endogenous variables.
54
 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests the 
null hypothesis that the residual values of MJONES, CONCENTRATION and 
MANSHARE are jointly equal to zero. If the F-statistic is significant, the null 
hypothesis would be rejected, suggesting that endogeneity is present. Table 5.16 
present the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. The results suggest insignificant 
F-statistics for MJONES and CONCENTRATION but significant F-statistics for 
MANSHARE (p < 0.05). Results of Durbin-Wu-Hausman test reveals that we have 
endogeneity problem in our regression model related to MANSHARE.  The next 
sections discuss the causes, consequences and treatment of endogeneity and followed 
by alternative regression model.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53
 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test only performed on dependent and non-dummy independent variables 
54
 As previously mentioned we assume MJONES, CONCENTRATION and MANSHARE are 
endogenous 
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TABLE 5-16: Durbin-Wu-Hausman test results  
 
Ho = the residual of MJONES, CONCENTRATION and MANSHARE are endogenous 
 
Reject Ho if F-statistic significant 
 
Variables Chi2 value (p-value of F-statistics) 
 
MJONES 
 
7.431 (p=0.172) 
 
CONCENTRATION 
 
18.332 (p=0.406) 
 
MANSHARE 
 
13.581 (p=0.021) 
 
 
5.3.3.3 Endogeneity: causes, consequences and treatment  
 
Endogeneity occurs when independent variables are correlated to error terms in a 
regression (Roberts and Whited, 2011) and it plagues almost every aspect of 
empirical corporate finance including the ownership structure of the firms (Li, 2011). 
According to Roberts and Whited (2011), endogeneity comprises of three main 
sources which are: (i) omitted variables, (ii) measurement error and (iii) simultaneity.  
 
 
Endogeneity causes OLS regression to be biased and inconsistent (Wooldridge, 
2002). In the issue of ownership structure and earnings-management, the 
endogeneity problem in the form of simultaneity is a serious concern for a regression 
model. This is because if ownership structure is based on input related to earnings-
management choices, then residuals in regression would be correlated with the 
ownership variables and the coefficient estimates will be biased. For example, while 
ownership concentration by blockholders or managerial ownership could be 
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associated with earnings-management activities in firm, higher earning management 
activities could also attract shareholders to retain or invest into firms. This is due to a 
possibility that blockholders or management who are aware (or involved indirectly) 
in earnings-management activities in firms but decided to maintain or increase their 
investments in the company aims to gain personal profit from favourable reported 
earnings such as an increase in share prices. Therefore, studies on the relationship 
between ownership and earnings-management must take into account the effect of 
joint determination of these variables.  
 
However, previous studies into the relationship between ownership structure and 
earnings-management largely ignored the potential for simultaneity bias between 
ownership and earnings-management where the level of share ownership by 
blockholders or managers and earnings-management might be jointly determined. 
Most of the previous research only focuses on one way relationship on the effects of 
ownership concentration either by blockholders or managerial on earnings-
management and not vice versa (e.g. Ding et al., 2007; Mohd Ali et. al, 2008; Yang 
et al., 2008; Al-Fayoumi et al., 2010 etc.).  
 
To deal with endogeneity problems, several options are suggested by the literature. 
To solve the problem of omitted variables caused by unobservable heterogeneity 
among firms in a cross sectional sample, the use of panel data is one potential 
solution (Coles et al., 2007; Hu and Izumida, 2008). In addition, Li (2011) suggested 
that the regression include as many important and time-variant control variables as 
possible such as the incorporating year and industry dummies, particularly when the 
data in the sample are in the form of panel data. Meanwhile, endogeneity caused by 
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measurement error was defined by Roberts and Whited (2011: 79) as “the 
discrepancy between a proxy and its unobserved counterpart.” They suggest using a 
valid measurement or finding better measures for a specified proxy. In relation to our 
study, some of these suggestions have been taken into account; for example, we used 
panel data, employed various control variables, incorporating year and industry 
dummies and so on. 
 
However, as discussed above, our concern of endogeneity problem is in the form of 
simultaneity. Two main options for solving simultaneity bias in regression are 
discussed in prior literature, which are: the use of instrumental variables regression 
(Li, 2011; Roberts and Whited, 2011) and the use of a simultaneous system of 
equations based on 2SLS estimation (Weir at al., 2002; Cornett et al., 2009; 
Farooque et al., 2010). We first tried to use instrumental variables regression (IV 
regression) method but none of our variables managed to fulfil strict requirements 
under this approach
55
. Since the use of IV regression was not possible, we opt to use 
2SLS regression instead.   
 
To test the simultaneous relationship using 2SLS estimation, two related equations in 
which earnings-management and ownership concentration are treated as endogenous 
variables are developed. The first is the earnings-management model which is similar 
to the main model used in this study (equation 1) and the second is the blockholder’s 
ownership concentration model (equation 2) which is driven by the findings of prior 
literature. In the first stage, the ownership concentration is regressed using the main 
                                                          
55
 According to Adkins and Hill (2008: 249), instrumental variables must be from outside the 
regression model, uncorrelated with the regression error and as strongly correlated with the 
endogenous variable as possible. Moreover, to ensure that the instrumental variables used are valid, 
they need to pass several post-estimation requirements such as the F-statistic should be at least 3.3 or 
the F-value should be at least 10 in order for instrumental variables estimation to function adequately.  
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model and fitted value from the regression is obtained. This fitted value represents 
the portion of ownership concentration which might not be explained by earnings-
management (endogenous) in the regression. The same steps are done on model two 
(blockholder’s ownership concentration model) where CONCENTRATION treated 
as dependent variable.  In the second stage, earnings-management (MJONES) and 
CONCENTRATION are replaced with their fitted value drawn from the first stage 
regressions where they are located at the right side of the equation.   
 
For the ownership concentration model (equation 2), we also control for performance 
variables, firm’s size and age, growth prospects, years effects and industry.  
 
Growth prospects (GROWTH). The ratio of the market-to-book value of equity is 
used as a proxy of a company’s growth prospects. It is predicted that the greater a 
company’s growth prospects, the more likely it is that the company will have a 
widely held ownership structure. Kahn and Winton (1998) find that the percentage 
holding of pre-IPO shareholders will diminish at a faster rate in fast-growing firms 
because of the need for more financing partly through the issuance of more shares. 
Therefore, we predict a negative relationship between GROWTH and 
CONCENTRATION. 
 
Liquidity (LIQUIDITY). Liquidity measures the availability of firm’s to invest and 
the more liquid the assets are, the more attractive the firm in the eyes of shareholders 
and thus, increase the potential of large shareholders to increase their stake. 
According to Williamson (1988), firms with higher liquidity are better able to pay 
debt and therefore easier to finance thus become more attractive for investors. 
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Therefore, we predict a positive relationship between LIQUIDITY and 
CONCENTRATION 
 
Firm size (SIZE). Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s market 
capitalization as the investment community normally uses this figure to determine a 
company’s size. It might be expected that larger firms would be less likely to have a 
higher degree of ownership concentration. This is for the reason that, purchasing a 
controlling stake in a large company is more expensive than purchasing a controlling 
stake in a medium-sized or small listed company.  Large companies may also be 
expected to have issued more shares than smaller companies and therefore the larger 
the capital requirement by the investors, in order to own significant shares in the 
firm.  This implies a more diffuse ownership structure (Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 
2006; Demstez and Villalonga, 2001). Therefore, we predict a negative relationship 
between SIZE and CONCENTRATION. 
 
Previous year performance (LAGROA). Corporate performance proxied by ROA 
in the previous year could be the determinants of blockholder ownership 
concentration in their portfolio companies. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz 
and Villalonga, (2001) argue that corporate performance might influence 
shareholders’ investment behaviour where the better the financial performance is, the 
higher ownership concentration by shareholders. Therefore, we predict a positive 
relationship between LAGROA and CONCENTRATION. 
 
Dividend payout (DIVIDEND). Similar to LAGROA, higher dividends might also 
encourage blockholders to increase their stakes in the firm. Therefore, this variable is 
expected to have a positive relationship with ownership concentration. 
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Leverage (LEVERAGE). Leverage measured by debt-assets ratio is predicted to 
have a negative sign to ownership concentration. This is because creditors and risk 
rating agencies are assumed to play strong monitoring roles in controlling 
management’s activity thus reduced the agency cost (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; 
Stultz, 1990). In that circumstance, there is no need for blockholders to own too 
many shares in one particular company. Therefore, we predict a negative relationship 
between LEVERAGE and CONCENTRATION. 
 
Investment opportunity (COINVESTMENT). Firms with substantial investment 
opportunity may attract investors in order to earn a return greater than firms that have 
less investment opportunity. Therefore a positive relationship with concentration 
isexpected for this variable. 
 
Free cash flow (FCF).  Agency theory asserts that the conflicts between shareholders 
and managers exist partly because of the free cash flow issue where opportunistic 
managers tend to spend free cash flow unwisely on value destroying investment 
(Jensen, 1986). This is because there is more opportunity to compensate themselves 
as firms become larger from investments. In this situation, concentrated ownership is 
particularly relevant as monitoring mechanism. This is because while small 
shareholders have little incentive to monitor management because of the free-rider 
problem, concentrated ownership mitigates the problems of collective choice among 
shareholders (Lange, 1995). Therefore, if concentrated ownership solves free cash 
flow problems, then the desired level of ownership concentration is expected to 
increase with the amount of free cash flow. Therefore, we predict a positive 
relationship between FCF and CONCENTRATION. 
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Loss (LOSS). While financial performance in the previous year might influence 
ownership concentration positively in the current year, the inverse relationship is 
expected for loss making firms in the current year as shareholders become more 
selective in their investment decisions.   
 
Firm Age (FIRMAGE). It might be expected that the longer the period of time that 
has elapsed since a company first listed on the stock exchange, the more likely the 
company is to have a widely held share ownership structure. For example, a study by 
Brennan and Franks (1997) in the UK find that there is a considerable sell-down by 
the pre-IPO shareholders in the years following a company’s IPO. Therefore, we 
predict a negative relationship between FIRMAGE and CONCENTRATION. 
 
Year effects and industry dummies (YEAR DUMMY and INDUSTRY). As 
different industries might be characterized by different shareholder concentration 
patterns (van der Elst, 2004) and since these are panel data, it is important to control 
for year and industry effects. 
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The equation for earnings-management and ownership structure is represented 
below: 
 
EMit = α + β1CONCENTRATIONit  + β2PIF GLICit + β3FGLICit + β4SEDCit + β5PRIVATEit 
+ β6MANSHAREit + β7SECONDBLOCKit + β8BODSIZEit + β9BODMEETit + 
β10BODINEDit + β11DUALITYit + β12ACSIZEit + β13ACMEETit + β14ACINEDit + 
β15ACEXPERTit + β16SIZEit + β17LAGROAit + β18LEVERAGEit + β19ANALYSTit + 
β20TACCLTAit  + β21COINVESTMENTit + β22FCFit + β23LOSSit + β24BIG4it + 
β25FIRMAGEit  +  β26IFRSit  +  β27Year2005it + β28Year2006it + β29Year2007it + 
β30Year2008it  +  β31Constructionit +  β32Consumerit + β33Industrialit +  β34Infrastructureit + 
β35Plantationsit  +  β36Propertiesit +   β37Servicesit  + εit............................ equation (1) 
 
 
CONCENTRATIONit = α + β1EMit +  β2GROWTHit + β3LIQUIDITYit + β4SIZEit + 
β5LAGROAit + β6DIVIDENDit + β7LEVERAGEit + β8COINVESTMENTit + β9FCFit + 
β10LOSSit  +  β11FIRMAGEit + β12Year2005it + β13Year2006it + β14Year2007it + β15Year2008it 
+  β16Constructionit  +  β17Consumerit  +  β18Industrialit +  β19Infrastructureit +  β20Plantationsit  
+ β21Propertiesit +   β22Servicesit  + εit............................ equation (2) 
 
 
 
Table 5-17 presents the definitions and operationalisation of variables used in 
equation 2.
56
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56
 Variable definitions and operationalisation for equation 1 have been explained in Table 4-4 
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TABLE 5-17: Variable definitions and operationalisation (equation 2) 
 
Variables Acronym Operationalisation 
 
Dependent variable: 
Ownership concentration  
 
 
CONCENTRATION 
 
 
The shareholding percentage of the largest 
shareholder in a company 
Independent variables:  
Earnings-management proxy by 
discretionary accrual 
 
EM 
 
Discretionary accrual estimated using 
Cross-sectional modified Jones Model  
 
Growth prospects proxy by 
market-to-book ratio 
 
GROWTH The market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the 
market value of equity (market capitalization) to 
its book value (the value of assets minus 
liabilities) and is used to proxy for a company’s 
growth prospects 
 
Liquidity LIQUIDITY The ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
 
Firm size (proxy by firm’s 
market  capitalization) 
SIZE Natural logarithm of firm’s market capitalization 
One-year lagged for firm’s 
financial performance measure 
by return on assets 
LAGROA Calculated as net income/total assets 
 
Dividend per share DIVIDEND The total of declared dividends  
 
Financial leverage  LEVERAGE The percentage of total debt to total assets of the 
company 
 
Investment opportunity  COINVESTMENT Gross property, plant and equipment divided by 
lagged total assets. This is a proxy for investment 
opportunity 
 
Free Cash Flow FCF Operating cash flow minus capital expenditures 
 
Firms with negative earnings 
 
LOSS Dichotomous according to the firm’s income 
before extraordinary items: 1 if the firms 
recorded negative earnings and 0 otherwise 
 
Firm age 
 
FIRMAGE The number of years a company’s shares have 
been traded on the Bursa Malaysia Securities 
 
Year dummies YEAR DUMMY Dummy variables for years within the test period  
 
Industry type  INDUSTRY Dichotomous according to which sectors the 
company belongs to according to Bursa Malaysia 
sector classifications 
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5.3.3.4 Two-stage least square (2SLS) regression analysis (Analysis 2) 
 
As discussed above, to mitigate the potential bias in regression results caused by 
endogeneity, the 2SLS regression is performed and used as our main findings. The 
results of 2SLS regression analysis are presented in Table 5-18. The sequence of 
analysis is based on results from this table, not based on hypotheses sequences. 
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TABLE 5-18: 2SLS regression of earnings-management, blockholders’ investment and control variables 
Assumption: Earnings-management, ownership concentration by blockholder and managerial ownership are endogenous 
 
 Panel A 
OWNERSHIP = Blockholder ownership 
concentration 
(CONCENTRATION) 
Panel B 
OWNERSHIP = Managerial 
ownership 
(MANSHARE) 
Panel C
57
 
OWNERSHIP= Blockholder 
and managerial ownership 
 
Endogenous Variables Model 1 
MJONES 
Model 2 
CONCENTRATION 
Model 3 
MJONES 
Model 4 
MANSHARE 
Model 5 
MJONES 
MJONES (fitted value)  -0.35** 
(-2.10) 
 0.45** 
(2.32) 
 
CONCENTRATION (fitted value) -0.09** 
(-2.20) 
   0.06*** 
(2.73) 
MANSHARE (fitted value)   0.58*** 
(3.35) 
 0.65*** 
(3.66) 
      
Exogenous Variables      
PIF GLIC 0.14 
(5.61) 
 0.14 
(5.60) 
 0.17 
(5.84) 
FGLIC 0.38 
(3.12) 
 0.34 
(3.09) 
 0.37 
(3.11) 
SEDC 0.19** 
(5.29) 
 0.22** 
(5.51) 
 0.21** 
(5.46) 
PRIVATE  2.68** 
(2.56) 
 0.76 
(1.40) 
 1.24** 
(0.54) 
 
                                                          
57 In this model, both ownerships concentration by blockholder and managerial ownership (independent variables) are considered as endogenous variables and replaced by the 
fitted values from their first regression and both of them become part of MJONES equation (Model 1 in Panel C) 
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SECONDBLOCK 
 
-0.03 
(-0.95) 
 -0.161** 
(-2.38) 
 -0.16** 
(-2.34) 
BODSIZE 
 
0.55*** 
(3.63) 
 0.19 
(1.39) 
 0.09 
(0.64) 
BODMEET 
 
-0.09 
(-0.92) 
 -0.24* 
(-1.73) 
 -0.27* 
(-1.84) 
BODINED (%) 
 
0.04*** 
(2.74) 
 -0.01 
(-0.51) 
 -0.02 
(-1.06) 
DUALITY 
 
0.24 
(0.43) 
 0.16 
(0.22) 
 0.16 
(0.23) 
ACSIZE 0.88** 
(2.37) 
 -0.02 
(-0.05) 
 -0.15 
(-0.27) 
ACMEET 0.22 
(1.52) 
 -0.16 
(-0.72) 
 -0.26 
(-1.12) 
ACINED -0.77 
(-1.53) 
 0.36 
(0.51) 
 0.36 
(0.50) 
ACEXPERT 0.62* 
(1.81) 
 -0.11* 
(-0.28) 
 -0.22* 
(-0.51) 
Firm-specific variables 
 
     
SIZE (TOTAL ASSETS) 
 
2.21** 
(1.93) 
 2.33** 
(2.09) 
 2.31** 
(2.06) 
LAGROA 
 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
0.05** 
(1.97) 
-0.05 
(-1.64) 
0.05** 
(2.16) 
-0.07 
(-2.03)** 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.06*** 
(3.56) 
-0.05*** 
(-2.66) 
0.05*** 
(2.66) 
-0.00 
(-0.22) 
0.05*** 
(2.72) 
ANALYST 
 
-0.65** 
(-2.01) 
 -0.55** 
(-1.93) 
 -0.55* 
(-1.90) 
TACCLTA 
 
9.21 
(1.18) 
 9.43 
(1.19) 
 9.36 
(1.19) 
COINVESTMENT 
 
-3.03** 
(-2.02) 
-5.43** 
(-2.47) 
-3.08** 
(-2.14) 
7.92*** 
(3.83) 
-3.08** 
(-2.13) 
GROWTH   
 
-0.07 
(-0.75) 
 -0.18* 
(-1.72) 
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LIQUIDITY  
 
0.03 
(0.53) 
 0.00 
(0.19) 
 
DIVIDEND  
 
1.756 
(0.784) 
 1.557 
(0.665) 
 
SIZE (MCAP)  
 
5.14*** 
(20.33) 
 2.05*** 
(8.30) 
 
FCF 
 
0.00** 
(1.92) 
8.48*** 
(3.22) 
0.00** 
(2.01) 
-0.00*** 
(-5.22) 
0.00** 
(2.01) 
LOSS 12.65*** 
(5.95) 
-2.29* 
(-0.33) 
12.88*** 
(6.43) 
-2.51* 
(-0.39) 
13.83*** 
(6.66) 
BIG4 0.165 
(0.41) 
 -0.27 
(-0.48) 
 -0.37 
(-0.62) 
FIRMAGE -0.05** 
(-2.10) 
0.01 
(0.60) 
0.11*** 
(2.96) 
-0.31*** 
(-14.13) 
0.13*** 
(3.13) 
IFRS 0.28 
(1.01) 
 0.52 
(1.41) 
 0.82** 
(2.02) 
YEAR2005 
 
-0.84 
(-1.76) 
-0.24 
(-0.48) 
-0.77 
(-1.12) 
-0.22 
(-0.34) 
-0.82* 
(-1.72) 
YEAR2006 
 
-0.14 
(-0.21) 
-0.31 
(-0.48) 
-0.15 
(-0.28) 
-0.11 
(-0.24) 
-0.17 
(-0.28) 
YEAR2007 
 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
0.98 
(1.41) 
-0.04 
(-0.03) 
1.04 
(2.12) 
-0.02 
(-0.05) 
YEAR2008 
 
0.31 
(0.49) 
-0.71 
(-1.04) 
0.17 
(0.26) 
-0.61 
(-1.01) 
0.34 
(0.52) 
CONSTRUCTION 
 
-0.27 
(-0.31) 
-0.58 
(-0.64) 
-0.37 
(-0.52) 
-0.71 
(-0.87) 
-0.29 
(-0.34) 
CONSUMER PRODUCT 
 
-1.71 
(-1.99) 
0.85 
(1.08) 
-1.49 
(-1.98) 
0.41 
(0.74) 
-1.73 
(-2.04) 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT 
 
0.53 
(1.08) 
-0.26 
(-0.39) 
0.24 
(0.03) 
-0.24 
(-0.36) 
0.55 
(1.13) 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
-0.44 
(-0.52) 
-0.45 
(-0.54) 
-0.47 
(-0.58) 
-0.43 
(-0.49) 
-0.42 
(-0.47) 
PLANTATIONS 
 
-0.57* 
(-0.81) 
0.57 
(0.54) 
-0.53 
(-0.78) 
0.40 
(0.89) 
 
-0.67* 
(-0.94) 
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PROPERTIES 
 
0.20 
(0.31) 
-0.30 
(-0.39) 
-0.34 
(-0.41) 
-0.28 
(-0.36) 
0.22 
(0.33) 
 
TRADING/SERVICES 
 
 
-0.07 
(-0.08) 
0.12 
(0.19) 
-0.07 
(-0.05) 
0.15 
(0.22) 
-0.09 
(-0.09) 
_cons 7.53*** 
(4.03) 
38.537*** 
(10.39) 
6.145*** 
(4.33) 
42.312*** 
(11.65) 
8.40*** 
(4.12) 
      
N 2696 2696 2696 2696 2696 
F-statistics 388.93 932.90 851.97 805.12 220.35 
PROB>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARE 0.2796 0.2020 0.2803 0.2187 0.2807 
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Panel A shows the results of 2SLS regression when we treated MJONES and 
blockholder ownership concentration (CONCENTRATION) as endogenous 
variables. We find a negative and significant association between 
CONCENTRATION and earnings-management (β = -0.09, p < 0.05) and vice versa 
(β = -0.35, p < 0.05). This indicates that the higher the ownership concentration by 
blockholders, the lower earnings-management practices in the firms they invest in. 
Similarly, the higher earnings-management practices in firms, the lower ownership 
concentration by blockholders. These findings support hypothesis 6 and suggest that 
the stakes by blockholders might lead to tighter supervision and the ability to control 
the management that in return might reduce the risk of accounting manipulations by 
opportunistic managers. These results are consistent with findings in Ding et al. 
(2007) where they suggest that at a high level of ownership concentration, the 
blockholders become the true owners and will ensure the future growth of the firms 
by minimising earnings-management practices. Our results are also in line with 
Wang and Yung (2011), Abdoli (2011) and Alves (2012). More importantly, the 
results are in parallel with property rights and agency theory which suggest the 
higher the degree of share ownership by a blockholder, the greater the incentive and 
ability to participate in the supervision and control of the firm’s management (Rock, 
1991; Holderness, 2003).  
 
On the contrary, we find a positive and significant association between managerial 
ownership and earnings-management (β = 0.58, p < 0.01) and vice versa   (β = 0.45, 
p < 0.05) as shown in Panel B. This indicates that MANSHARE indeed encourage 
earnings-management practices in firms managed by themselves and greater 
magnitude of earnings-management play an important role in attracting more 
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investment by management. These results support hypothesis 5 and consistent with 
the argument by Morck et al. (1988) that greater MANSHARE would provide 
managers with deeper entrenchment and therefore, greater scope of opportunistic 
behaviour including manipulate earnings particularly when their tenure, promotions, 
reputation and compensation are tied to firm accounting performance (Ronen and 
Yaari, 2008). Moreover, in emerging markets with a comparatively weak degree of 
investor protection and lack of market discipline, managers may make accounting 
choices that reflect personal motives rather than economic decisions (Sanchez-
Ballesta and Garsa-Meca, 2007). The results are also in line with empirical studies in 
other emerging economies such as Limpaphayom and Manmettakul (2004) in 
Thailand, Al-Fayoumi et al., (2010) in Jordan as well as a previous study in Malaysia 
by Johari et al., (2008).  
 
Panel C confirmed the above analysis where in model 5 we treated MJONES, 
CONCENTRATION and MANSHARE as endogenous variables. The results shows 
the higher magnitude of relationship between MANSHARE and MJONES (β = 0.65, 
p < 0.01) compare to a very low magnitude of relationship between 
CONCENTRATION and MJONES (β = 0.06, p < 0.01).  
    
The subsequent discussion refers to the results of analysis as in model 5 of Panel C. 
The results reported in model 5 partially support earlier findings regarding 
hypotheses 4 which suggest that firms owned by private blockholder engage in 
earnings-management practices at higher magnitude compared to the lower 
magnitude of earnings-management practices in PIF GLIC, FGLIC and SEDC 
(PRIVATE; β = 1.24, p < 0.05; PIF GLIC; β = 0.17, p > 0.1; FGLIC; β = 0.37, p > 
0.1; SEDC; β = 0.21, p < 0.05). These results are in line with studies in Chinese 
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markets by Ding et al. (2007) and Wang and Yung (2011). However, the results 
contradict to Yen et al. (2007) in Malaysia that suggest earnings-management 
activities are lower in the firms owned by Chinese family-linked companies as 
compared to their GLCs counterpart. One possible explanation is that research by 
Yen et al. (2007) is limited to firms that are owned by Chinese family-linked 
companies while our research covering all type of private blockholders. In addition, 
while Yen et al. (2007) included firms in financial industry in their sample, we 
exclude those firms as they are subject to different compliance and regulations 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ab Razak et al., 2011) and more importantly their 
behaviour of accruals differs from other industries (Klein, 2002; Park and Shin, 
2004; Mohd Ali et al., 2008). Moreover, as previously discussed, GLICs are 
explicitly charged with improving the corporate governance in their portfolio 
companies (Malaysia Ministry of Finance, 2010) which is in line with government 
policy to attract foreign investment. Therefore, to implement the mandate and to 
support government policy on foreign investment, GLICs might have an incentive to 
mitigate earnings-management practices in their portfolio companies.  
 
With regard to earnings-management practices among GLCs owned by different 
GLICs, the 2SLS results here do not support our prediction that earnings-
management of portfolio companies owned by PIF GLIC is lower than earnings-
management of portfolio companies owned by FGLIC (hypothesis 1). Concerning 
the hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3 that predicts earnings-management are lower in 
portfolio companies owned by PIF GLIC and FGLIC as compared to portfolio 
companies owned by SEDC, our 2SLS results reject both of these hypotheses as they 
are statistically insignificant. Even though the magnitude of earnings-management in 
SEDC higher than in PIF GLIC (PIF GLIC; β = 0.17, p > 0.1; SEDC; β = 0.21, p < 
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0.05) which is consistent with hypothesis 3, we do not have enough evidence to 
support these findings as the relationship between PIF GLIC and earnings-
management is statistically insignificant.  
 
Moreover, in terms of the magnitude of coefficient, the coefficient value of earnings-
management for SEDC is actually lower than recorded in FGLIC even though it is 
higher than PIF GLIC. The full results of 2SLS regression for GLCs owned by 
GLICs are as follows (PIF GLIC; β = 0.17, p > 0.1; FGLIC; β = 0.37, p > 0.1; SEDC; 
β = 0.21, p < 0.05). One possible explanation is the small numbers of listed GLCs 
owned by SEDCs (around 10 listed GLCs) which facilitate control by SEDCs and as 
a result reduce the earnings-management practices in their firms. Therefore, based on 
2SLS regression, we find that our results on the magnitude of earnings-management 
among GLCs owned by different GLICs fail to support hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2 
and hypothesis 3 which consistent with our earlier findings in Pairwise comparison 
(T-test and Mann-Whitney U test for differences in mean and median earnings-
management of different type of GLICs in Table 4-14). This findings are also in line 
with robust regression results in Table 4-15 that shows only SEDC has significant 
association with earnings-management. Therefore, our findings with regards to the 
impact of different GLICs on earnings-management practices of their portfolio 
companies indicate that the objectives and control structures of GLICs does not 
affect how government ownership influences the earnings-management of GLCs.   
 
 
With reference to the control variables, our results indicate a constructive role of 
secondary blockholders in mitigating earnings-management behaviour in the firms 
they invested in. This is shown by a significant negative association between 
SECONDBLOCK and earnings-management (β = -0.16, p < 0.05). This matches 
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with an argument in Zhong et al. (2007) that secondary blockholders have more 
incentive to play an active role in monitoring the management for their long-term 
benefits. This is partly because, unlike to small shareholders that can sell their shares 
quickly if they spot earnings manipulation in firms, secondary blockholders selling a 
large block of shares often causes a decrease in share prices and thus, becomes a loss 
to their investment.   
 
Related to board characteristics, we find a significant negative association between 
BOARDMEET and earnings-management (β = -0.27, p < 0.1). The results are 
consistent with arguments that regular board meetings allow the directors to identify 
and resolve potential problems, particularly those that are related to the quality of 
financial reporting (Chen, Firth, Gao and Rui, 2006). Vafeas (1999) also stressed that 
active boards are more likely to put more effort into monitoring the integrity of 
financial reporting.  
 
However, although the association of BODSIZE, BODINED and DUALITY with 
earnings-management in the direction as we predicted in hypotheses (BODSIZE: β = 
0.09, p > 0.1; BODINED: β = -0.02, p > 0; DUALITY: β = 0.16, p > 0.1), the 
relationship are statistically insignificant.  
 
The results for DUALITY consistent with previous study in Malaysia by Johari et al., 
(2008) that find CEO duality do not influence the practice of earnings-management 
in Malaysian firms. However, our result is contradict with Mohd Saleh et al (2005) 
that report a positive relationship between DUALITY and earnings-management. 
The significant reduction in the cases of duality function between study by Mohd 
Saleh et al (2005) and our study is a possible explanation of this discrepancy to the 
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extend that their influence or pressure for management to engage in earnings-
management is diminishing . This indicates the success of MCCG in promoting the 
best practices of corporate governance regarding the separation of power between 
chairman and CEO. 
 
The results also indicate that control variables related to audit committee 
characteristics such as ACSIZE, ACMEET and ACINED have no impact on 
earnings-management practices in firms (ACSIZE; β = -0.15, p > 0.1; ACMEET; β = 
-0.26, p > 0.1; ACINED; β = 0.36, p > 0.1). The results for ACMEET are in line with 
a previous study in Malaysia by Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006) which 
suggests a negative but insignificant relationship between this variable and earnings-
management.  
 
We find a significant negative association between ACEXPERT and earnings-
management (β = -0.22, p < 0.1), suggesting that audit committees with relevant 
financial expertise are helpful in the mitigation of financial misstatement. This 
results is in harmony with various previous studies such as Abbott et al., (2002); Xie 
et al.(2003); Abbott, Parker and Peters, (2004); Bédard et al. (2004); Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005); Carcello et al. (2006) as well as Dhaliwal et al. (2010). This also 
indicates the important role of audit committee financial expertise as a means of 
strengthening the monitoring and oversight role that the audit committee plays in the 
financial reporting process.  
 
Overall, the results of 2SLS regression for board and audit committee variables 
indicate that corporate governance variables related to board and audit committee 
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have limited impact in mitigating earnings-management practices in firms. This 
finding is almost similar to the results of robust regression analysis reported in Table 
4-15 where only BODSIZE is found to have significant impact on earnings-
management but other corporate governance variables (BODMEET, BODINED, 
ACSIZE, ACMEET, ACINED and ACEXPERT) are insignificant in explaining 
earnings managememt.  
 
Our results also indicate that control variables related to firm-specific variables have 
a substantial impact on firms’ earnings-management practices. Firm size measured 
by TASSETS positively and significantly associate with earnings-management at a 
high magnitude of coefficient (β = 2.31, p < 0.05) suggesting large firms in Malaysia 
manage earnings more than small-sized firms. According to Barton and Simko 
(2002), large firms manage earnings since they face more pressures to meet or beat 
analysts expectations and our findings are in line with Sun and Rath (2009) who 
reports strong evidence that large firms are the primary determinants of earnings-
management in Australia. Relating to this, while large firms are usually audited by 
auditors from the Big-4 that could help in preventing earnings misrepresentation in 
firms (Lennox, 1999; Gore, Pope and Singh 2001), the larger the firm size, the more 
bargaining power they have in negotiations with auditors and auditors are more 
likely to waive earnings-management attempts by large clients (Nelson, Elliott and 
Tarpley, 2002). This is what happened in our results where we find BIG4 
insignificantly related to earnings-management practices (β = -0.37, p > 0.1) 
suggesting a simlar scenario to that reported by Nelson et al. (2002) might occur in 
Malaysian listed firms. 
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LEVERAGE shows positive and significant association to earnings-management 
even though at a low magnitude of coefficient (β = 0.05, p < 0.01). This indicates 
that firms with high leverage are more likely to engage in earnings-management due 
to their concerns over debt covenant default (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Dichev 
and Skinner 2002; Beatty and Weber 2003) and to ensure refinancing. The results are 
in line with the findings in Kim and Yi (2006) in Korea markets.  
 
However, a low level magnitude of coeeficient for LEVERAGE may also imply a 
close scrutiny by lenders in mitigating earnings-management in the firms that obtain 
loans from them.  Similar to LEVERAGE, free cash flow (FCF) also has a positive 
and significant relationship to earnings-management at a very low magnitude of 
coefficient (β = 0.00, p < 0.05). This is consistent with agency theory argument that 
opportunistic managers tend to spend free cash flow unwisely on value destroying 
investment (Jensen, 1986) as there are more opportunity to compensate themselves 
as firm becomes larger resulting from the investments.  As a result, managers might 
engage in earnings-management to cover up the poor performance resulting from the 
poor investment. However, the low magnitude of the relationship implies that, in the 
context of listed firms in Malaysia controlled by block ownership, managers are not 
able to act with impunity in making investments due to the dominant role of 
blockholders.  
 
As expected, we find a positive and significant association between LOSS and 
earnings-management with high magnitude of coefficient (β = 13.83, p < 0.01). This 
indicates that firms incurring losses actively manage their earnings for several 
reasons such as to secure position if they are CEO (Ertimur, 2004), to avoid reports 
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of further earnings decreases (DeGeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999) or to convey a 
positive signal to outsiders evaluating the firms, particularly the credit rating agency 
and stock analysts that could affect firm's credit rating and their cost of debt 
(Dechow et al., 2000).  
 
Our results also report a negative and significant association between LAGROA and 
earnings-management (β = -0.07, p < 0.05). This result is contrary to many previous 
studies such as Myers et al. (2007), Jo and Kim (2007) and Wang and Yung (2011). 
However, Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argued that firms with high profits tend to 
choose an accounting method that can reduce their earnings in order to mitigate 
political pressure. This is true in the context of Malaysia, particularly in large-size 
GLCs. For example, some GLCs such as Tenaga Nasional Berhad, the electrical 
provider in Malaysia, need to get government approval before increasing the 
electricity tariff. In this case, the government will examine their annual profits and it 
is difficult for them to obtain consent for an increase in tariffs if at the same time the 
firm recorded high profits. Therefore, this situation might create incentives for 
managers to deflate earnings. In relation to this, we also find that, COINVESTMENT 
is negative and significantly associate with earnings-management (β = -3.08, p < 
0.05) suggesting firms may reduce the reported earnings number to limit the potential 
emergence of political risk (AlNajjar and Riahi-Belkaoui, 2001) as discussed above. 
 
FIRMAGE is positively and significantly related to earnings-management    (β = 
0.13, p < 0.01) suggesting firms that already exist in the long term have better 
appreciation of the market environment and this  put extra pressure on managers to 
show a consistent/better growth and thus, maintain their reputations in the business 
which consequently may lead to earnings-management practices. Our results are also 
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consistent with Ismail and Weetman (2008) in their study in Malaysia that suggests 
that long-established firms have a higher capacity to use accrual accounting in 
managing their earnings. Meanwhile, we find a positive and significant association 
between IFRS and earnings-management (β = 0.82, p < 0.05) suggesting no impact 
of the introduction of IFRS on the reduction of earnings-management level in 
emerging economy like Malaysia. However, perhaps it is too early to evaluate the 
impact of IFRS on earnings-management in Malaysia as full convergence of the 
existing Malaysian Reporting Standards and IFRS only take place in 2012 although 
the standards were revised to be virtually identical with IFRS in 2007. This result is 
consistent with findings in Rudra and Bhattacharjee (2012) in Indian markets. 
 
The results report an insignificant association between TACCLTA and earnings-
management and finally, as predicted, ANALYST negatively and significantly 
correlated to earnings-management (β = -0.55, p < 0.1) suggesting monitoring by 
financial analyst can help to curb earnings-management activities in firms by 
reducing information asymmetry between shareholders and managers. This finding is 
in line with Yu (2008) and Gavious (2007). 
 
 
The adjusted R-square statistics found in 2SLS regression of 28.07% (model 5) are 
higher than those reported in previous studies in Malaysia on the issue of earnings-
management. For example, studies on the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics (board and audit committee) and earnings-management by Mohd 
Saleh et al. (2005) and Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006) reported adjusted R-
square of 22.3% and 12.8% respectively. This suggests that taking into account 
different types of blockholders’ ownership and considering various related control 
variables improves the predictive power of the empirical model. In the meantime, 
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adjusted R-square using 2SLS regression is slightly lower than adjusted R-square 
reported in robust regression analysis. Interestingly, in robust regression analysis, the 
adjusted R-square shows a consistent trend where there are almost no between the 
models (model 1 to model 7) even though corporate governance variables (board and 
audit committee) are added to the control variables. Therefore in both regression 
(2SLS and robust regression), we found limited impact of corporate governance 
variables in mitigating earnings-management practices in firms.  
 
Table 5.18 (model 2 and model 4) also presents the results of control variables from 
the 2SLS regression of ownership stakes of blockholders and managerial ownership 
in listed firms. As expected, LAGROA is positively related to CONCENTRATION 
and MANSHARE (β = 0.55, p < 0.05) indicating previous year corporate 
performance influence shareholders’ investment behaviour where the better the 
financial performance, the higher ownership concentration both by blockholders and 
management. This in line with arguments in Demsetz and Lehn (1985) as well as 
Demsetz and and Villaonga (2001). On the other hand, loss making firms (LOSS) 
show a negative and significant relationship with CONCENTRATION (β = -2.29, p 
< 0.1) and MANSHARE (β = -2.51, p < 0.1) as investors become more selective in 
their investment decisions and might avoid firms that recorded losses.       
 
While both LIQUIDITY and DIVIDEND insignificantly related to 
CONCENTRATION and MANSHARE, our findings indicate that firm size is 
positively related to blockholders ownership concentration (β = 5.14, p < 0.01) and 
managerial ownership (β = 2.05, p < 0.01). This contradicts previous research into 
the relationship between firm size and (largely private) ownership concentration in 
developed market economies (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 
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2001), but is in line with previous research in emerging economies (Ang and Ding, 
2006; Le and Buck, 2011). As the existence of a high concentrated ownership is 
prevalence in emerging economies (Al Farooque, 2010) including Malaysia 
(Classens et al., 2000; Tam and Tan, 2007), this concentration on large firms is not 
surprising in the Malaysian context. 
 
As predicted, LEVERAGE is negatively and significantly related with 
CONCENTRATION (β = -0.05, p < 0.01) indicating effective monitoring role by 
creditors and risk rating agencies that have potential to reduce agency cost (Bolton 
and Scharfstein, 1990; Stultz, 1990). In this circumstance, there is no need for 
blockholders to hold high stakes. In the meantime, GROWTH significantly and 
negatively related to MANSHARE (β = -0.18, p < 0.1) suggesting the greater a 
company’s growth prospects, the more spreading its shares ownership partly because 
of the issuance of new shares to finance firm’s investment activities. Consistent to 
the agency theory that ownership concentration might solve agency problem related 
to free cash flow (Jensen, 1986), we find a positive and significant association 
between FCF and CONCENTRATION (β = 8.48, p < 0.01). Although the results 
suggest that FCF is statistically significant and negatively related to MANSHARE, 
the correlation coefficients are exceedingly low (β = -0.00, p < 0.01). Finally, we 
find that control variable related to COINVESTMENT reports a negative and 
significant relationship with CONCENTRATION (β = -5.43, p < 0.05) but a positive 
and significant relationship with MANSHARE (β = 7.92, p < 0.01). This suggests 
that while investment opportunities attract more investment by management, 
blockholders might react oppositely, as they fear that firms with more investment 
opportunities are more likely to engage in earnings-management (Chen, Elder and 
Hung, 2010; Jo and Kim, 2007).    
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5.3.4 Additional analysis and robustness checks
58
 
 
 
5.3.4.1 Alternative measures for earnings-management 
As previously discussed, our main measure of earnings-management is the modified 
Jones model (MJONES) which is widely used as a proxy of earnings-management 
due to its effectiveness in detecting earnings-management practices in firms 
(Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). Using various samples and assumptions to test 
various measures of earnings-management, Dechow et al. (1995) concluded that the 
MJONES provides the most powerful test of earnings-management. According to 
Islam et al. (2011) MJONES is designed among other to reduce the measurement 
error of discretionary accruals when discretion is applied over sale.  
 
 
However, to provide reasonable assurance that our main results are robust to various 
measure of discretionary accruals and to see whether the use of different measures 
of earnings-management have a significant different to our initial findings, we 
employed two more proxies of earnings-management which are the original cross 
sectional Jones model (JONES) and the Performance-adjusted discretionary 
accruals model (DAROA). The results of these three measures of earnings-
management are presented in Table 5-19.  
 
As showed, the results of the 2SLS regression relatively consistent across all 
measures of earnings-management. However, we noticed that while the direction of 
relationship (positive or negative) between variables used in the regression remain 
                                                          
58
 Although not reported in additional analysis, all the regressions in this section included variables 
years and industry dummies. 
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unchanged, some variables either lost significant level or become significant using 
other measures of earnings-management. This is particularly obvious when we 
compared the results between MJONES and DAROA. Our two control variables 
involved in this problem are BODMEET and DUALITY.  
 
 
Using MJONES and JONES models, the results of BODMEET are consistent with a 
negative and significant relationship (MJONES: β = -0.27, p<0.1; JONES: β = -
0.24, p<0.1). However, BODMEET lost its significance when DAROA is used as a 
measure of earnings-management. This implies that when DAROA is used as proxy 
earnings-management, the predictive ability of corporate governance variables 
related to BODMEET is less powerful in mitigating earnings-management practices 
in firms. DUALITY that shows insignificant relationship when measure with 
MJONES (β = 0.16, p>0.1) and JONES (β = 0.14, p>0.1) become significant when 
measure using DAROA (β = 0.19, p<0.1) suggesting the combination of Chairman 
and CEO is associated with higher earnings-management in a firm when firm’s 
performance accounted for in the calculation of earnings-management
59
. 
 
 
From this discussion, while we have some changes in significant level of two of our 
control variables, there are no changes in the direction of relationship among 
different measures of earnings-management. More importantly, the results of our 
main variables with regard to ownership structures are consistent in terms of 
direction or significant level across all measures of earnings-management. In 
addition, we found that the magnitude or coefficient value is qualitatively similar 
among the variables and the predictive power of our models is not much different. 
                                                          
59
 Unlike MJONES and JONES that are not include firm’s performance in their calculation, firm’s 
performance which is return on assets (ROA) is part of financial item included in the calculation of 
DAROA 
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Therefore, we conclude that our 2SLS results based on MJONES are robust to 
various measures of earnings-management. 
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TABLE 5-19: 
The results of alternative measures for earnings-management using 
2SLS regression estimator 
 
 
 
Variables 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
(1) 
MJONES 
(2) 
JONES 
(3) 
DAROA 
CONCENTRATION  0.06*** 
(2.73) 
0.04** 
(4.28) 
0.09** 
(0.64) 
PIF GLIC 0.17 
(5.84) 
0.16 
(0.43) 
0.14 
(0.36) 
FGLIC 0.37 
(3.11) 
0.28 
(2.21) 
0.34 
(0.53) 
SEDC 0.21** 
(5.46) 
0.16** 
(0.29) 
0.18** 
(0.47) 
PRIVATE  1.24** 
(0.54) 
1.39** 
(0.82) 
1.79** 
(3.34) 
MANSHARE 0.65*** 
(3.66) 
0.55*** 
(0.80) 
0.62*** 
(0.92) 
2
ND
 BLOCK 
 
-0.16** 
(-2.34) 
-0.14** 
(-1.46) 
-0.08** 
(-0.14) 
BODSIZE 
 
0.09 
(0.64) 
0.06 
(0.11) 
0.09 
(1.63) 
BODMEET 
 
-0.27* 
(-1.84) 
-0.24* 
(-0.68) 
-0.21 
(-2.14) 
BODINED (%) 
 
-0.02 
(-1.06) 
-0.04 
(-3.24) 
-0.03 
(-0.74) 
DUALITY 
 
0.16 
(0.23) 
0.14 
(1.48) 
0.19* 
(0.59) 
ACSIZE -0.15 
(-0.27) 
-0.18 
(-0.09) 
-0.10 
(-1.45) 
ACMEET -0.26 
(-1.12) 
-0.22 
(-0.10) 
-0.28 
(-0.36) 
ACINED 0.36 
(0.50) 
0.28 
(2.46) 
0.55 
(0.80) 
ACEXPERT -0.22* 
(-0.51) 
-0.24* 
(-0.12) 
-0.23* 
(-0.89) 
TASSETS 
 
2.31** 
(2.06) 
2.68** 
(0.89) 
2.13** 
(1.15) 
LAGROA 
 
-0.07** 
(-2.03) 
-0.09** 
(0.16) 
-0.08* 
(-1.08) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.05*** 
(2.72) 
0.04*** 
(0.40) 
0.04** 
(4.30) 
ANALYST 
 
-0.55* 
(-1.90) 
-0.61* 
(-2.35) 
-0.64* 
(-3.15) 
TACCLTA 
 
9.36 
(1.19) 
8.04 
(1.93) 
5.55 
(7.28) 
COINVESTMENT 
 
-3.08** 
(-2.13) 
-4.44** 
(-0.97) 
 
-3.20** 
(-29.60) 
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FCF 
 
0.00** 
(2.01) 
0.02** 
(0.20) 
0.00** 
(2.55) 
LOSS 13.83*** 
(6.66) 
10.37** 
(1.99) 
9.35** 
(5.37) 
BIG4 -0.37 
(-0.62) 
-0.61 
(-2.35) 
-0.44 
(-0.97) 
FIRMAGE 0.13*** 
(3.13) 
0.11*** 
(0.44) 
0.15*** 
(0.40) 
IFRS 0.82** 
(2.02) 
0.93** 
(0.14) 
0.62* 
(0.94) 
_cons 8.40*** 
(4.12) 
8.69*** 
(1.02) 
7.67*** 
(3.36) 
    
N 2696 2696 2696 
 
F-statistics 56.76 60.51 79.34 
 
PROB>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3677 0.3481 0.3714 
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate a significance level: *p < 0.1, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
 
5.3.4.2 Different regression estimators 
Due to the endogeneity problem, the main analyses were regressed using the 2SLS 
regression analysis. However, to provide reasonable assurance that our main findings 
are robust to the specifications of various regression estimators as well as benchmark 
for comparison, alternative regression estimators in addition to 2SLS presented in 
Table 5-20. Column (1) is the result of 2SLS regression, column (2) is the result of 
Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) regression and column (3) is the 
result of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).   
 
Generally, we find that the regression result using LIML and GMM estimators are 
consistent with our main findings in terms of the direction of the relationship as well 
as the coefficient value of predictors and control variables with earnings-
management. However, while the results for SEDC are similar in 2SLS and LIML 
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with 0.5 significant level, this variable losses its significance in the GMM regression. 
Overall, based on results of other regression estimators, we conclude that our main 
findings are robust to alternative regression estimators.   
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TABLE 5-20: 
The results of different regression estimators of firms’ earnings-
management, blockholders investment and control variables  
 
 
 
Variables 
DV=MJONES 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
(1) 
2SLS 
(2) 
LIML 
(3) 
GMM 
CONCENTRATION  0.06*** 
(2.73) 
0.06*** 
(2.71) 
0.05** 
(2.50) 
PIF GLIC 0.17 
(5.84) 
0.16 
(5.75) 
0.17 
(5.83) 
FGLIC 0.37 
(3.11) 
0.39 
(3.20) 
0.40 
(2.23) 
SEDC 0.21** 
(5.46) 
0.20** 
(5.35) 
0.22 
(5.51) 
PRIVATE  1.24** 
(0.54) 
1.28* 
(0.56) 
1.24* 
(0.54) 
MANSHARE 0.65*** 
(3.66) 
0.64*** 
(3.66) 
0.61*** 
(3.80) 
2
ND
 BLOCK 
 
-0.16** 
(-2.34) 
-0.15** 
(-2.33) 
-0.15** 
(-2.35) 
BODSIZE 
 
0.09 
(0.64) 
0.10 
(0.68) 
0.10 
(0.82) 
BODMEET 
 
-0.27* 
(-1.84) 
-0.27* 
(-1.84) 
-0.36** 
(-2.10) 
BODINED (%) 
 
-0.02 
(-1.06) 
-0.02 
(-1.04) 
-0.02 
(-1.12) 
DUALITY 
 
0.16 
(0.23) 
0.17 
(0.23) 
0.16 
(0.23) 
ACSIZE -0.15 
(-0.27) 
-0.14 
(-0.25) 
-0.14 
(-0.25) 
ACMEET -0.26 
(-1.12) 
-0.26 
(-1.10) 
-0.24 
(-1.07) 
ACINED 0.36 
(0.50) 
0.35 
(0.49) 
0.36 
(0.50) 
ACEXPERT -0.22* 
(-0.51) 
-0.21 
(-0.49) 
-0.21 
(-0.49) 
TASSETS 
 
2.31** 
(2.06) 
2.31** 
(2.06) 
2.30** 
(2.05) 
LAGROA 
 
-0.07** 
(-2.03) 
-0.07** 
(-2.02) 
-0.06** 
(-1.99) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.05*** 
(2.72) 
0.05*** 
(2.74) 
0.05*** 
(2.72) 
ANALYST 
 
-0.55* 
(-1.90) 
-0.55* 
(-1.90) 
-0.56* 
(-1.89) 
TACCLTA 
 
9.36 
(1.19) 
9.44 
(1.22) 
9.67 
(1.26) 
COINVESTMENT 
 
-3.08** 
(-2.13) 
-3.08** 
(-2.13) 
-3.07** 
(-2.12) 
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FCF 
 
0.00** 
(2.01) 
0.00** 
(2.01) 
0.00** 
(1.99) 
LOSS 13.83*** 
(6.66) 
12.81*** 
(6.02) 
13.64*** 
(6.54) 
BIG4 -0.37 
(-0.62) 
-0.36 
(-0.62) 
-0.33 
(-0.59) 
FIRMAGE 0.13*** 
(3.13) 
0.12*** 
(3.12) 
0.11*** 
(3.54) 
IFRS 0.82** 
(2.02) 
0.81** 
(2.02) 
0.79** 
(2.00) 
_cons 8.40*** 
(4.12) 
8.99*** 
(4.39) 
9.01*** 
(4.40) 
    
N 2696 2696 2696 
 
F-statistics 56.76 56.42 57.01 
 
PROB>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3677 0.3521 0.3689 
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate a significance level: *p < 0.1, **p < 
0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
 
5.3.4.3 Tests for the directions of earnings-management 
Previoulsy (Table 5-12), we conduct one sample T-test to check the existence of 
earnings-management practices among firms in our data set. Based on the results of 
pooled data, we find evidence that firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia 
in our study period manage their reported earnings upward (income-increasing 
earnings-management). However, the results of our test above do not provide 
information on the influence of industry types and years on earnings-management 
practices. This is particularly important as different industrie might act in different 
ways for their earnings-management practices. This information will provide valuable 
information particularly for investors. Therefore, to strengthen our evidence and to 
provide more detail information on earnings-management activities of listed firms in 
Malaysia, we performed a parametric t-test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
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(Wilcoxon test) on our three measures of earnings-management based on industry and 
years. 
 
5.3.4.3.1 The magnitude of earnings-management by industry 
Table 5-21 presents the direction of earnings-management by industry. For earnings-
management measure by MJONES model, five out of eight industries (construction, 
consumer products, infrastructure, properties and services) manage their earnings 
upward. This shows a positive sign of these industries with discretionary accruals 
that are significantly different from zero for the parametric t-test. The plantations 
industry also shows the same direction but the p-value is insignificant (p > 0.1). We 
find similar results on the directions of earnings-management in Wilcoxon test.   
 
Results of mean and median discretionary accruals measured using JONES model 
are not much different compared to MJONES model particularly on the nature of 
earnings-management activities as well as the significant level. However, the results 
show slight difference when we employed DAROA as proxy for earnings-
management. Using a parametric t-test, we find that five out of eight industries 
manage their earnings upward but only three of them significantly different from 
zero (consumer products, infrastructure and services). In Wilcoxon test, six out of 
eight industries show their discretionary accruals significantly different from zero but 
only four industries manage their earnings upward (construction, consumer products, 
infrastructure and services).      
 
From the results, we noticed that industrial products shows a consistent negative 
signed across all measures of earnings-management and for both tests the p-value 
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consistently show significantly different from zero. This shows that the industrial 
products industry was the only industry that manages their earnings downward 
(income-decreasing earnings-management). Among industries that manage their 
earnings upward, we find that companies in the infrastructure project industry 
category are the highest in managing their earnings followed by consumer and 
construction industries.  
 
Overall, we find evidence supporting our earlier findings that listed firms in Main 
Board of Bursa Malaysia from 2004 through 2008 managed their reporting earnings 
upward except those firms in industrial products industry.        
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TABLE 5-21: The magnitude of earnings-management by industry 
 
Year Parametric t-test Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
 
 Mean t-stat P Median z-stat P 
 
MJONES 
      
 
Construction 
 
0.0358 
 
4.0073 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0491 
 
5.193 
 
0.0000 
Consumer  0.0438 9.0402 0.0000 0.0442 9.957 0.0000 
Industrial -0.0216 -2.4968 0.0128 -0.0142 -3.850 0.0001 
Infrastructure 0.0477 3.8318 0.0006 0.0425 3.194 0.0014 
Plantations 0.0063 1.1454 0.2534 0.0067 0.573 0.5663 
Properties 0.0123 2.4701 0.0139 0.0060 2.479 0.0132 
Services 0.0215 4.6776 0.0000 0.0167 5.096 0.0000 
Technology -0.0117 -1.2918 0.2006 -0.0023 -1.069 0.2849 
 
JONES 
      
 
Construction 
 
0.0336 
 
3.8179 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0459 
 
5.088 
 
0.0000 
Consumer  0.0418 8.8838 0.0000 0.0441 9.900 0.0000 
Industrial -0.0207 -3.5379 0.0004 -0.0162 -4.360 0.0000 
Infrastructure 0.0457 3.5525 0.0013 0.0430 3.096 0.0020 
Plantations 0.0060 1.1152 0.2661 0.0050 0.555 0.5787 
Properties 0.0109 2.3111 0.0213 0.0044 2.070 0.0385 
Services 0.0195 4.3095 0.0000 0.0141 4.733 0.0000 
Technology -0.0109 -1.2747 0.2065 -0.0070 -1.306 0.1917 
 
DAROA 
      
 
Construction 
 
0.0233 
 
1.3226 
 
0.1875 
 
0.0224 
 
2.072 
 
0.0382 
Consumer  0.0222 1.3226 0.0000 0.0201 5.673 0.0000 
Industrial -0.0452 -4.9906 0.0000 -0.0288 -7.813 0.0000 
Infrastructure 0.1040 5.6921 0.0000 0.1257 4.056 0.0000 
Plantations -0.0072 -1.1801 0.2394 -0.0187 -1.907 0.0565 
Properties 0.0026 0.5336 0.5939 -0.0054 -0.103 0.9181 
Services 0.0177 3.8789 0.0001 0.0134 3.943 0.0001 
Technology -0.0021 -0.2574 0.7976 -0.0001 -0.311 0.7561 
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5.3.4.3.2 The magnitude of earnings-management by year 
Table 5-22 reports the direction of earnings-management by years. The results show 
the same mean and median direction as well as their significant values as different 
from zero for both MJONES and JONES models. The value of mean and median for 
the models is almost equally distributed among the years with the highest value for 
mean recorded in the year 2007 for both models (MJONES: 0.0301, p<0.01; JONES: 
0.0283, p<0.01). Similar trends can be seen in Wilcoxon test. 
 
Using DAROA as proxy of earnings-management, we find that both means and 
medians discretionary accruals significantly different from zero in the years of 2006 
and 2007. However, in terms of signed direction, mean and median discretionary 
accruals in both tests show different direction where in the year 2006 both mean and 
median show a negative direction but positive direction exhibit in the year of 2007.  
 
Interestingly, we find that in all three proxies of earnings-management models in 
2006 show a consistent negative direction both for t-test and Wilcoxon test with the 
mean and median of the year significantly different from zero. However, the years of 
2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008 consistently show positive directions in both tests. 
 
Overall, the result suggests that, earnings-management practices in firms in our data 
set does not influence by any individual year as indicate by no extreme values of 
mean and median discretionary accruals. Therefore, our earlier findings with regards 
to earnings-management practices as discussed above are robust from the effect of 
any individual year
60
.   
                                                          
60
 We also investigate whether the results of the pooled 2SLS regression might be biased by the results 
of any particular year by repeated the regression by individual years. Similar to this finding, we found 
our pooled regression does not influence by any individual year.  
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TABLE 5-22: The magnitude of earnings-management by year 
 
Year Parametric t-test Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
 
 Mean t-stat P Median z-stat P 
 
MJONES 
      
 
2004 
 
0.0216 
 
4.1409 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0243 
 
4.696 
 
0.0000 
 
2005 
 
0.0108 
 
2.2282 
 
0.0263 
 
0.0033 
 
1.888 
 
0.0591 
 
2006 
 
-0.0187 
 
-1.8025 
 
0.0720 
 
0.0024 
 
-1.493 
 
0.1353 
 
2007 
 
0.0301 
 
6.1274 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0295 
 
7.056 
 
0.0000 
 
2008 
 
0.0136 
 
3.1172 
 
0.0019 
 
0.0123 
 
3.524 
 
0.0004 
 
JONES 
      
 
2004 
 
0.0174 
 
3.5504 
 
0.0004 
 
0.0204 
 
3.785 
 
0.0002 
 
2005 
 
0.0077 
 
1.6862 
 
0.0923 
 
0.0026 
 
1.452 
 
0.1464 
 
2006 
 
-0.0147 
 
-2.1494 
 
0.0320 
 
0.0004 
 
-1.662 
 
0.0964 
 
2007 
 
0.0283 
 
5.8573 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0271 
 
6.874 
 
0.0000 
 
2008 
 
0.0135 
 
3.2635 
 
0.0012 
 
0.0095 
 
3.746 
 
0.0002 
 
DAROA 
      
 
2004 
 
0.0082 
 
1.5616 
 
0.1190 
 
0.0084 
 
1.262 
 
0.2071 
 
2005 
 
0.0004 
 
0.0976 
 
0.9223 
 
-0.0068 
 
-1.048 
 
0.2948 
 
2006 
 
-0.0489 
 
-3.9948 
 
0.0001 
 
-0.0236 
 
-7.448 
 
0.0000 
 
2007 
 
0.0285 
 
5.9844 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0272 
 
7.098 
 
0.0000 
 
2008 
 
0.0040 
 
0.9315 
 
0.3520 
 
0.0014 
 
0.738 
 
0.4602 
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5.3.4.4 New definitions for board and audit committee variables 
Our main findings suggest that board and audit committee variables have little 
impact on earnings-management as only BODMEET and ACEXPERT has 
weakness link with earnings-management (P < 0.1). As previously highlighted, in 
the main analysis we used actual number of board size and board meeting as well as 
proportion of independent directors on board to define the board variables. The 
same method is used to audit committee variables except we add one more variable 
which is ACEXPERT measured by the proportion of audit committee members with 
an accounting or finance background to the total audit committee size. 
 
In order to examine whether our main results are robust to the new variables 
definitions related to board and audit committee characteristics, we provide 
alternative definitions. The other variables remain unchanged. Following Katmun 
(2012), the new definitions for board characteristics are as follows; 
i) Board size: coded as “1” when the numbers of members on the board below the 
median and “0” otherwise. The new acronym for this variable is BODSIZE1 to 
differentiate it with acronym in other tests; 
ii) Board meeting: coded as “1” when board meeting frequency is above the median 
and “0” otherwise. The new acronym for this variable is BODMEET1 to 
differentiate it with acronym in other tests; and 
iii) Board independent: coded as “1” if the percentage of independent directors on 
the board is more than 50% and “0” otherwise. The new acronym for this variable is 
BODINED1 to differentiate it with acronym in other tests. 
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Meanwhile, following Abbott et al. (2003) and Zaman et al. (2011), the new 
definitions for audit committee characteristics are as follows: 
i) Audit committee size: coded as “1” when the numbers of members in the audit 
committee is three or more and “0” otherwise.  The new acronym for this variable is 
ACSIZE1 to differentiate it with acronym in other tests; 
ii) Audit committee meeting: coded as “1” when the numbers of meetings is three or 
more and “0” otherwise.  The new acronym for this variable is ACMEET1 to 
differentiate it with acronym in other tests; 
iii) Audit committee independence: coded as “1” when the audit committee 
comprised entirely of independent directors and “0” otherwise.  The new acronym 
for this variable is ACINED1 to differentiate it with acronym in other tests; 
iv) Audit committee financial expertise: coded as “1” when at least one member of 
the committee having financial expertise and “0” otherwise.   The new acronym for 
this variable is ACEXPERT1 to differentiate it with acronym in other tests; 
 
Table 5-23 reports the results of regression using the redefined corporate 
governance variables as stated above. Overall the regression results with this 
alternatives definition are relatively consistent to those reported in the main findings 
in terms of the direction of relationship (positive or negative sign) to earnings-
management as well as the magnitude of coefficient value. Therefore, we conclude 
that the main findings are robust to the alternatives definitions of board and audit 
committee and this strengthen our earlier argument that in the context of emerging 
markets like Malaysia, corporate governance variables have little impact in 
mitigating earnings-management practices in firms. 
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TABLE 5-23: 
The comparison of regression results between main findings and new 
definitions for board and audit committee using 2SLS regression 
estimator 
 
 
Variables 
The results of 
main findings 
Redefined 
corporate 
governance variables 
 
The results of 
redefined corporate 
governance 
measures 
CONCENTRATION  0.06*** 
(2.73) 
CONCENTRATION  0.08*** 
(4.21) 
PIF GLIC 0.17 
(5.84) 
PIF GLIC 0.13 
(1.73) 
FGLIC 0.37 
(3.11) 
FGLIC 0.35 
(2.92) 
SEDC 0.21** 
(5.46) 
SEDC 0.20** 
(0.59) 
PRIVATE  1.24** 
(0.54) 
PRIVATE  1.37** 
(1.29) 
MANSHARE 0.65*** 
(3.66) 
MANSHARE 0.57*** 
(0.88) 
2
ND
 BLOCK 
 
-0.16** 
(-2.34) 
2
ND
 BLOCK 
 
-0.14** 
(-1.05) 
BODSIZE 
 
0.09 
(0.64) 
BODSIZE1 
 
0.09 
(0.86) 
BODMEET 
 
-0.27* 
(-1.84) 
BODMEET1 
 
-0.25* 
(-2.41) 
BODINED  
 
-0.02 
(-1.06) 
BODINED1 
 
-0.02 
(-1.75) 
DUALITY 
 
0.16 
(0.23) 
DUALITY 
 
0.19 
(2.26) 
ACSIZE -0.15 
(-0.27) 
ACSIZE 1 -0.17 
(-1.66) 
ACMEET -0.26 
(-1.12) 
ACMEET1 -0.23 
(-0.97) 
ACINED 0.36 
(0.50) 
ACINED1 0.44 
(2.29) 
ACEXPERT -0.22* 
(-0.51) 
ACEXPERT1 -0.26** 
(-0.55) 
TASSETS 
 
2.31** 
(2.06) 
TASSETS 
 
2.91** 
(0.35) 
LAGROA 
 
-0.07** 
(-2.03) 
LAGROA 
 
-0.05** 
(-1.18) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.05*** 
(2.72) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.06*** 
(0.48) 
ANALYST 
 
-0.55* 
(-1.90) 
ANALYST 
 
-0.77* 
(-1.96) 
 
TACCLTA 
 
9.36 
(1.19) 
 
 
TACCLTA 
 
10.08 
(2.26) 
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COINVESTMENT 
 
-3.08** 
(-2.13) 
COINVESTMENT 
 
-4.27** 
(-1.97) 
FCF 
 
0.00** 
(2.01) 
FCF 
 
0.01** 
(0.91) 
LOSS 13.83*** 
(6.66) 
LOSS 12.14*** 
(1.87) 
BIG4 -0.37 
(-0.62) 
BIG4 -0.35 
(-2.86) 
FIRMAGE 0.13*** 
(3.13) 
FIRMAGE 0.16*** 
(0.66) 
IFRS 0.82** 
(2.02) 
IFRS 0.92** 
(1.16) 
_cons 8.40*** 
(4.12) 
_cons 10.87*** 
(2.64) 
    
N 2696 N 2696 
F-statistics 56.76 F-statistics 54.43 
PROB>F 0.0000 PROB>F 0.0000 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3677 Adjusted R
2
 0.3621 
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate a significance level: *p < 0.1, **p < 
0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
In this empirical project, we investigate whether GLCs with different types of 
controlling GLIC owners engage in more or less earnings-management and more 
generally whether GLCs engage in more or less earnings-management than firms 
which are not controlled by government investors. In addition, as one of the main 
characteristics of listed firms in Malaysia is the existence of highly concentrated 
ownership (Claessens et al., 2000; Tam and Tan, 2007) that can trigger a conflict of 
interest between controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders, we also 
investigate whether block ownership by blockholders and/or management impact 
earnings-management practices in the firms they invest in.     
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The issues highlighted above are vital ones in today’s competitive Asian economic 
environment. Good corporate governance is essential for building an attractive 
investment climate. For many investors, the quality of financial reports is central to 
their investment decisions (OECD White Paper, 2003). In this context, the Malaysian 
government explicitly expects its federal GLICs to facilitate good corporate 
governance and minority shareholders protection in their portfolio companies 
(Malaysia Monistry of Finance, 2010; Malaysia Putrajaya Committee on GLC High 
Performance, 2006a; 2006b).        
 
By focusing on firms that are listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia from 2004 
to 2008 (2696 firm-year observations), we provide evidence that overall, firms in our 
sample indeed manage their reported earnings upward (income increasing earnings-
management). However, we do not have sufficient evidence to support our main 
hypotheses that earnings-management practices higher in GLCs controlled by state 
GLICs than GLCs controlled by federal GLICs or GLCs controlled by pension and 
investment fund GLICs. Therefore, our suspicion that capital market participants 
might discount accounting information published by GLCs due to earnings-
management practices is unfounded and cannot be proven empirically. This may be 
driven by effective monitoring mechanisms imposed by GLICs in line with 
government efforts to promote good corporate governance practices in GLCs, in order 
to attract foreign investment inflows to Malaysian capital markets.   
 
In fact, we have clear evidence to support our following prediction that firms owned 
by private blockholders engage in earnings-management activities at a higher 
magnitude than GLCs owned by government blockholders. This finding is consistent 
with previous studies in other markets such as Ding et al. (2007) and Wang and Yung 
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(2011), both in China markets. In spite of this, in Malaysia, our result is opposite to 
Yen et al. (2007) who found that earnings-management practices are lower in the firms 
owned by Chinese family-linked companies than GLCs. One possible explanation is 
the different in time period under examination and more importantly the different in 
sample selection between our study and their research. In this regard, Yen et al. (2007) 
employed limited number of GLCs at federal level while we included all GLCs at 
federal and state levels. But the more obvious difference from our study is that they 
included finance-related companies in their sample, which may affect the results, as 
various studies in earnings-management exclude finance-related companies due to 
different compliance and and regulations (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ab Razak et al., 
2011) and more importantly their behaviour of accruals differs from other industries 
(Klein, 2002; Park and Shin, 2004; Mohd Ali et. al, 2008). 
 
We also document to what extent ownership concentration by blockholders and 
managerial ownership impact earnings-management practices of firms in our sample. 
In line with the property rights and agency hypothesis, we provide evidence that the 
higher the degree of share ownership by blockholders, the greater the incentive and 
ability for them to participate in the supervision and control of firm’s management 
which ultimately helps in mitigating earnings-management practices as we found in 
this study.  This suggests that at high level of ownership, blockholders are more likely 
to seek to preserve future growth potential by minimising earnings-management 
practices in the firms they invested in. 
 
However, contrary to the incentive alignment effect of managers, we found that when 
the share ownership is in the hand of management (managerial ownership), they 
become ineffective in taking value-maximizing decisions and in the context of our 
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study we provide evidence that managerial ownership indeed increase earnings-
management practices in firms. This in line with argument in Morck et al. (1988) that 
greater managerial ownership would provide management with deeper entrenchment 
and therefore greater scope of opportunistic behaviour.         
 
Our analysis also shows limited influence of corporate governance mechanisms in 
mitigating earnings-management activities in listed firms. While this finding is 
consistent to the previous studies in Malaysia, for example by Abdul Rahman and 
Mohamed Ali (2006), the results are quite alarming as they undermine the relentless 
effort by government and regulators to promote corporate governance best practices 
among listed firms in Malaysia. The insignificant role of most of the audit committee 
characteristics (except for audit committee financial expertise) indicating that the 
compulsory establishment of audit committee in listed firms has yet to achieve its 
intended goals that among other is to oversee the financial reporting process.  
 
With regards to interaction effect, our analysis also provides evidence that there is a 
substitutive relationship between blockholders ownership concentration and internal 
corporate governance mechanisms in reducing earnings-management activities in 
firms. This suggests a constructive and dominant role of blockholders in firms to 
combat earnings-management activities that are in line with our earlier results.   
 
Finally, our research also indicates that external monitoring mechanisms have mixed 
effects to earnings-management practices in firms. We provide evidence that the 
number of analysts following a firm indeed contributes in mitigating earnings-
management. However, the used of IFRS in financial reporting in actual fact does not 
help in curbing earnings-management. There are two possible explanation for these 
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issues, namely whether it is due to the acceptance of IFRS are not yet comprehensive 
among listed firms in Malaysia or the standards itself not sufficiently effective to help 
in reducing earnings-management practices in financial reporting. In the meantime, we 
do not have enough evidence to support our prediction that the presence of well-
qualified auditor among Big-4 audit firms helps in preventing earnings 
misrepresentation in firms’ financial reports as the relationship is insignificant.  
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis is divided into two major projects. Whereas the first research project 
considers differences in the impact of government investment institutions, golden 
shares and board from senior civil servants and politicians on firm performance, the 
second research project focuses on how government ownership affects corporate 
reporting practices, in particular earnings-management. This examines not only 
different types of government investment organisations but different impacts on 
private blockholders.   
 
Research into the impact of government ownership on different government 
investment organisations on corporate performance and corporate governance (in 
particular, corporate reporting and therefore transparency) is particularly important 
for the economic development of emerging economies, in particular Malaysia. This 
is because improvements in the corporate governance of GLCs are expected to 
facilitate not only economic efficiency gains for individual firms but also help attract 
foreign investors and domestics depositors to Malaysian capital markets. In turn, this 
may improve domestic firms’ access to outside capital important for their growth. 
Limited access to external funds is frequently identified as one of the key problems 
which hamper the economic development of emerging economies both at national 
and firm level.     
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6.1 First project: ownership structure and performance 
The first project intends to examine the impact of GLICs per se and GLCs ownership 
structures on GLCs corporate performance measured by accounting performance 
(returns on assets and return on equity) and market performance (quasi Tobin’s Q). 
The influence of politicians and senior civil servants on the board of GLCs and the 
potential of reverse causality between ownership and performance were also 
investigated. The sample is comprised of 224 firm-year observations of GLCs listed 
in the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia during the year since 2004 to 2008.    
 
The results of statistical tests revealed that the impact of government control via 
block ownership varies depending on the type of organizations, which manages the 
government’s ownership stakes. In detail, we found that portfolio companies of 
government investment organisations that are further away from the centre, such as 
SEDCs, have a worse financial performance than those owned by more tightly 
supervised government investment organisations. However, contrary to our 
prediction, we found inconclusive findings regarding whether GLCs controlled by 
PIF GLIC outperform those controlled by FGLIC that raises the possibility that the 
supervision by powerful neutral regulators might be an effective substitute for the 
limited economic supervision incentives of board members in FGLIC boards.  
 
We also provide evidence that GLCs with golden share provisions outperform GLCs 
without suggesting GLICs might act as boundary spanners for this kind of firms and 
provide access to government resources, government contracts and advice or 
sympathy from regulators. With regard to ownership concentration of GLICs, our 
research indicates that a higher proportion of GLIC ownership is beneficial for GLC 
performance, suggesting higher degree of share ownership provide greater incentive 
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and ability for GLICs to participate in the supervision and control of GLCs’ 
management. 
 
In the meantime, board membership by politicians and senior civil servants appears 
to affect the financial performance of GLCs negatively indicating their potential to 
be a boundary spanners to resources does not appear to compensate for their limited 
or detrimental impact on the supervision and control of GLCs. We also document the 
limited impact of corporate governance variables related to board characteristics on 
performance. 
 
In relation to the potential of reverse causality effects between ownership and 
performance, we found that although results suggest that GLIC ownership is 
statistically significant and positively related to firm performance, with regards to 
ROA and ROE, the correlation coefficients are exceedingly low.  This indicates that 
a higher proportion of GLIC ownership is beneficial for GLC performance, not that 
GLICs tend to shift their portfolio towards better performing GLCs. The analysis 
results also suggest that golden share provisions do substitute for GLIC ownership 
concentration; however, there appears to be no similar substitution effect between 
board membership of senior civil servants and politicians and GLIC ownership 
concentration. Rather, GLICs tend to invest particularly in companies with a high 
degree of board membership by senior civil servants and politicians. 
 
Overall, our results for the first project demonstrate that the government investment 
organisations are able to impact positively on the corporate performance of their 
portfolio companies. In addition, they also reveal that different government 
investment organizations have different control structures that determine the level of 
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influence by government. This new knowledge contributes to better understanding on 
GLCs particularly for foreign direct and portfolio investment. As the government 
encouraging the mobilisation of private domestic savings as well as foreign direct 
and portfolio investment to improve domestic firms’ access to outside capital, this 
study might be useful in providing a new perspective on the role of government 
investment from an emerging markets viewpoint.  
 
6.1.1 Contribution of the study 
 
This study contributes to the literature on the effect of government ownership in the 
performance of GLCs in Malaysia in several ways: 
 
1. This study contributes to literature by answering the key question of whether 
different types of government investment organizations with different 
objective and control structures have differing impacts on the corporate 
performance of their portfolio companies. This is important because, 
depending on the objectives of the government investment organizations and 
their influence to pursue those objectives (such as through their representative 
on the board of directors), government ownership and control rights are likely 
to influence the performance of their portfolio companies in a variety of 
ways, which might be beneficial or detrimental to private investors' interests. 
For example, knowing the GLCs under which GLICs perform better or worse, 
capital market participants can make more informed decisions on their 
investments in GLCs and thus can protect their interests; 
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2. This study is relevant as it is the first study in Malaysia that investigates the 
government ownership-performance by taking into account differences in 
organizational objectives and control structure of different GLICs and its 
impact on performance of their portfolio companies. The findings from this 
study contribute to a richer literature in this area and can be a stepping stone 
for other researchers or academics to conduct further research in this area.  
 
 
3. This study contributes to knowledge regarding whether direct and indirect 
participation of senior civil servants and politicians on the boards of directors 
of GLCs in Malaysia affects their financial performance. This information 
will be very useful not only to foreign investors in their investment decision 
process but for the GLICs themselves where it helps them in determining the 
appropriate combinations of board membership in GLCs as well as its 
leadership structure. Considering the big contribution of GLCs on Malaysian 
economy as previously discussed, improving performance of GLCs through 
better corporate governance mechanisms would also have a far-reaching 
effect on the performance of the economic sector as a whole.  
 
4. This research shows that the government investment organisations are able to 
have a positive impact on the corporate performance of their portfolio 
companies. In addition, it also reveals that different government investment 
organizations have different control structures that determined the level of 
influence by the government. This new knowledge contributes to better 
understanding on GLCs particularly for foreign direct and portfolio 
investment. As the government encourages the mobilisation of private 
domestic savings as well as foreign direct and portfolio investment to 
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improve domestic firms’ access to outside capital, this study might be useful 
in attracting private investments into the stock market. 
 
 
6.1.2 Limitations of the study and recommendations for future research 
 
 
This study has several limitations and recommendations for future research: 
 
1. As our study only considers corporate governance to protect minority 
shareholder interests in relation to financial performance, the government 
cannot use our findings to find out about how effective GLCs support its 
policies related to employment and social objectives. We therefore 
recommend future research to cover this area.      
 
2. Our results show a positive and significant association between golden share 
provisions and corporate performance across all performance measures. This 
might indicate that GLCs with golden shares benefit from financial support, 
preferential access to government contracts, or tight supervision of 
management by relevant ministries, the Auditor General and the Putrajaya 
Committee on GLC High Performance. We are unfortunately not able to 
differentiate to what degree the impact of golden shares on the performance 
of GLCs is related to increased management control by the MOF Inc. or the 
MOF Inc’s ability to act as a boundary spanner to government resources. For 
future research, a deeper study on the extent of government special treatments 
(e.g. what types of assistance provided by the government) mentioned above 
to GLCs with golden shares will provide more useful information especially 
to investors.  
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3. In this study, we consider that the economic incentives of government 
representatives to engage in effective control are limited as their remuneration 
is not directly tied to the performance of the GLCs.  The research could be 
extended by a more careful differentiation of performance incentives of 
government representatives, both at GLIC and GLC level. This would be 
beneficial to improve our understanding on the role of government 
representatives in government-linked investment companies and their 
portfolio firms.  
 
4. One important limitation on our study is exclusion of the listed firms owned 
by private blockholders; for those, we are only able to compare the 
performance of GLCs based on their different ownership structure. However, 
it is not unintentional as the main purpose of the paper is to consider whether 
different government investment organisations differ with regard to among 
other on their protection of minority shareholder interests, the study that 
never be conducted in Malaysia, by far. This is of interest both to the 
government, which expects GLICs to further corporate governance and 
corporate financial performance of GLCs, and for portfolio investors, who in 
an environment with poor enforcement of minority shareholder rights might 
be attracted to partly government owned companies.  Private investors may 
expect the risk of exploitation there to be lower than in companies dominated 
by private blockholders. However, for future research we strongly encourage 
researchers to consider firms owned by private blockholders for a richer 
theoretical and empirical analysis as well as to show if there is better 
governance and performance in the former compared to the latter. 
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5. This study is based on secondary data collected from annual reports and 
downloaded from electronic sources. For future research, qualitative methods 
such as semi-structured interviews with the CEOs of various GLICs and 
GLCs as well as policy makers in MOF Inc. might be useful to get a better 
understanding of GLICs role and involvement in their portfolio companies.  
 
6. Future research using different datasets, different measures of performance 
and perhaps in different countries should consider to employ similar 
approaches as used in this study when they deal with the issue of government 
ownership. Differences in economic systems, corporate governance structures 
of government investment authorities and their portfolio companies might 
produce different results. Moreover, most government investment, 
particularly in emerging economies, is controlled by a range of government 
organisations that invest on behalf of the government. Combining all 
government-linked companies with different objectives and control structures 
in one group of ownership does not render the real impact of government 
ownership in firms.    
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6.2 Second project: ownership structure and earnings-management 
Our second project was motivated from the results of the first project. In the first 
project, measuring corporate performance using accounting (return on assets and 
return on equity) and market performance data (quasi-Tobin’s Q), the research 
showed consistent results. However, the impact of different GLICs on their portfolio 
firms’ performance appeared much more pronounced when performance was 
measured with accounting performance data rather than market performance data.  
 
 
One potential reason for this might be that capital market participants discount 
accounting information published by GLCs, as they may be perceived to be prone to 
misstate their accounts in order to manipulate public perception of their performance. 
This raised the question whether GLCs with different types of controlling GLIC 
owners (government blockholders) engage more or less in earnings-management, 
and more generally whether GLCs engage more or less in earnings-management than 
firms which are not controlled by government investors. We investigated these issues 
and in addition also examined the influence of ownership concentration by 
blockholders as well as managerial ownership on earnings-management practices in 
firms they invested in.  The possible complementary or substitutive link between 
ownership and corporate governance variables were also observed.   
 
 
We employed sample firms that are listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia from 
2004 to 2008 (2696 firm-year observations). As our preliminary regression results 
suffer from an endogeneity problem, the simultaneous relationship between 
ownership and earnings-management is taken into account that is based on 2SLS 
regression analysis. We provide evidence that overall firms in our sample indeed 
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manage their reported earnings upward. However, contrary to our prediction that 
earnings-management practices higher is in GLCs owned by SEDCs than GLCs 
owned by federal GLICs and GLCs owned by FGLIC engage more in earnings-
management than GLCs owned by PIF GLIC, we do not have sufficient evidence to 
support the claims. Nevertheless, we have enough evidence to support our prediction 
that firms owned by private blockholders engage in earnings-management activities 
at higher magnitude than GLCs owned by government blockholders. 
 
 
In relation to blockholders ownership concentration, we found that the higher the 
degree of share ownership by blockholders, the greater the incentive and ability for 
them to participate in the supervision and control of firm’s management, which 
ultimately helps in mitigating earnings-management practices. This shows by a 
negative association between blockholders ownership concentration and earnings-
management.  On the contrary, we report that when the share ownership is in the 
hand of management (managerial ownership), they become ineffective in taking 
value-maximizing decisions. In the context of our study we provide evidence that 
managerial ownership indeed increases earnings-management practices in firms.  
 
The second project also demonstrates limited influence of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms in mitigating earnings-management activities in listed firms 
which is consistent to our findings in the first project. The insignificant role of most 
of the audit committee characteristics for example indicating that the compulsory 
establishment of audit committee in listed firms has yet to achieve its intended goals 
that among other is to oversee the financial reporting process. In the meantime, 
external monitoring mechanisms have mixed effects to earnings-management 
practices in firms. While we found the number of analysts following indeed 
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contributing in mitigating earnings-management, we do not have enough evidence to 
support our prediction that the appointment of well-qualified auditors from Big-4 
audit firms help in preventing earnings misrepresentation in firms’ financial reports 
as the relationship is insignificant. Similarly, we found the used of IFRS in financial 
reporting does not help curb earnings-management.  
 
Overall, our results for the second project demonstrate that our suspicion that the 
capital market participants might discount accounting information published by 
GLCs due to earnings-management practices is unfounded and cannot be proven 
empirically. This may be driven by the effective monitoring mechanisms imposed by 
GLICs as well as various government agencies which are in line with government 
efforts to promote good corporate governance practices in GLCs in order to attract 
foreign investment inflows to Malaysian capital markets. Related to this, we provide 
evidence that in the context of Malaysia, equity ownership by blockholders actually 
helps to minimize earnings-management practices in firms while managerial 
ownership actually leads to expropriation of minority shareholders interests. This 
project might benefit in providing a new perspective on the role and impact of the 
presence of blockholders in listed firms from an emerging markets viewpoint.  
 
6.2.1 The contribution of the study 
 
This study contributes to the literature on the effect of ownership structures on the 
earnings-management practices of listed firms in Malaysia in several ways: 
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1. This study contributes to the new knowledge by answering the important 
question of whether different types of government investment organizations with 
different objective and control structures have different impacts on the earnings-
management practices of their portfolio companies. This is important because, 
depending on the objectives of the government investment organizations and 
their influence to pursue those objectives, government ownership and control 
rights are likely to influence the earnings-management practices of their 
portfolio companies in a variety of ways, which might be beneficial or 
detrimental to private investors' interests. We also provide evidence on earnings-
management practices in listed firms owned by private blockholders that in 
actual fact is much higher than GLCs. Using this information, capital market 
participants can make more informed decisions on their investments in listed 
firms in Malaysia and thus protect their interests; 
 
 
2. This study is relevant as it is the first study in Malaysia that investigates the 
government ownership-earnings-management by taking into account the 
differences in organizational objectives and control structure of different GLICs 
and its impact on earnings-management of their portfolio companies. The 
findings from this study contribute to the literature in this area and may be a 
stepping stone for other researchers or academics to conduct further research in 
this area; 
 
 
3. As far we know, this is the first study that takes into account the endogeneity 
problem in the relationship between ownership structure and earnings-
management and also provides solutions to these issues. This is important as this 
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study may “start the ball rolling” for more researchers to be conducted in the 
future;      
 
4. This research is useful to GLICs as it may be used to introduce more effective 
control mechanisms in their portfolio companies in accordance with their 
mandate to encourage best corporate governance practices in line with 
government efforts to attract more investment into Malaysian capital markets. In 
addition, the regulators such as Securities Commission Malaysia and Bursa 
Malaysia might benefit from this research as they can make use the information 
to formulate more effective regulations and law in order to minimize earnings-
management activities in the firms’ financial reporting. This eventually will give 
greater confidence to investors, particularly to foreign portfolio investment 
companies, and thus improving domestics firms’ access to outside capital. 
 
 
6.2.2 Limitations of the study and recommendations for future research 
 
This study has several limitations and recommendations for future research: 
 
 
1.  This study considered all listed firms controlled by blockholders other than 
GLICs as private blockholders. This is mainly because of our focuses on GLCs 
as continuation from our first study on the impact of GLICs on performance of 
GLCs. However, future researchers might want to separate the private 
blockholders according to their largest shareholders such as family ownership, 
institutional ownership etc. 
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2.  Another limitation of this study is the use of discretionary accruals as proxy for 
earnings-management. Future researchers might also want to consider other 
types of earnings manipulation such as through related-party transaction or 
tunnelling activities among listed companies in Malaysia; 
 
3. This study relied on secondary data collected from annual reports and 
downloaded from electronic sources. For future research, qualitative method 
such as questionnaire or open interview with key figures of GLICs for example 
might be useful to obtain more accurate picture in examining the effectiveness of 
blockholders in constraining earnings-management practices in their portfolio 
companies so that the researcher become more aware of the secluded side of the 
relationship or influence, if relevant; 
 
4. This study focuses on the magnitude (absolute value of discretionary accruals) 
rather than the motives of earnings-management. For future research, the 
motives behind earnings-management (income increasing, income decreasing or 
earnings smoothing) can be considered to obtain detail information on the 
motives behind earnings-management practices for a deeper and richer 
knowledge in the area of study. 
 
5. The potential of endogeneity in the form of simultaneity between ownership and 
earnings-management as discussed in this study is not properly captured. 
However, the issue is worthy of exploration, given there is lack of research in 
this issue. We used a 2SLS regression estimator to deal with this issue even 
though it is uncertain to what extent this problem is actually solved in the model. 
According to Coles et al. (2007), the available solutions to endogeneity so far 
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fail to provide definite or pure solution to the problem. Future research could 
investigate this relationship using a more detail statistical analysis such as the 
use of instrumental variables to provide a better understanding of the interplay 
between ownership and earnings-management.         
 
6. Future researchers should consider employing similar approaches to those used 
in this study when dealing with the issue of government ownership. This is 
because most government investments, particularly in emerging economies, are 
controlled by a range of government organisations that invest on behalf of 
government. Combining all government-linked companies with different 
objectives and control structures in one group of ownership does not render the 
real impact of government ownership in firms.    
 
6.3 Overall conclusion: ownership structure, performance and earnings-
management 
Overall, when results are taken together, this study highlights several main 
observations. First, it demonstrates that the impact of GLICs per se is matter to the 
performance and earnings-management of their portfolio companies. This is 
particularly true because while GLICs have a positive impact on the corporate 
performance of GLCs, at the same time they also help to minimize earnings-
management practices in those firms, as shown by lower earnings-management in 
GLCs than private firms.  
 
Second, while portfolio companies of government investment organisations more 
remote from the centre, such as SEDCs, have a worse financial performance than 
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those owned by more tightly supervised government investment organisations, it is 
not to the extent of encouraging them to be involved in earnings manipulation. One 
possible explanation for this is that the limited number of GLCs under this category 
might facilitate monitoring activities by SEDCs. In addition, the fear of political 
repercussions that could affect political career can also be the reason. This is 
because, with small numbers of listed GLCs in one particular state, any issues that 
arise will become a big and sensational issue. Therefore, the politicians who control 
GLCs will be more careful and will try to avoid the firms becoming involved in 
inappropriate activities, including earnings-management practices. 
 
Third, while past studies (see Leuz et al., 2003; Gopalan and Jayaraman, 2012)  
suggest that there are more incentive to manipulate earnings in the country of which 
the ownership concentration is higher and weak investor protection, this is not 
necessarily true in the contact of blockholders in Malaysia. This is because while we 
demonstrated that ownership concentration by government blockholders positively 
impact GLCs’ corporate performance in the first project, blockholders ownership 
concentration also helps in minimizing earnings-management in all type of listed 
companies (GLCs and non-GLCs) in our second project. This suggests the 
constructive contribution of concentrated ownership in the context of emerging 
markets that can help in reducing information asymmetry in firms and in line with 
argument that higher ownership concentration is to compensate weak investor 
protection (Haniffa  and Hudaib, 2006), not to expropriate the minority shareholders. 
  
Finally, as discussed above, corporate governance variables consistently show 
limited influence on corporate performance as well as weak influence in mitigating 
earnings-management practices. This implies that the efforts to improve corporate 
governance mechanisms in Malaysia are yet to achieve its intended goals and 
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perhaps given less attention by listed firms. Therefore, continued effort is needed to 
improve corporate governance in Malaysia for the benefit of investors in particular as 
well as Malaysian capital markets in general. 
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APPENDIXES 
Appendix 1 
Detail definition of independent director based on Bursa Malaysia Main Market 
Listing Requirement (copied directly from the source) 
Independent director means a director who is independent of management and free from any 
business or other relationship which could interfere with the exercise of independent 
judgement or the ability to act in the best interests of an applicant or a listed issuer. Without 
limiting the generality of the foregoing, an independent director is one who -  
(a) is not an executive director of the applicant, listed issuer or any related corporation of 
such applicant or listed issuer (each corporation is referred to as “said Corporation”);  
(b) has not been within the last 2 years and is not an officer (except as a non-executive 
director) of the said Corporation. For this purpose, “officer” has the meaning given in section 
4 of the Companies Act 1965;  
(c) is not a major shareholder the said Corporation;  
(d) is not a family member of any executive director, officer or major shareholder of the said 
Corporation;  
(e) is not acting as a nominee or representative of any executive director or major 
shareholder of the said Corporation;  
(f) has not been engaged as an adviser by the said Corporation under such circumstances as 
prescribed by the Exchange or is not presently a partner, director (except as an independent 
director) or major shareholder, as the case may be, of a firm or corporation which provides 
professional advisory services to the said Corporation under such circumstances as 
prescribed by the Exchange; or  
(g) has not engaged in any transaction with the said Corporation under such circumstances as 
prescribed by the Exchange or is not presently a partner, director or major shareholder, as the 
case may be, of a firm or corporation (other than subsidiaries of the applicant or listed issuer) 
which has engaged in any transaction with the said Corporation under such circumstances as 
prescribed by the Exchange.  
 
 
 
 
 
